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PREFACE 
It has never been more important that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) On-
Scene Coordinators (OSCs) be prepared to respond to incidents involving radiological releases.  
The ruthlessness of the September 11 attacks, and the willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their 
lives to achieve their objectives, creates a new dimension in the fight against terrorism.  In 
particular, experts are concerned that a “dirty bomb” event, in which a conventional explosive is 
used to disperse radioactive material, is almost certain to occur at some time.  The great number 
of orphaned radioactive sources (i.e., sources that have fallen outside regulatory control) both 
within and outside the U.S. creates an increased threat of terrorist incidents involving radio­
logical releases and increases the risk of non-terrorist incidents in which EPA must ensure that 
the public health is protected. 
The purpose of this document is to provide EPA OSCs with up-to-date technical information on 
radiological emergency response that can be used as a reference and as a training tool for 
developing a better understanding of the potential challenges. The document contains 
information that may be of interest to other federal, state, and local responders, but has been 
designed primarily for EPA OSCs and incorporates by reference existing EPA protocols, 
policies, and guidance. These guidelines are intended to be a “living document” that will be 
updated in the future by the National Decontamination Team in EPA’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM) as continued progress is made in planning for potential terrorist incidents 
involving radiation. 
The scope of the document covers the full range of radiological incidents, but its focus is 
predominantly on Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), because RDDs are expected to occur 
in urban environments and present a radiological response challenge for OSCs. Any suspected 
terrorist incident could involve additional hazards, such as explosive, chemical, or biological 
contamination. Therefore, it is considered essential that responders follow normal hazardous 
material response protocols until the type and severity of the incident has been fully identified. 
The document focuses mainly on: 
•	 The early and intermediate phases of a response, including early activities that should be 
implemented to assist or mitigate long-term cleanup 
•	 Eight radionuclides considered to be the most likely to be encountered during a 
radiological response (Cesium-137, Strontium-90, Cobalt-60, Americium-241, Radium­
226, Iridium-192, Plutonium-238, and Plutonium-239/240) 
In responding to a radiological emergency, the OSC and other EPA responders will be integrated 
into the local Incident Command System (ICS) for the response. The OSC’s responsibilities will 
be consistent with those outlined under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan (NCP) and the National Response Plan (NRP). It is important that OSCs 
understand the federal plans under which they may be operating when responding to a radio­
logical incident. Response to a radiological terrorist incident is likely to be conducted under the 
NRP and will involve numerous federal agencies. Procedures and processes are provided by 
which the OSC can fulfill his or her responsibilities under the applicable plan(s). 
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ACRONYMS 
ACL  Administrative Control Level 
AFRAT  Air Force Radiation Assessment Team 
AFRRI  Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 
ALARA  As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
ALI  Annual Limit on Intake 
241Am Americium-241 
AMS  Aerial Measuring System 
ARAC  Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability  
ARARs Applicable  or  Relevant  and Appropriate Requirements  
ARG  Accident Response Group 
ARL  Action Reference Level 
BOAs  Basic Order Agreements  
CBIRF  Chemical Biological Incident Response Force  
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High Yield Explosive  
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  
137Cs Cesium-137 
CEDE  Committed Effective Dose Equivalent  
CERCLA  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act  
CMAT  Consequence Management Advisory Team 
CMRT  Consequence Management Response Team 
60Co Cobalt-60 
CONPLAN  Concept of Operations Plan 
CPM Counts  per  Minute 
CRI  Center for Radiation Information 
CZT Cadmium/Zinc/Telluride 
DEST  Domestic Emergency Support Team  
DHS  Department of Homeland Security  
DoD  Department of Defense  
DOE  Department of Energy  
DOELAP  Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program 
DOJ  Department of Justice  
DOT  Department of Transportation  
DPM  Disintegrations per Minute 
DSCA  Defense Support for Civil Authorities 
DTPA Diethylenetriaminepentaacetic  Acid 
ECOT  Emergency Communications and Outreach Team  
EDTA  Ethylenediamintetraacetic Acid  
EOC  Emergency Operations Center  
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency  
ERT  Environmental Response Team 
ESF  Emergency Support Function  
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FDA  Food and Drug Administration  
FEMA  Federal Emergency Management Agency  
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FRMAC 
FRP 
GIS 
GPHS 
GPS 
HASP 
HMRU 
HRT 
HHS 
HPGe
HRS 
IAC 
IAEA 
IAP 
IC 
ICP 
ICS 
ICSD 
IDLH 
IMAAC 
IND 
INS 
IO 
192Ir 
JFO 
JIC 
JNACC 
JOC 
JTF-CS 
KI 
MARSAME 
MARSSIM 
MDA 
MOA 
MRAT 
MRE 
NBC 
NCP 
NEST 
NIMS 
NIRT 
NNSA 
NPL 
NRC 
NRC 
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center  
Federal Response Plan 
Geographic Information System 
General Purpose Heat Source  
Global Positioning System 
Health and Safety Plan 
Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
Health Response Team 
Department of Health and Human Services  
 High  Purity  Germanium  Detector 
Hazard Ranking System 
Incident Advisory Council 
International Atomic Energy Agency  
Incident Action Plan 
Incident Commander 
Incident Command Post 
Incident Command System 
Ionization Chamber Smoke Detectors 
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health  
Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center  
Improvised Nuclear Device  
Incident of National Significance  
Information Officer  
Iridium-192 
Joint Field Office 
Joint Information Center  
Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center  
Joint Operations Center 
Joint Task Force Civil Support  
Potassium Iodide  
Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and 
Equipment 
Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual 
Minimum Detectable Activity 
Memorandum  of  Agreement 
Medical  Radiobiology Advisory Team 
Meal Ready to Eat 
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan  
Nuclear Emergency Support Team 
National  Incident  Management System  
Nuclear Incident Response Team 
National Nuclear Security Administration  
National Priorities List  
National Response Center 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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NRP 
NVLAP 
OAR 
OEM 
OPA 
ORIA 
OSC 
OSHA 
OSRTI 
OSWER 
PA 
PAGs 
PEL 
PIAT 
PIC 
PIO 
214Po 
PPE 
238Pu 
239/240Pu 
QSGs
226Ra 
RAMT 
RAP 
RCRA 
RDD 
REAC/TS 
RED 
RERT 
RRSF 
RSO 
RTG 
SAC 
SCBA 
SHEM 
SHEMP 
SOG 
SOP 
90Sr 
START 
TAT 
TEDE 
TLD 
TSD 
UC 
USACE 
National Response Plan 
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 
Office of Air and Radiation 
Office of Emergency Management  
Oil Pollution Act 
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air 
On-Scene  Coordinator 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 
Preliminary  Assessment 
Protective Action Guides 
Permissible Exposure Limits  
Public Information Assist Team 
Pressurized  Ion  Chamber 
Public Information Officer  
Radium-C 
Personal Protective Equipment  
Plutonium-238 
Plutonium-239/240 
Quick Start Guides 
Radium-226 
Radiological Advisory Medical Team 
Radiological  Assistance Program 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
Radiological Dispersal Device 
Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 
Radiological Exposure Device 
Radiological Emergency Response Team 
Radiological Response Survey Form 
Regional Safety Officer 
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator  
Special Agent in Charge 
Self-Contained  Breathing Apparatus  
Safety, Health, and Environmental Management  
Safety, Health, and Environmental Management Program 
Standard Operating Guidance  
Standard Operating Procedure 
Strontium-90 
Superfund Technical Assistance and Response Team 
Turn-Around  Time 
Total Effective Dose Equivalent 
Thermoluminescent Dosimetry 
Treatment, Storage, and Disposal  
Unified Command 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  
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USDA  U.S. Department of Agriculture  
USCG  U.S. Coast Guard 
WCO  Waste Certifying Official 
WCS  Waste Control Specialist 
WMD  Weapon of Mass Destruction 
WMD-CST  Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team 
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1. PURPOSE  AND  SCOPE 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The ruthlessness of the September 11 attacks has alerted the world to the potential for nuclear 
terrorism. The willingness of terrorists to sacrifice their lives to achieve their objectives creates a 
new dimension in the fight against terrorism. We face the potential of terrorists acquiring or 
building nuclear bombs or using radioactive sources to incite panic, contaminate property, and 
cause injury or death among civilian populations. While a nuclear bomb detonation would cause 
the greatest destruction, it is the least likely of the potential radiological incidents. More likely, 
due to the great number of orphaned radioactive sources, would be a “dirty bomb” incident in 
which a conventional explosive is used to disperse radioactive material. Although terrorists have 
not yet used a nuclear weapon or detonated a “dirty bomb,” reports that some terrorist groups, 
particularly al-Qaeda, have attempted to acquire nuclear material is a cause for concern. 
According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database, there 
were 196 cases of trafficking in nuclear material and 400 cases of trafficking in other radioactive 
sources (medical, industrial) between 1993 and 2004. However, only 18 of these cases actually 
involved small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium that is needed to produce a 
nuclear bomb. IAEA experts judge the quantities involved to be insufficient to construct a 
nuclear explosive device. 
There also has been a six-fold increase in the inventory of nuclear and radioactive materials in 
peaceful programs worldwide since 1970. According to IAEA figures, there are 438 nuclear 
power reactors, 651 research reactors (of which 284 are in operation), and 250 fuel cycle plants 
around the world, including uranium mills and plants that convert, enrich, store, and reprocess 
nuclear material. Additionally, tens of thousands of radiation sources are used in medicine, 
industry, agriculture, and research. While the level of security at nuclear facilities is generally 
very high, the security of medical and industrial radiation sources is disturbingly weak in some 
countries. 
The threats from nuclear terrorism are dependent upon the materials available and types of 
facilities involved, and fall into three main categories: nuclear and radioactive material facilities, 
nuclear material, and radioactive sources. 
Nuclear and Radioactive Material Facilities 
The primary risks associated with nuclear facilities involve the theft or diversion of nuclear 
material from the facility, or a physical attack or act of sabotage designed to cause an 
uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the surrounding environment. In urban areas that do not 
have nuclear reactors or fuel cycle facilities, other facilities with radioactive material inventories 
do exist, such as nuclear medicine facilities, hospitals, construction sites using radiography 
sources, and industrial sites using radioactive sources. Radioactive material could present risks if 
there is a physical attack or an accidental fire at such a facility. Radioactive materials also could 
be stolen from such a facility and fabricated into a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) to be 
used elsewhere. 
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Nuclear Materials 
Terrorists obtaining or building nuclear weapons may be the least likely terrorism scenario, but 
by far would be the most devastating. While it cannot be discounted that terrorists could obtain 
some nuclear material, it is highly unlikely they could use it to manufacture and successfully 
detonate a nuclear bomb. But no scenario is impossible. Beyond the difficulty for terrorists to 
obtain weapons-grade material, actually producing a nuclear weapon is far from a trivial 
exercise. Scientific expertise and access to sophisticated equipment would be required. However, 
when the Cold War ended, thousands of highly knowledgeable scientists and engineers 
previously involved in the Soviet Union’s weapons program were laid off or found their incomes 
drastically reduced. Another legacy of the Cold War is the disturbing reports, albeit unsubstan­
tiated, of missing nuclear weapons. 
Radioactive Sources 
Terrorists could develop a crude RDD using radioactive sources commonly used in every day 
life. The number of radioactive sources in the world is vast. Sources used in radiotherapy alone 
are on the order of ten thousand. Many more are used in industry. For example, Cobalt-60 (
60Co) 
sources are used to check for welding errors or cracks in buildings, pipelines, and structures. 
Radionuclides also are used for food preservation. There are a large number of unwanted 
radioactive sources, many of which are simply abandoned and “orphaned” of any regulatory 
control. A dirty bomb could be made by combining conventional explosives with a radioactive 
source, although handling the source could be deadly. 
Concern about radioactive sources and dirty bombs is high because the security of radioactive 
materials in many countries has been relatively lax. There are few security precautions on 
radiotherapy equipment and a large source could be removed quite easily, especially if those 
involved have no regard for their own health. Moreover, in many countries, the regulatory 
oversight of radiation sources is weak. As a result, an undetermined number of radioactive 
sources have become orphaned of regulatory control and their location is unknown, even in the 
United States. 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state regulations require owners licensed 
to use or store radioactive material to secure this material from theft and unauthorized access. 
These measures have been greatly strengthened since the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Licensees must promptly report lost or stolen high-risk radioactive material. Local authorities 
also assist in determined efforts to find and retrieve such sources. Most reports of lost or stolen 
material involve small or short-lived radioactive sources that are not useful for creating a RDD. 
The NRC has not detected a pattern of collecting such sources for the purpose of assembling an 
RDD. It is important to note that the radioactivity of the combined total of all unrecovered 
sources over the past five years (when corrected for radioactive decay) would not reach the 
threshold for one high-risk radioactive source. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said world­
wide. The U.S. is working to strengthen controls on high-risk radioactive sources both at home 
and abroad (NRC 2005). 
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1.2  RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE EVENTS 
The principal type of RDD is a dirty bomb that combines a conventional explosive with 
radioactive material. In most instances, the conventional explosive device would have more 
immediate lethal effects than the radioactive material. At the levels created by most probable 
sources, not enough radioactivity would be present in a dirty bomb to kill people or cause severe 
illness. For example, most radioactive material employed in hospitals for diagnosis or treatment 
of cancer is sufficiently benign that approximately 100,000 patients are released every day with 
this material in their bodies. However, certain other radioactive materials, dispersed in the air, 
could contaminate up to several city blocks, creating fear and possibly panic and requiring 
potentially costly cleanup. 
A second type of RDD might involve a radioactive material that is dispersed in air or water by 
mechanical means rather than through the use of an explosive. Methods to administer these 
materials might be a water spray truck, a crop duster, or manually spreading radioactive material. 
Another type of RDD might involve a powerful radioactive source hidden in a public place, such 
as a trash receptacle in a busy train or subway station, where people passing close to the source 
might get a significant dose of radiation. By definition this would be considered a Radiological 
Exposure Device (RED). 
RDDs would be used to spread radioactive contamination and are in no way similar to a nuclear 
weapon and its destructive effects. The presumed purpose of an RDD would be as a Weapon of 
Mass Disruption rather than a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
1.2.1  Impact of a Dirty Bomb 
The extent of local contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of the 
explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and weather conditions. Prompt 
detection of the kind of radioactive material employed would greatly assist local authorities in 
advising the community on protective measures, such as quickly leaving the immediate area or 
sheltering inside until further advised. Subsequent decontamination of the affected area could 
involve considerable time and expense. A dirty bomb, though not expected to result in significant 
radiological effects, could have significant psychological and economic effects. 
Although not a terrorist incident, the accidental contamination of Goiânia, a major city in Brazil, 
with a medical radiation source exemplifies the potential for a terrorist group to wreak havoc on 
an urban center. In September, 1987, scrap scavengers broke into an abandoned radiological 
clinic, stole a highly radioactive Cesium-137 (
137Cs) source and moved it to a junkyard for sale 
as scrap. Workers broke open the encasement and cut up the 1,375 Curie capsule of cesium into 
pieces. The valuable-looking scrap was then distributed to friends and family of workers around 
the city. As a result, some 112,000 persons were eventually monitored, of whom 249 were found 
to be contaminated either internally or externally, fourteen suffered from severe internal radia­
tion effects, and four subsequently died. Significant contamination was found in 85 homes, 50 
vehicles, and 45 public locations where decontamination or removal was required. Seven homes 
where decontamination was not feasible were demolished and removed. Decontamination 
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activities generated approximately 3,500 cubic meters of waste, encapsulated in about 12,500 
drums and 1,470 boxes (IAEA 1988).   
1.2.2  Cancer and Other Health Effects 
Most injuries from a dirty bomb would probably occur from the heat, debris, radiological dust, 
and force of the conventional explosion used to disperse the radioactive material, affecting only 
individuals close to the site of the explosion. At the low radiation levels expected from an RDD, 
the immediate health effects from radiation exposure likely would be minimal (DHS 2004a). 
Health effects of radiation exposure are determined by the amount of radiation absorbed by the 
body, type of radiation, means of exposure (external or internal), and length of time exposed. 
The health effects of radiation tend to be directly proportional to the radiation dose. Acute 
radiation syndrome (ARS) is a short-term health effect caused by exposure to a highly radio­
active material over a relatively short amount of time. ARS is not likely to result from a dirty 
bomb. If a reasonable estimate can be made of a person’s dose, much is known about the health 
effects of that dose. 
Psychological effects from fear of being exposed may be one of the major consequences of a 
dirty bomb. Unless information about potential exposure is made available from a credible 
source, people unsure about their exposure might seek advice from medical centers, complicating 
the centers’ ability to deal with acute injuries. 
Just because a person is near a radioactive source for a short time or gets a small amount of 
radioactive dust on himself or herself does not mean he or she will get cancer later in life, 
especially if it is removed quickly. Studies have shown that radiation is a relatively weak 
carcinogen. Exposure at the low radiation doses expected from an RDD would increase the risk 
of cancer very slightly over naturally occurring rates. A long-term medical surveillance program 
may need to be established for victims of a significant radiological attack to monitor potential 
health effects (EPA 2005a). 
It should be noted that potassium iodide (KI) would not be protective except in the very unlikely 
event that the dirty bomb contained radioactive iodine isotopes in large quantities. Radioactive 
iodine isotopes are not particularly attractive for use in an RDD for a variety of technical 
reasons, the most important of which is the short half-life (eight days) of the Iodine-131 radio­
nuclide. KI only protects the thyroid from radioactive iodine, but offers no protection to other 
parts of the body or against other radioactive isotopes (NRC 2003).  
1.3  PURPOSE OF OSC RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE GUIDELINES 
The purpose of this document is to provide EPA On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) with up-to-date 
technical information on radiological emergency responses. Information in this document can be 
used: 
•	 As a training tool to develop a better understanding of the potential challenges associated 
with a radiological emergency response 
•	 As a technical reference during any radiological emergency response 
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Because the document has these two purposes, it contains information designed for access during 
both preparedness and response. As a result, some of the information in the document may not be 
of immediate assistance during an incident, while other sections (e.g., Entry/Egress Procedures) 
are designed to provide immediate assistance to OSCs during a response. 
The document contains information that may be of interest to other federal, state, and local 
responders, but has been designed primarily for EPA OSCs and incorporates by reference 
existing EPA protocols, policies, and guidance. 
This document will be updated on a periodic basis to reflect new knowledge, policy develop­
ments, and relevant research. Additional reference materials may be found at www.epaosc.net. 
1.4 SCOPE 
While the document was designed to cover the full range of radiological incidents, its focus is 
predominantly on RDDs, because of the likelihood that OSCs will be among the first federal 
responders on the scene of an RDD incident. RDDs are expected to occur in urban environments, 
triggering a host of issues that may also be involved (albeit to a lesser extent) in radiological 
incidents not involving terrorist activity. Incidents involving nuclear threats are outside the 
current scope of this document, although this may be included in future updates. 
It should be noted that, while the scope of this document focuses on the radiological aspects of a 
potential incident, any suspected terrorist incident could involve additional hazards, such as 
explosives, chemical or biological contamination, or secondary devices. It is therefore essential 
that responders follow normal hazardous material response protocols until the type and severity 
of the incident has been fully identified. 
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
This document has been developed under the following assumptions: 
•	 All EPA OSCs responding to radiological emergencies will be enrolled in an EPA 
Radiation Health and Safety Program consistent with current EPA requirements and 
guidance (including EPA’s Medical Surveillance Program Implementation Plan; EPA 
2005a), and will have been provided basic training by EPA’s Environmental Response 
Team (ERT) on the use of EPA’s standard radiological response equipment.  
•	 The authors considered information regarding the early and intermediate phases of a 
response to be the most helpful to OSCs, so this document focuses on those phases. 
Information also is provided regarding early activities that should be implemented to 
assist or mitigate long-term cleanup (recovery). 
•	 The OSC and other EPA responders will be integrated into the Incident Command 
System (ICS) for the response. The OSCs’ responsibilities will be consistent with those 
outlined under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
(NCP) (40 CFR Part 300) and the NRP (DHS 2004b). 
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•	 The document focuses on eight radionuclides that have unique chemistry, half-life, or 
radiation emissions that can represent the majority of radionuclides in commercial use 
and that might be encountered by OSCs: Cesium-137 (
137Cs), Strontium-90 (
90Sr), 
Cobalt-60 (
60Co), Americium-241 (
241Am), Radium-226 (
226Ra), Iridium-192 (
192Ir), 
Plutonium-238 (
238Pu), and Plutonium-239/240 (
239/240Pu). 
1.6  DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION AND USE 
Chapter 2. Federal Plans and Agency Roles: This chapter is designed primarily for prepared­
ness use and provides a general overview of the federal plans governing a radiological response 
and an overview of the assumptions regarding a response that dictate the flow of the rest of this 
document. 
Chapter 3. EPA Response: This chapter has an introduction designed for preparedness use, 
followed by operating guidance that should be used by OSCs in entering potentially 
contaminated areas. 
Chapter 4. Health and Safety: This chapter provides general information for use by OSCs in 
both preparing for a radiological incident and in assessing what should be included in a site­
specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP). It also provides references that may be helpful in 
developing a site-specific HASP. 
Chapter 5. Radiological Standard Operating Procedures: This chapter consists of an over­
view of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that can be used by OSCs in all phases of a 
response. The SOPs have been developed to be used with the nationally consistent equipment 
purchased by EPA for radiological emergency response. The SOPs are not included in this 
document, but will be available in a companion CD and via the Internet. 
Chapter 6. Stabilization/Decontamination: This chapter provides a general overview of 
information needed to perform decontamination following a radiological release, prevent further 
spread of contamination, allow return of properties to use, and reduce the potential long-term 
cleanup requirements. It is organized by radionuclide and may be helpful to OSCs in prepared­
ness (as a training tool) or in a response to help the OSCs understand the range of radionuclide­
specific tools that may be used. 
Chapter 7. Cleanup Planning: This chapter provides an overview of the cleanup considerations 
that the OSC should address during the early and intermediate phases of a response. It provides a 
review of the recommendations in the forthcoming Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
guidance, Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents (DHS 2006). 
Chapter 8. Waste Disposition: This chapter is designed as a tool to assist the OSC in 
developing a waste management plan, including characterization, treatment, and disposal. The 
chapter provides a review of the waste acceptance criteria of existing commercial facilities that 
accept radiologically contaminated waste. It may be helpful to the OSC either in preparing for a 
potential incident or during a response to an incident. 
12
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Chapter 9. Community Outreach: This chapter is designed as a preparedness tool to assist the 
OSC in understanding the context of community outreach and introducing the OSC to communi­
cation issues specific to ionizing radiation (versus other hazardous substances). 
1.7 DOCUMENT  DEVELOPMENT 
This document was developed by a team of EPA personnel from the Office of Solid Waste and 
Emergency Response (Offices of Emergency Management and Superfund Remediation and 
Technology Innovation/Environmental Response Team), the Office of Air and Radiation/Office 
of Radiation and Indoor Air (both Headquarters and the National Air and Radiation Environ­
mental Laboratory), and regional OSCs, with support from several contracting firms. 
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2.  FEDERAL PLANS AND AGENCY ROLES 
OSCs should understand the federal response plans under which they may operate in response to 
a radiological incident, including terrorist incidents. Three major federal response plans (or 
systems) describe the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in radiological response 
and the mechanisms for coordination among these agencies.  
Most of the “routine” radiological incidents to which EPA OSCs respond (such as orphan 
sources and abandoned facilities) are addressed under the NCP (40 CFR Part 300). A radio­
logical terrorist incident response, however, is likely to be conducted under the National 
Response Plan (NRP) and will involve numerous federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and DHS (DHS 2004b). As described later in this chapter, the NCP is 
considered an operational supplement to the NRP, so NCP authorities related to radiological 
responses remain relevant to an EPA response to a radiological terrorist incident under the NRP. 
The NRP is based upon the Incident Command System (ICS) response management structure set 
forth in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Emergency responses under the 
NCP also follow the NIMS/ICS framework. 
This chapter briefly describes these three major response plans—NCP, NRP, and NIMS—and 
how they relate to a radiological response, particularly a response to a radiological terrorist 
incident. More detailed training on these three systems is available to OSCs through other 
venues, including EPA’s Incident Management Training, regional NRP training, and courses at 
OSC Readiness Training. 
Section 2.1 provides a brief description of the NCP, with a focus on radiological response 
authorities. OSCs operate under the NCP on a day-to-day basis, and should be familiar with NCP 
requirements. Section 2.2 briefly describes the NIMS and the ICS under which OSCs conduct 
emergency responses. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the NRP, the NRP response frame­
work for radiological incidents, and EPA’s role in such incidents. It also explains how the NCP 
and NIMS/ICS fit into an NRP radiological response. Section 2.4 describes EPA’s response to 
radiological terrorist incidents in particular. Section 2.5 describes the federal special teams that 
can assist the OSC in a radiological response. 
OSCs should be aware that much of the federal planning for radiological terrorist incidents 
conducted to date has focused on radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). The Federal Govern­
ment is in the process of undertaking additional planning to more fully prepare for a response to 
an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident. Additional details on the Federal Government’s 
response and role in an IND incident, therefore, should be forthcoming in the NRP and other 
appropriate federal emergency planning documents.  
2.1  EPA RESPONSE TO RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS UNDER THE NCP 
The NCP, 40 CFR Part 300, implements the response authorities of the Comprehensive Environ­
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or “Superfund”) and the Clean 
Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). The NCP provides policy and protocols 
for cleaning up releases of oil, hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, including 
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accidental or deliberate releases of radiological contamination. Under the NCP, EPA OSCs 
respond to incidents in the inland zone while U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) OSCs respond to 
incidents in the coastal zone. Most “routine” radiological incidents to which OSCs respond are 
addressed under the NCP, but NCP authorities and federal roles also play a part in a NRP 
response to a radiological terrorist incident. 
With respect to radiological emergency response, OSCs should be aware of two aspects of the 
following NCP authorities: 
1.	 Roles of Other Federal Agencies in Providing OSCs: While EPA and USCG provide 
OSCs for most responses under the NCP, Executive Order 12580 and Section 300.120 of the 
NCP state that the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE), which 
frequently handle radioactive materials, also provide OSCs for emergency responses. DoD 
and DOE provide their own OSCs for responses involving releases from, or on, their 
facilities, materials, and weapons (which includes incidents involving their materials or 
weapons in transit). Their responsibilities include addressing any off-site releases. If DoD or 
DOE requests EPA assistance in the response, the Regional Removal Manager will make the 
decision to respond on a case-by-case basis depending upon resource availability, and should 
coordinate that decision with EPA’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Head­
quarters. These DoD and DOE roles carry over into the NRP, as will be described further in 
Section 2.3 of this chapter. 
2.	 CERCLA Limitations on Radiological Response Authorities: The definition of “release” 
under CERCLA, codified in the NCP, excludes releases of source, byproduct, or special 
nuclear material from a nuclear incident at certain facilities licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, most notably, commercial nuclear power plants and fuels associated 
with these plants. This exclusion may preclude the use of Superfund monies for releases that 
are covered by this exclusion where, for example, it is known that no other hazardous 
substances, pollutants, or contaminants are or could be commingled with the source, 
byproduct, or special nuclear material covered by the CERCLA “release” definition. Again, 
as will be discussed in Section 2.3 of this chapter, this exclusion should be considered if EPA 
assistance is requested under the NRP for terrorist incidents at nuclear power plants.  
2.2 	 NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM / INCIDENT COMMAND 
SYSTEM 
DHS issued NIMS in March 2004 to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, 
and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity (DHS 2004c). Federal 
policy requires federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS. EPA has adopted NIMS for its 
emergency response program. 
NIMS relies on the ICS, a system for managing incidents that integrates the facilities, equipment, 
personnel, procedures, and communications involved in a response within a common organiza­
tional structure. At the on-scene level, an Incident Command Post (ICP) is established. This is 
the location from which tactical response operations are directed. The NIMS ICS specifies how 
the ICP is organized. The organization has five major functions:  command, operations, 
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planning, logistics, and finance and administration (with a potential sixth function to cover 
intelligence). The ICP is led by the Incident Commander (IC), the senior individual with the 
authority to direct the response. Where multiple ICs have jurisdiction over the response, the ICP 
is led by a Unified Command (UC). Under Unified Command, ICs work together to establish 
common objectives and carry out tactical response activities, with each IC retaining his or her 
ultimate authority. A Joint Information Center (JIC) may be established to coordinate public 
information activities. (See Chapter 9 for more information on public information during a 
radiological emergency response.) 
Under the NCP, the individual with the authority to direct and coordinate the response at the on­
scene level is the OSC. Therefore, for a radiological response in which EPA is taking a leader­
ship role, the OSC generally fulfills the role of the EPA IC at the ICP. When EPA is only 
providing support to another entity (e.g., local or federal agency) during a response, the OSC 
may instead provide that support through another location within the ICS, such as the Planning 
Section and/or Operations Section. For a radiological terrorist incident that occurs in a major 
urban area, it is likely that local officials (e.g., fire department) will establish an ICP prior to the 
OSC’s arrival (assuming local response capabilities have not been overwhelmed or incapaci­
tated), and the OSC would join the ICP in a location appropriate to EPA’s role in the response. 
Other EPA and NCP response assets may fill other positions in the ICS as determined by the 
OSC. 
As needed and in accordance with EPA’s role in the response, the OSC may also request full or 
partial activation of an Incident Management Team (IMT) from the regional EPA office. The 
IMT consists of personnel who are trained and experienced in specific ICS positions. The OSC 
may request full activation of an IMT if the magnitude or complexity of the incident requires 
establishing and maintaining an ICS structure for a prolonged response. Normally, the EPA IC 
will continue to be the responding OSC who first established UC with the local responders at the 
ICP. 
An Area Command may also be established if the incident is large enough to require more than 
one ICP, or if there are multiple incidents within the same geographic area. In this case, the EPA 
regional emergency response program would send an EPA representative to the Area Command. 
One other aspect of NIMS/ICS will be particularly important for radiological responses, which 
typically require the management of significant volumes of environmental data. The NIMS states 
that for incidents involving large volumes of environmental data, an Environmental Unit (EU) 
may be established within the Planning Section of the ICP to facilitate interagency data coordina­
tion and management. For radiological incidents where EPA plays a leadership role, it is 
expected that EPA would work with local authorities to establish an EU (or its equivalent) to 
coordinate data within the ICP. Coordination of data also will be performed through the Federal 
Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) when a FRMAC is activated, which 
is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5 of this chapter. EPA’s Radiological Emergency 
Response Team (RERT) Commander fulfills the role of Senior EPA Official in the FRMAC. 
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2.3 	 OVERVIEW OF RESPONSE TO RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 
Under the NRP, DHS is responsible for overall federal coordination of all actual and potential 
Incidents of National Significance (INSs). The Secretary of DHS determines whether an incident 
should be designated an INS. The NRP establishes the protocols and procedures for the Federal 
Government to support state, local, and tribal agencies in responding to significant incidents. In 
general, the NRP is activated for INSs; however, several of its annexes may also be used for non-
INSs (see text box). This section provides an overview of the NRP and several NRP annexes that 
are critical for radiological responses. 
The NRP relies on NIMS, and thus recognizes that tactical management of an incident occurs at 
the ICP level. When an EPA OSC leads a NRP response, the EPA OSC fulfills the role of IC at 
the ICP level. However, during a NRP INS, DHS will activate additional response structures 
above the ICP level to coordinate with the federal agencies, states, locals, and private sector. 
Figure 2.1 presents an overview of the 
NRP/NIMS response structure for an  Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the
INS (DHS 2004b). These additional  NRP versus the NCP 
structures include the Joint Field Office 
(JFO) and Incident Advisory Council  The principal annex of the NRP that addresses
(IAC), both managed by DHS. The EPA  interagency coordination for radiological response 
regional emergency response program  is the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. It 
sends an EPA representative(s) to the  should be noted that the NRP’s Nuclear/Radiologi-
JFO, and EPA Headquarters sends a  cal Incident Annex can be used for both INSs 
representative to the IAC. The JFO is led  under the NRP, as well as incidents of lesser 
by a JFO Coordination Group, which is  severity not under the NRP. For radiological 
similar to and operates under the same  incidents that are below the threshold of an INS 
principles as the UC at the ICP. Among  but that still require federal participation in the 
other functions, the JFO Coordination  response, however, the Annex states that the
Group and IAC may provide strategic  Coordinating Agency has the option of coordi­
direction for the response, guidance on  nating the Federal response using: 1) the 
allocation of federal resources, and  procedures in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident
assistance in resolving conflicts that  Annex; 2) agency-specific plans; and/or 3) the 
arise at lower levels in the response  NCP, as appropriate. Thus, since most “routine” 
structure. So, while an OSC continues to  radiological responses that EPA conducts do not 
respond as the EPA IC at the ICP for an  rise to the level of an INS under the NRP, EPA 
NRP INS, additional coordination will  will carry out most of its radiological responses 
be needed with these other NRP  solely under the NCP. Other departments/agencies 
response structures. In general, the  may choose another option for “routine” incidents. 
ICP/UC communicates with the  A radiological terrorist incident, however, is 
JFO/JFO Coordination Group, and the  expected to be declared an INS under the NRP.
JFO Coordination Group communicates 
with the IAC. 
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Figure 2.1  NRP/NIMS Framework (adapted from NRP) 
Whether EPA has a role in a radiological response under the NRP, and whether that role is a 
leadership or support role, is identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, a key 
component of the NRP for radiological responses. This Annex lists different possible scenarios 
of nuclear/radiological releases and assigns leadership to a Coordinating Agency, a specific 
federal agency responsible for each response scenario. The scenarios and Coordinating Agency 
designations are listed in Table 2.1. 
DHS always assumes the role of overall federal coordinator for the incident, but the designated 
“Coordinating Agency,” in consultation with DHS, has the primary responsibility for the federal 
nuclear/radiological aspects of the response for a given scenario. The Coordinating Agency 
should be part of the UC at the ICP (generally the OSC when EPA is the Coordinating Agency), 
and should also provide a Senior Federal Official to the JFO Coordination Group (assigned by 
the regional office when EPA is the Coordinating Agency). 
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Table 2.1 Coordinating Agencies 
Type of Incident  Coordinating Agency 
a.  Radiological terrorism incidents (e.g., RDD/IND or radiological exposure 
device): 
(1)  Material or facilities owned or operated by DoD or DOE 
(2)  Material or facilities licensed by NRC or Agreement State 
 (3)  All  others 
(1)DoD or DOE 
(2) NRC 
(3) DOE* 
b. Nuclear  facilities: 
(1)  Owned or operated by DoD or DOE 
(2)  Licensed by NRC or Agreement State 
(3)  Not licensed, owned, or operated by a federal agency or an 
Agreement State, or currently or formerly licensed facilities for which 
the owner/operator is not financially viable or is otherwise unable to 
respond 
(1)DoD or DOE 
(2) NRC 
(3) EPA 
c.  Transportation of radioactive materials: 
(1)  Materials shipped by or for DOE or DOE 
(2)  Shipment of NRC or Agreement State-licensed materials 
(3)  Shipment of materials in certain areas of the coastal zone that are not 
licensed or owned by a federal agency or Agreement State (see 
USCG list of responsibilities for further explanation of “certain areas”) 
 (4)  All  others 
(1)DoD or DOE 
(2) NRC 
(3) DHS/USCG 
(4) EPA 
d.  Space vehicles containing radioactive materials: 
(1)  Managed by NASA or DoD 
(2)  Not managed by DoD or NASA impacting certain areas of the coastal 
zone
 (3)  All  others 
(1)  NASA or DoD 
(2) DHS/USCG 
(3) EPA 
e.  Foreign, unknown, or unlicensed material: 
(1)  Incidents involving foreign or unknown sources of radioactive material 
in certain areas of the coastal zone 
 (2)  All  others 
(1) DHS/USCG 
(2) EPA 
f.  Nuclear weapon accident/incident (based on custody at time of event)  DoD or DOE 
Other types of incidents not otherwise addressed above  DHS designates 
*  For category a(3), “all other” radiological terrorist incidents, DOE is designated as the Coordinating 
Agency in the table. For this category of incident, however, the annex states that the Coordinating 
Agency role transitions from DOE to EPA for environmental cleanup and site restoration at a 
mutually agreeable time, and after consultation with state, local, and tribal governments, the 
cooperating agencies, and the JFO Coordination Group.  
When EPA is the Coordinating Agency, an EPA OSC becomes the IC who, along with the EPA 
representatives on the JFO and IAC, need to understand their responsibilities as laid out in the 
NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. The Annex describes the specific responsibilities of 
the Coordinating Agency with regard to the following: 
•  Coordination of the overall technical response 
•  Management of technical data 
•  Oversight of development of Protective Action Recommendations 
•  Incident security
1 
1 OSCs should be aware that DoD, DOE, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have the 
authority to establish a National Defense Area (NDA) or National Security Area (NSA) for radiological incidents 
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•  Demobilization 
•  Coordination of information with the public, Congress, and White House 
•  Coordination with the Department of State when incidents have international implications 
When USCG is the designated Coordinating Agency, it does not assume that role for the entire 
coastal zone (as is the case for other incidents under the NCP), but only for incidents in certain 
coastal areas (i.e., vessels, areas seaward of the shoreline to the outer edge of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, and within the boundaries of certain waterfront facilities). Those areas are 
described in more detail at the end of the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex in the description 
of USCG’s responsibilities. Therefore, for radiological incidents, EPA assumes leadership for 
some types of incidents in the coastal zone as identified in Table 2.1. 
The Coordinating Agency may request assistance from various Cooperating Agencies listed in 
the Annex. EPA may be called upon as a Cooperating Agency.  It is important to be aware that 
even when EPA is not a designated Coordinating Agency for an incident, the assigned 
Coordinating Agency may request EPA’s assistance. EPA may serve in either role for a 
radiological terrorist incident, though EPA is not designated as the initial Coordinating Agency 
for any radiological terrorist scenario. DOE transitions the Coordinating Agency role to EPA 
under radiological terrorist scenario a(3) in Table 2.1.  
When EPA OSCs represent the Coordinating or Cooperating Agency during an INS, they 
generally respond using their NCP authorities, which are coordinated with the NRP. In addition 
to the NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, two other NRP annexes that describe how 
EPA coordinates NCP activities with the NRP apply to EPA OSCs when both the NRP and NCP 
are activated: 
•  Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
2 
•  Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex 
ESF #10 is activated under the Stafford Act or as a result of a “federal-to-federal support” 
activation under the NRP. Federal-to-federal support under the NRP involves the transfer of 
resources from one federal agency to another to fund assistance in coordinating the response. 
DHS may transfer the funds to EPA to respond. Alternatively, EPA follows the procedures in the 
Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex (in this case EPA is conducting the response using 
CERCLA/OPA funds). EPA and USCG are the two primary agencies that implement these 
annexes, and bring the resources of the NCP response system to an NRP INS response. 
Operationally, the two annexes are very similar, but the use of different statutory authorities/ 
funds may have an impact on the allowable scope of EPA’s response. For example, as noted 
earlier, OSCs may be precluded from conducting a Superfund-funded response to a commercial 
involving their weapons and special nuclear materials. NDAs and NSAs are established to safeguard classified 
and/or restricted information and place non-federal lands under federal control for the duration of the incident. If 
EPA assists, we would typically be addressing contamination outside the NDA/NSA. 
2 Under ESF #10, EPA also may be tasked to carry out activities under Stafford Act authority that are not typically 
conducted under the NCP. The Stafford Act is authorized when the President declares a “National Emergency.” 
When responding under the Stafford Act, EPA receives a “mission statement” from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)/DHS, and FEMA pays the cost. 
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nuclear power plant incident if the incident falls under the CERCLA exclusion, but would have 
the authority to assist if funded under a Stafford Act Mission Assignment from DHS/Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Another difference between the two annexes is that 
DHS’s role, particularly DHS/FEMA’s role, may be different depending upon whether or not 
they are implementing Stafford Act responsibilities or not.  
Generally, the ESF#10 and Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex describe how:   
•	 EPA OSCs function as the EPA IC (if EPA has a leadership role)  
•	 EPA staffs the other NRP response structures (e.g., JFO, DHS/FEMA Regional Response 
Coordination Center, IAC) 
•	 Other NCP response mechanisms (e.g., the Regional Response Teams and National 
Response Team) are linked into the NRP structure 
One other NRP annex that OSCs should be familiar with is the Catastrophic Incident Annex, 
which the Secretary of DHS may activate in response to a large-scale disaster or IND incident. 
Essentially, this Annex pre-authorizes certain federal agencies to deploy immediately without 
waiting for the normal NRP activation procedures to be completed. Thus, it allows a proactive 
federal response. EPA is one of those agencies authorized to deploy immediately when this 
Annex is activated. However, it does not change EPA’s fundamental role in the response after 
initial deployment. This Annex is more relevant to federal agencies without response authority of 
their own than to EPA that has CERCLA/NCP authority to respond to any incident that meets the 
NCP criteria for a response. Thus, EPA would not necessarily have to wait for NRP activation to 
respond to a radiological incident, including a radiological terrorist incident. But any EPA 
response should be consistent with the identification of federal roles (in particular, the designa­
tion of the Coordinating Agency) in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. 
2.4 	 OVERVIEW OF EPA RESPONSE TO RADIOLOGICAL TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS UNDER THE NRP 
2.4.1 	 Terrorist Incident in Urban Area or Other Location for Which EPA is 
Pre-Designated as the Coordinating Agency for Environmental 
Cleanup Phase 
If a radiological terrorist incident occurs in a likely terrorist target, such as a major city or other 
area that is covered by category a(3) in Table 2-1, and DHS declares the incident an INS, 
activates the NRP, and possibly activates the Catastrophic Incident Annex, the following occur: 
•	 DHS is the overall federal coordinator of the response and provides oversight primarily 
from the JFO and Headquarters.  
•	 DOE is the initial Coordinating Agency, providing technical leadership for the federal 
radiological aspects of the response, in consultation with DHS. 
•	 EPA provides support to DOE, initially as a Cooperating Agency and later as the 

Coordinating Agency for the environmental cleanup. 
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•	 Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI is the lead agency for criminal investigations of 
terrorist acts or threats (not for the overall federal response; DHS maintains that role). 
•	 Other federal agencies may be activated under the NRP to assist as appropriate. Examples 
are the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for public health and medical 
assistance, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or “the Corps”) for emergency 
removal of contaminated debris to facilitate the response, and the Department of Labor’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for worker health and safety 
issues. 
In a major city, the local fire department likely will establish one or more ICPs before federal 
resources arrive (assuming local response agencies are not overwhelmed or incapacitated). 
EPA’s initial responders would most likely integrate into the UC and ICP. (Chapter 3 of this 
document addresses immediate response procedures for the OSC.)  DOE, EPA, and FBI would 
provide representatives to the local ICP as appropriate, including IC representatives to the UC. 
(It is assumed in this scenario that locals/states would require significant federal assistance.)   
EPA generally chooses an OSC to be the IC.
3  The OSC subsequently assigns other EPA 
response personnel to appropriate locations within the ICS as needed, and may request full or 
partial activation of an IMT, as needed. In some cases, to maintain a reasonably sized UC, EPA, 
DOE, and the local IC may prefer that within the UC, DOE represent all federal technical 
response assets during the emergency phase while DOE is the Coordinating Agency (with EPA 
filling other ICP positions). Later that responsibility transfers to EPA.  
As noted earlier, EPA would likely work with the local authorities to establish an EU (or its 
equivalent) within the Planning Section to coordinate environmental data within the ICP. 
Procedures for sharing and managing radiological and non-radiological environmental data 
would have to be defined. DOE would deploy the advance elements of the FRMAC (see Section 
2.5 for more details), which would be integrated with the ICS. The forthcoming EPA Incident 
Management Handbook will provide additional suggestions regarding FRMAC incorporation 
into the ICS. All three federal agencies would also send representatives to the JFO (and other 
NRP response structures as needed). Tactical operations should be planned and carried out at the 
ICP in accordance with NIMS, but the ICP also would need to provide information to, and 
coordinate with, the JFO.  
Wherever possible, regional offices should conduct advance planning with local officials in high­
risk areas on how federal response assets would integrate into the local incident management 
system for a large radiological incident. 
EPA will integrate NCP activities with the NRP in accordance with either ESF #10 or the Oil 
and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex, depending on the source of funding for EPA’s 
3 If the terrorist incident occurs in certain areas of the coastal zone (i.e., vessels, areas seaward of the shoreline to the 
outer edge of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and within the boundaries of certain waterfront facilities, as described 
in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex under the description of USCG’s responsibilities), DOE would still be 
the initial Coordinating Agency under the NRP for the emergency phase, but USCG would assist DOE and provide 
the OSC in the UC for the purposes of the NCP. It is expected that EPA would still be called upon to assist both 
USCG and DOE in the early response, and would provide representatives to the appropriate sections of the ICS. 
EPA would provide the OSC/IC in the UC when the Coordinating Agency role transitions to EPA. 
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activities. It is expected, however, that a radiological incident causing significant impacts will 
result in a Stafford Act declaration and activation of ESF #10. Supplemental appropriations may 
also be provided. 
As noted above, under the NRP, DHS coordinates field-level activities from the JFO. It is not 
expected that DHS would assign an IC to the ICP, but DHS may instead decide to send a DHS 
liaison to the ICP. 
With regard to FBI participation, the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation 
Annex to the NRP describes how the FBI should conduct its operations during the investigation 
phase (before an incident may be declared an INS under the NRP) and after an incident is 
declared an INS. The FBI is responsible for investigating the incident, as well as for locating any 
illegally diverted nuclear weapon, device, or material and for restoring nuclear facilities to their 
rightful custodians. 
When an INS is declared, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) will join the JFO as a member 
of the JFO Coordination Group, and the FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC) will integrate into 
the JFO. The FBI also will send representatives to the ICP. The Terrorism Incident Law 
Enforcement and Investigation Annex identifies three potential FBI positions within the ICP: 
•  FBI representative to the UC 
•  Deputy Chief of the Operations Section 
•  Deputy Chief of the Planning Section 
If conflicts arise at the ICP between law enforcement and emergency response activities that are 
not resolved by the UC (such as data sharing), issues should be raised to the JFO Coordination 
Group for resolution. EPA OSCs would raise these issues through the EPA Senior Federal 
Official in the JFO. 
If the FBI is investigating a terrorist threat, it may ask EPA to assist in the investigation before 
the incident occurs. The FBI may set up a JOC to conduct an investigation involving a WMD or 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE). EPA may be 
asked to participate in the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), which provides 
guidance to the FBI SAC concerning WMD threats and actual incidents. Rostered DEST 
members represent EPA Headquarters, and may be deployed with the DEST to the JOC. 
Regional participation in the DEST may also be requested. 
The EPA OSC’s initial role in a radiological terrorist incident is to coordinate EPA resources in 
the ICP to support DOE, FBI, and local authorities. Critical early tasks should include health and 
safety planning, site characterization, and site stabilization (Chapter 3 provides information on 
the initial assessment of the incident and other priorities, while Chapter 4 addresses health and 
safety requirements for a radiological emergency response and for radiological incident cleanup). 
Once adequate health and safety measures are in place, additional assessment may be initiated 
using the procedures outlined in Chapter 5. 
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As the emergency subsides, planning for decontamination and cleanup should begin (as outlined 
in Chapters 6, 7, and 8). DOE will transition the Coordinating Agency role to EPA for 
environmental cleanup and site restoration at a mutually agreeable time, and after consultation 
with state, local, and tribal governments, the Cooperating Agencies, and the JFO Coordination 
Group. When this transition occurs, however, EPA should work with DHS to ensure that DOE 
and other relevant Cooperating Agencies under the NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex 
will commit the required resources, personnel, and funds for the duration of the federal response. 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the OSC’s response activities during a radiological terrorist 
incident, and indicates the corresponding chapter of this document that addresses the activity. 
It should be mentioned that, under the NRP, the lead federal agency for monitoring and 
decontamination of the affected public is HHS (under ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical 
Services Annex). HHS is charged with coordinating federal assistance (e.g., National Disaster 
Medical System) for public decontamination. DOE provides assistance to HHS for this activity 
during radiological incidents. The NRP notes that state and local governments retain primary 
responsibility for public screening and decontamination, and that federal assistance is limited. 
USACE plays a key role as a Cooperating Agency to EPA during the environmental response to 
a RDD/IND incident, including management of waste and contaminated wastewaters. The areas 
in which USACE may provide assistance are listed at the end of the NRP Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex under the description of USACE responsibilities. (If ESF #10 is activated, EPA 
may assign environmental activities to USACE. If not, the OSC should work with USACE in the 
same manner the OSC would with any other NRT member agency or special teams.)  In addition, 
USACE has a primary role under ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering Annex. Historically 
under the Stafford Act, USACE has been the federal agency with responsibility for assisting 
locals with the clearance of debris in a disaster. The NRP expanded the definition of the term 
“debris” to include contaminated debris. If a RDD/IND results in radioactively contaminated 
building debris and rubble, USACE is usually assigned to clear the debris from the “debris zone” 
for the purposes of facilitating the emergency response.  The debris zone will be defined by 
representatives from USACE and ESF #10 (EPA), and USACE will coordinate their 
contaminated debris removal and management activities under ESF #3 with ESF #10.  
USACE should provide staff to the ICP as appropriate to coordinate their debris removal 
activities. Ideally, EPA and USACE would co-locate in a joint ICP with the other onsite federal, 
state, and local agencies under the UC to ensure smooth coordination between ESF #3 and ESF 
#10 activities for a radiological terrorist incident. If unable to collocate all resources in the same 
command post, an agreement should be reached on how to ensure a UC and coordinated 
activities (e.g., sharing liaisons between ESF #10 and ESF #3 command post locations). 
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Table 2.2  Incident Response by an OSC and Applicable Chapter of Radiological 
Response Guidelines 
Site Activity  OSC Response Activity  Chapter 
Incident occurs (spread of 
contamination likely) 
OSC response supports fire, EMS, 
and police 
Chapter 3 
Radiation detected  OSC calls RERT, ERT, NDT* as 
appropriate for advice, and imple­
ments entry/egress procedures 
Chapter 3 
Radionuclide identified (α, γ, β 
emission levels determined) 
Set up health and safety zones to 
limit the spread of contamination, 
and implement initial activities 
Chapters 3 and 4 
Health and safety measures in 
place, health physicists arrive onsite 
Implement appropriate survey, 
monitoring, and sampling 
procedures 
Chapter 5 
Contamination extent and hot spots 
determined 
Initial site stabilization efforts and 
cleanup planning 
Chapters 5 and 6 
Cleanup planning  Implement process for setting site­
specific levels 
Chapter 7 
Waste disposition  Determine disposition options  Chapter 8 
* Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), Environmental Response Team (ERT), National 
Decontamination Team (NDT) 
DHS has developed a federal interagency guidance document titled Application of Protective 
Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
Incidents, which was published in the Federal Register for interim use and comment on January 
3, 2006 (DHS 2006). This guidance recommends protective action guides (PAGs) to support 
decisions about actions that may need to be taken to protect the public during a RDD or IND 
incident. The PAGs address the early, intermediate, and late phases of the response. The 
document includes a process for establishing final cleanup levels for RDD/IND incidents. This 
guidance is described in more detail in Chapter 7. 
2.4.2 	 Terrorist Incident for which DoD/DOE/NRC is Assigned as 

Coordinating Agency 

DoD and DOE are the designated Coordinating Agencies under the NRP Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex for radiological terrorist incidents involving their materials or facilities (see 
Table 2.1). The NRC is the Coordinating Agency for radiological terrorist incidents involving 
materials or facilities licensed by the NRC or an Agreement State.  
In such incidents, the Coordinating Agency may request assistance from any Cooperating 
Agency, including EPA. The appropriate role for the EPA OSC (and other EPA response 
personnel) and placement in the ICP depends upon the type of assistance requested. For example, 
if EPA provides onsite technical assistance, EPA personnel may join the Operations and 
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Planning Sections. EPA may also provide representatives to the JFO and other NRP structures, if 
appropriate. 
The initial Coordinating Agency may request a transition of that role to EPA or other 
Cooperating Agency to manage the long-term cleanup. If DoD, DOE, or NRC request such a 
transition, the Regional Removal Manager should coordinate the decision with EPA OEM 
Headquarters. 
The funding source is a consideration in these scenarios. If EPA receives adequate Stafford Act 
funding and a Mission Assignment, providing assistance should be relatively straightforward. If 
a Stafford Act declaration is not made, or a Mission Assignment is not provided to EPA, a 
funding source will need to be identified. If the incident involves DoD or DOE materials or 
facilities, EPA may expect DoD or DOE to reimburse Superfund for EPA’s assistance. If the 
terrorist incident involves a commercial nuclear power plant and the release is determined to be 
covered by the CERCLA release exclusion described earlier (i.e., source, byproduct, or special 
nuclear materials), funding from a source other than Superfund will be needed. This may occur 
in situations where, for example, it is known that no other hazardous substances, pollutants, or 
contaminants are or could be commingled with the source, byproduct, or special nuclear material 
covered by the CERCLA “release” definition. It is possible that the federal-to-federal support 
mechanisms in the NRP may be used to transfer funds from one agency to another, and/or that 
supplemental appropriations may be provided from Congress.  
2.5 FEDERAL  SPECIAL  TEAMS ASSISTANCE AND ROLES 
In addition to the Special Teams (listed in the NCP) that are available to assist the OSC, there are 
a number of other federal assets that may be called upon in a radiological response. Their 
placement within the ICP will vary depending upon the type of assistance they provide, but most 
will integrate into the Operations and/or Planning Sections. 
2.5.1  Interagency Teams under the NRP 
Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
connection with an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency, to 
call certain DOE and EPA elements into service as an organizational unit of DHS. The Act 
defines these assets as the “Nuclear Incident Response Team” (NIRT), which includes those (1) 
DOE entities that perform nuclear and/or radiological emergency support functions (including 
accident response, search response, advisory, and technical operations functions), radiation 
exposure functions at the medical assistance facility known as the Radiation Emergency 
Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), radiological assistance functions, and related 
functions; and (2) EPA entities “that perform such support functions (including radiological 
emergency response functions) and related functions.” 
DOE has entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DHS regarding the specific 
assets that constitute the DOE component of the NIRT. In discussions with EPA, DHS has 
indicated that DOE does not foresee providing direct operational direction to EPA assets that 
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might become part of the NIRT. Instead, it intends to rely on the structure of the NRP and its 
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and the mission assignment process where applicable, to 
provide overall coordination of a federal response. Therefore, EPA and DHS have not entered 
into an agreement regarding the NIRT. However, OSCs should be aware of the NIRT and its 
statutory background (see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=17&content=368).  
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center 
The FRMAC is an interagency organization that coordinates federal off-site radiological 
monitoring and assessment activities for a nuclear or radiological accident or incident. For 
Incidents of National Significance, the FRMAC supports DHS and the designated Coordinating 
Agency under the NRP’s Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. The FRMAC provides federal 
and state authorities with coordinated and quality-controlled evaluation and interpretation of 
radiological monitoring and assessment data. The size of the response is dependent on the 
magnitude of the incident. Although all federal, state, and local monitoring and assessment assets 
integrate into the FRMAC as part of a response under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, 
the FRMAC is frequently referred to as a DOE asset, because DOE leads the FRMAC for the 
emergency phase of the response and provides significant resources to the establishment of the 
FRMAC. The leadership of the FRMAC transitions to EPA during the intermediate phase of the 
response. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex sets forth specific conditions that must be 
met before this transition may occur. (Additional information about DOE FRMAC assets and the 
deployment of the FRMAC may be found in Section 2.6.2, DOE Assets.)  Discussions are 
currently ongoing with DOE, and specifically FRMAC management, regarding the integration of 
the FRMAC into a site-specific ICS. Additional details may be found in the forthcoming EPA 
Incident Management Handbook. 
The FRMAC’s expertise includes radiation monitoring, sampling, analysis, assessment, health 
and safety, and support and logistics functions. Figure 2.2 provides the organizational structure 
of the FRMAC (DOE 2005). EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), a Special 
Team under the NCP discussed later in this chapter, frequently exercises with the FRMAC. One 
of the RERT Commanders is expected to fulfill the role of the FRMAC’s Senior EPA Official. 
This role should not be confused with the EPA Senior Federal Official (SFO) in the JFO. The 
FRMAC Senior EPA Official works under the overall direction of the EPA OSC serving as 
EPA’s IC. During a response, it is expected that the FRMAC Director will work within the ICS 
organizational structure as appropriate, coordinating with both the Operations and Planning 
Sections, and specifically with the Environmental Unit Leader, if one is designated. 
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Figure 2.2  Full FRMAC Organizational Chart (adapted from DOE 2005) 
Note:  This organizational chart has not been updated to reflect the issuance of NIMS, and does not represent how 
those components will be integrated with the ICS in the field. EPA currently is working with DOE to clarify those 
issues, which will be addressed in the forthcoming EPA Incident Management Handbook and modified DOE 
FRMAC guidance. 
Advisory Team for the Environment, Food, and Health 
The Advisory Team for the Environment, Food, and Health (frequently referred to as the “A-
Team”) is an interagency team that develops Federal Protective Action Recommendations and 
provides them to the Coordinating Agency and, for INSs, DHS. Federal Protective Action 
Recommendations may include advice and assistance on measures to avoid or reduce exposure 
of the public to radiation from a release of radioactive material. This includes advice on 
emergency actions such as sheltering, evacuation, and prophylactic use of potassium iodide. 
Additionally, advice may be provided on long-term measures, such as restrictions on food, 
temporary relocation, or permanent resettlement, to avoid or minimize exposure to residual 
radioactivity or exposure through the ingestion pathway. The Advisory Team is chaired by the 
HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and includes members from EPA’s 
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), DHS, and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Advisory Team typically co-locates with the 
FRMAC, but provides recommendations directly to the Coordinating Agency. 
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Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center 
DHS established a multi-hazard Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center 
(IMAAC) to ensure that federal plume modeling efforts and communication are consistent across 
the government. While the IMAAC is a multi-hazard center, it was established specifically to 
address lessons learned from the TOPOFF2 dirty bomb exercise. In the event of an emergency, 
the IMAAC will provide atmospheric hazards predictions in support of the Coordinating Agency 
under the NRP for INSs. The IMAAC products will be recognized as the single source of federal 
hazards prediction and will be provided to federal, state, and local emergency responders and 
other government officials as necessary (DHS 2004c). The IMAAC will be responsible for 
providing accurate, reliable estimates of predicted hazard areas, with associated concentrations, 
which will serve as the foundation for decisions by the authorized emergency managers. It 
should be noted that the IMAAC is not intended to replace or supplant the atmospheric transport 
and diffusion modeling activities that are currently in place to meet agency-specific mission 
needs (DHS 2004c). 
EPA currently is working with DHS and the IMAAC to develop an approach for sharing 
IMAAC models during an emergency. OSCs and the EPA Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
currently are expected to have full access to IMAAC products during an emergency. The 
FRMAC also is coordinating with DHS/IMAAC regarding the coordination of data and 
modeling outputs during an emergency. 
2.5.2 EPA  Assets 
Environmental Response Team 
The Environmental Response Team (ERT) is a branch within EPA’s OSRTI that provides 
technical support to regional OSCs and Remedial Project Managers (RPMs) in responding to oil 
spills, hazardous materials emergencies, potentially hazardous situations, long-term remedial 
activities, and the detection and analytical method development for radiological, biological, and 
chemical agents. In the radiological area, the ERT is staffed with two Health Physicists whose 
collective experience exceeds 50 years in emergency response, site characterization and 
assessment, measurement, verification, cleanup, and disposal of materials contaminated with 
radioactivity. The ERT also maintains contractor support which includes two full-time personnel 
who provide health physics and radiation technician services, and additional access to 31 
contract Health Physicists. Equipment resources include alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron 
monitoring equipment, remote gamma surveillance systems, field gamma spectrometry 
equipment, large-area mobile gamma survey systems, air sampling and measurement systems, 
interdiction gamma detection systems, radon detection systems, radiation decontamination 
detectors, emergency response vehicles, and a mobile command post. The ERT stores and 
maintains radiation monitoring and evaluation equipment and supplies at its Cincinnati and Las 
Vegas facilities to support its own response activities, as well as to supplement regional 
equipment stores in the event of a major radiation release event. The ERT and its contractors 
provide technical and logistical health physics support to regional pre-deployments protecting 
major public events. The ERT also provides both basic and advanced radiation training to 
regional, state, and local response personnel. The ERT is prepared to respond to any incidents 
24-hours-per-day, 365-days-per-year. 
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National Decontamination Team 
The National Decontamination Team (NDT), in OSWER’s OEM, is the federal technical 
resource that supports domestic and international decontamination actions to protect human 
health, the environment, and national security. NDT focuses on decontaminating the infra­
structure from an INS, a specific mission that is not replicated by other EPA special teams under 
the NCP, such as the ERT, the RERT, or other elite response units from other federal agencies 
who may respond on-scene in the aftermath of an INS. Although NDT’s mission does not 
duplicate functions currently served by other assets, it coordinates with and complements other 
efforts. 
NDT’s competencies, capabilities, and training includes: 
•	 Advanced training in a variety of relevant disciplines including medical toxicology, 
biochemistry, risk assessment, health physics, industrial hygiene, and engineering that 
enables the team to tackle a broad range of complex, multi-disciplinary, problems 
•	 Extensive individual training and meeting physical fitness requirements for emergency 
response operations, including HAZWOPER (Level A entries), the Incident Command 
System, proper use of a wide-range of personal protective equipment (PPE), and 
specialized instruments suitable for an all-hazards venue 
•	 Maintaining security clearances as directed by OSWER’s OEM 
•	 Together with EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center (NHSRC) staff and 
others, assisting in bridging the gap between research and development and the delivery 
and vetting of products that enhance and improve field operations 
•	 Managing and deploying ASPECT aircraft for chemical and radiological incidents. 
The NDT is available 24 hours a day via pager at 800-329-1841. 
Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) 
EPA’s RERT draws personnel from ORIA’s national laboratories and headquarters. RERT 
provides OSCs with guidance and on-scene assistance at Superfund and emergency response 
sites and the FRMAC. RERT focuses on identifying and assessing potential impacts of low-level 
contamination. RERT assists federal, state, tribal, and local response efforts before, during, and 
following a radiological incident by: 
•	 Providing technical advice and assistance to prevent or minimize threats to public health 
and the environment 
•	 Providing advice on protective measures to ensure public health and safety 
•	 Providing assessments of dose and impact of any release on public health and the 

environment 

•	 Performing monitoring, sampling, laboratory analyses, and data assessments to assess 
and characterize environmental impacts 
•	 Providing technical advice and assistance for containment, cleanup, restoration, and 
recovery following a radiological incident 
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In addition to trained personnel, RERT provides mobile emergency response equipment 
including the RadNet monitoring system, Mobile Emergency Response Laboratories (MERLs), 
Mobile Sample Prep Laboratories, a variety of scanning and sampling equipment, and general 
support equipment. The two RERT Commanders, located in Montgomery, Alabama, and Las 
Vegas, Nevada, rotate as the primary contact for the Teams. The RERT Commander on rotation 
can be accessed 24-hours-per-day through the National Response Center. 
2.5.3 DOE  Assets 
DOE’s emergency response programs provide the national technical response to all nuclear or 
radiological emergencies within the United States and abroad. DOE provides expert technical 
advice in response to nuclear weapon accidents and significant incidents, radiological accidents, 
lost or stolen radioactive materials, and acts of nuclear terrorism. These assets facilitate access to 
nuclear weapons design and production knowledge, as well as provide deployable capabilities 
that can be configured rapidly for a time-phased response to any specific nuclear incident. All 
DOE assets may be deployed by contacting the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) at DOE Headquarters through the DOE Emergency Operations Center. 
Radiological Assistance Program Teams 
The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Teams are DOE’s primary accident response 
element and are comprised of health physicists and support personnel with a primary mission to 
perform radiological assessment and monitoring at an accident. The RAP Team is usually the 
first NNSA team to deploy to the scene of an accident or incident. The RAP Teams provide the 
initial DOE radiological emergency response and assist in the following: 
•	 Characterizing the radiation environment at the accident or incident scene 
•	 Identifying the presence of radioactive contamination on personnel, equipment, and 
property at the accident or incident scene 
•	 Determining the best methodology for personnel monitoring, decontamination, and 
material recovery 
The RAP Teams typically possess portable radiation detectors, air samplers, personnel protective 
clothing and equipment, and communication equipment. The RAP Teams are located in eight 
regional coordinating offices across the United States, as shown in Figure 2.3. Table 2.3 provides 
contact information. 
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Figure 2.3  DOE RAP Team Locations (DOE 2005) 
Table 2.3 DOE RAP Regional Contact Numbers (DOE 2005) 
Region 1, Brookhaven Area Office 
Region 2, Oak Ridge Regional Operations Office 
Region 3, Savannah River Operations Office 
Region 4, NNSA Service Center 
Region 5, Chicago Operations Office 
Region 6, Idaho Operations Office 
Region 7, Livermore Site Office 
Region 8, Richlands Operations Office 
DOE  HQ 
(631) 344-2200 
(865) 576-1005 
(803) 725-3333 
(505) 845-4667 
(630) 252-4800 
(208) 526-1515 
(925) 422-8951 
(509) 373-3800 
      (202)  586-8100 
Accident Response Group 
The Accident Response Group (ARG) responds in the event of an accident involving a U.S. 
nuclear weapon or a nuclear explosive device. The ARG, which is managed out of NNSA 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, brings expert personnel and specialized equipment for diagnosing, 
disabling, and rendering safe a damaged weapon or improvised device. ARG response is 
coordinated through the DOE Joint Nuclear [Weapon] Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC). 
The ARG first deploys an advance team–consisting of an Energy Senior Official, Senior 
Scientific Advisors, Weapon Recovery Director, Logistics Coordinator, Hazards Assessment 
Director, and Public Affairs Officer–to the scene, usually within a few hours after notification. 
The ARG advance team determines the type and number of personnel required and the 
equipment needed for the response. The RAP team provides radiological assessment and other 
information to the ARG. After this briefing, the RAP team works hand-in-hand with the ARG. 
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Aerial Measuring System 
The Aerial Measuring System (AMS) is based and operated out of Nellis Air Force Base in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, with additional operational capability at Andrews Air Force Base near 
Washington, DC (DOE 2005). The AMS aircraft carry radiation detection systems that provide 
real-time measurements of extremely low levels of ground and airborne contamination. AMS 
also can provide detailed aerial photographs and multi-spectral imagery and analysis of an 
accident site. AMS maintains both fixed-wing aircraft (Beechcraft B-200 or Cessna Citation) and 
helicopters (Bell 412). Aircraft can arrive quickly at the emergency scene to provide rapid 
mapping of the extent and levels of contamination. Figure 2.4 shows the approximate time from 
notification until data is in the hands of decision makers, for the B-200. While helicopters are 
slower than fixed-wing aircraft, they are able to travel at lower altitudes, typically 150 feet above 
ground, and can therefore provide a more detailed and complete radiological picture than can 
fixed-wing aircraft. However, because helicopters fly more slowly, the time between notification 
and provision of data is longer. A four-wheel drive vehicle-based radiation detection system, 
named KIWI, also can be used to develop highly detailed maps of any ground contamination. 
NNSA is then able to rapidly develop maps of the airborne and ground hazards. This enables the 
scientists to determine ground deposition of radiological materials and to project the radiation 
dose to which people and the environment are exposed. 
Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability 
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) provides real-time computer predictions 
of the atmospheric transport of radioactivity from a nuclear incident. These predictions use 
topographical and real-time meteorological data in a 3-D radiological dispersion model. Maps 
are produced that contain accumulated integrated doses, airborne concentrations, and contamina­
tion distributions. The ARAC, also known as the National Atmospheric Release Advisory 
Capability (NARAC), supports the IMAAC. 
Nuclear Emergency Support Team 
The Nuclear Emergency Support Team’s (NEST) mission is to provide specialized technical 
expertise to the federal response in resolving nuclear or radiological terrorist incidents (DOE 
2002). All response team activations and deployments are directed by DOE Headquarters after 
coordination with other concerned agencies. 
NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assess­
ment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render-safe procedures, and 
packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST capabilities are drawn from the nation’s 
nuclear weapons complex. Response teams vary in size from a five-person technical advisory 
team to a seven-person Search Response Team to a tailored deployment of dozens of technical 
specialists from NNSA’s nuclear weapons laboratories and facilities (including Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
Bechtel Nevada’s Remote Sensing Laboratory, and the Pantex Plant). The NEST specialized 
response teams include coordination and liaison, and advisory teams, search teams, technical 
operations teams, and planning support teams. The teams deploy with secure and non-secure 
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communications packages and Geographic Information System (GIS) databases that provide 
electronic mapping and demographics. 
Figure 2.4  DOE AMS B-200 Range Chart 
NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and 
assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render-safe 
procedures, and packaging for transport to final disposition. NEST capabilities are drawn from 
the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Response teams vary in size from a five-person technical 
advisory team to a seven-person Search Response Team to a tailored deployment of dozens of 
technical specialists from NNSA’s nuclear weapons laboratories and facilities (including Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada’s Remote Sensing Laboratory, and the Pantex Plant). The NEST 
specialized response teams include advisory teams, search teams, technical operations teams, and 
planning support teams that provide coordination and liaison. The teams deploy with secure and 
non-secure communications packages and GIS databases that provide electronic mapping and 
demographics. 
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Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 
The REAC/TS, an emergency response team of health professionals and radiation medical 
support, provides 24-hour medical consultation on health problems associated with radiation 
accidents. In addition, REAC/TS has a central training and demonstration facility where national 
and foreign medical, nursing, paramedical, and health physics professionals receive intense 
training in the treatment of radiation exposure. REAC/TS has been designated as the World 
Health Organization Collaboration Center for radiation emergency assistance.  
DOE FRMAC Assets 
DOE provides the resources and assets to activate FRMAC, as discussed in Section 2.5.1. These 
resources are primarily based and operated out of Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas, Nevada 
(at the DOE/NNSA Nevada Site Office), with additional assets elsewhere within DOE. When a 
FRMAC response is required and authorized by DOE Headquarters, DOE designates a FRMAC 
Director and initiates a FRMAC deployment. The FRMAC deploys as a phased response (DOE 
2005). Prior to the initiation of FRMAC operations, federal first responders coordinate radio­
logical monitoring and assessment data with the DOE Consequence Management Home Team 
(CMHT), contacted through DOE’s Emergency Operations Center. The CMHT operates within 
the Remote Sensing Laboratory in Las Vegas, Nevada, and integrates scientists from Sandia 
National Laboratories for nuclear effects modeling. This in-house component provides a reach­
back capability to support the deploying FRMAC assets in the field. The FRMAC Phase I can be 
expected to deploy in approximately eight hours (“wheels up” time), followed by FRMAC Phase 
II in about 11 hours (again, “wheels up” time). The full-field FRMAC (pictured in Figure 2.2) 
should be operational within 24 to 36 hours. All phased response times may vary depending on 
the location of the incident, travel, and weather conditions.  
The FRMAC Phase I (also known as the Consequence Management Response Team I, or CMRT 
I) is a 16-member rapid initial response capability (DOE 2005). This phase serves as a quick 
response element to augment the RAP Teams in U.S. responses. It also provides the core 
command and control for FRMAC contributions from other departments/agencies and state and 
local responders. The team will incorporate all the disciplines necessary to support operations 
(including radiation monitoring, sampling, analysis, assessment, health and safety, and support 
and logistics functions), but only on a limited scale. It is designed for rapid radiological data 
collection and assessment in order to provide early health effects advice and timely characteriza­
tion of the radiological situation to the officials responsible for making and implementing 
protective actions for the public. In addition, CMRT I has the capability to provide escort 
services for emergency workers entering potentially contaminated areas for lifesaving and/or 
forensic purposes. 
The FRMAC Phase II (also known as the CMRT II) is designed to dispatch as an augmentation 
team to CMRT I. The integrated CMRT II provides additional monitoring and assessment 
capability and 24-hour operations; establishes data, voice, and fax links with DOE offices; and 
establishes GIS support to the state and Coordinating Agency. If appropriate, the CMRT II will 
initiate preparations for the arrival of the FRMAC. 
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For deployments to remote areas, DOE has the resources and capability to establish technical 
operations centers in tents equipped with portable generator alternating current power, air 
conditioning/heating, satellite communications, radio communications, tables, chairs, and other 
support equipment. In addition, tents, sleeping bags, and food can be provided for several days 
(sufficient meals ready to eat [MREs] for 100 people for three days) for the housing and care of 
the phased responders. 
The full field FRMAC organizational chart is shown as Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2 shows the basic 
and most common operational configuration for the FRMAC during a major radiological 
emergency, as exercised at nuclear power plant and weapons exercises. However, this chart may 
be modified for smaller radiological deployments. The full field FRMAC includes participation 
by the Coordinating Agency and state. 
2.5.4 DoD  Assets 
For radiological responses conducted under the NCP alone, DoD assets must be accessed 
through DoD Headquarters. The National Response Team has recently issued guidance on how 
to access DoD resources, which can be found at www.nrt.org. For INSs under the NRP, initial 
requests for DoD Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) resources go to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat. Requests originating at the Joint Field Office go to 
the Defense Coordinating Officer (with limited exceptions, including USACE support, which 
can be accessed through ESF #3, and National Guard forces employed under State Active Duty 
or Title 32 status, who can be accessed through the state. Specific resources of potential interest 
to OSCs are listed below). 
Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team 
The Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team (MRAT) can be deployed from the Armed Forces 
Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), a tri-service facility in Bethesda, Maryland, that 
conducts research in the field of radiobiology and related matters essential to the operational and 
medical support of the DoD and the Military Services (DoD 2005). MRAT provides expertise in 
radiation risk communication, personnel dose estimation, hand-held nuclide identification, and 
radiation medicine (including chelation therapy, emetics and/or cathartics, protectants, and 
psychological awareness). MRAT also can provide technical advice regarding (but not perform) 
external personnel decon, perform internal and wound personnel decon, use site restoration 
software and models for both plume prediction and health physics interpretation, and provide 
waste disposal advice. 
Air Force Radiation Assessment Team 
The Air Force Radiation Assessment Team (AFRAT) is a field-qualified 37-person team of 
deployable health physicists, industrial hygienists, and laboratory technicians stationed at the Air 
Force Institute for Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis (DoD 2005). 
Assets include a forward-deployed field laboratory, supplemented by reach-back radioanalytical 
capability at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. The AFRAT may deploy to any location, worldwide, 
within 24 to 48 hours (time to arrive). It may provide a full range of equipment, force protection 
dosimetry, and consultation about health physics, industrial hygiene, and environmental quality. 
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The capability is comprised of five teams: Nuclear Incident Response Force I, Nuclear Incident 
Response Force II, Radiological Reconnaissance Laboratory I, Radiological Reconnaissance 
Laboratory II, and Field Laboratory for Assessment of Radiation Exposure. During an 
emergency, these teams may provide: 
•	 Onsite detection, identification, and quantification of ionizing radiation hazards 
•	 External dosimetry support for force protection of up to 1,000 measurements a day 
•	 Twenty-eight extra-duty personnel that include occupational health physicians, health 
physicists, bioenvironmental engineers, bioenvironmental engineering technicians, 
radioanalytical laboratory technicians, radiochemists, and laboratory technicians with 
expertise in industrial hygiene and environmental quality 
Radiological Advisory Medical Team 
The Radiological Advisory Medical Team (RAMT) is a U.S. Army rapid-response team 
specifically designed to provide timely expert guidance and services to the Combatant 
Commander, the DoD Senior Federal Official, and/or local medical authorities. It can provide 
limited medical support to response teams in controlled areas (DoD 2005). In peacetime or war, 
the RAMT is capable of responding to a wide variety of events involving limited or mass nuclear 
casualties, radiologically contaminated patients, or exposed populations from events, such as 
reactor accidents, radiological terrorism, or nuclear war. The RAMT may deploy within four 
hours of notification. During an emergency, the RAMT may provide:  
•	 Guidance relative to the potential health hazards to personnel from radiological 

contamination or exposure to ionizing radiation 

•	 Evaluation of survey data to provide technical guidance to the responsible officials using 
radiologically contaminated areas 
•	 Monitoring of medical facilities and equipment where contaminated patients have been 
evacuated 
•	 Advice on the potential health hazards from exposure to sources of ionizing radiation and 
the decontamination of personnel, medical treatment facilities, and medical equipment 
•	 Advice on early and follow-up laboratory and clinical procedures 
•	 Assistance with a bioassay program 
Consequence Management Advisory Team 
The Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT), which is coordinated from DoD’s U.S. 
NORTHCOM Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), is trained and equipped to help a DoD 
lead responder to assess and predict contamination after a nuclear incident (DoD 2005). A 
CMAT advance party may deploy to assess the onsite situation and may be followed by 
additional personnel depending on the situation. The CMAT advises the DoD lead official on 
overall federal response procedures and requirements associated with a nuclear weapon accident 
response. The MRAT also deploys as part of the CMAT. The CMAT’s deployment time depends 
on aircraft availability. During an emergency, the CMAT may provide: 
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•	 Hazard prediction and modeling capability 
•	 Secure and non-secure satellite voice, data, and fax communications 
•	 Public affairs personnel 
•	 Legal counselors 
•	 An extensive technical publications library on nuclear weapons and materials 
•	 Guidance and advice on current techniques for radiation injury treatment and internal 
decontamination 
•	 Casualty estimates (Biodosimetry Assessment Tool) 
•	 Guidance and advice about the potential health hazards and performance decrement 
effects from exposure to various doses of ionizing radiation 
•	 Advice on appropriate bioassay and clinical procedures 
•	 MRAT physicians who have access to, and expertise in, the use of pharmaceutical agents 
for treating radiation injury, including internal contamination 
U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force 
Despite its name, the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) responds to 
radiological and nuclear incidents (USCG 2005). The CBIRF, located in Indian Head, Maryland, 
is designed to deploy immediately in the event of a credible threat of a CBRNE incident in order 
to assist local, state, or federal agencies. CBIRF assistance includes coordinating initial relief 
efforts, security, detection, identification, expert medical advice, and limited decontamination of 
personnel and equipment. CBIRF consists of specially trained personnel and specialized 
equipment suited for a wide range of operational contingencies. Through detection, 
decontamination, and emergency medical services, the CBIRF capabilities are intended to 
minimize the effects of a chemical, biological, or radiological incident. CBIRF is prepared to 
respond on short notice to incidents worldwide in assisting the on-scene commander in providing 
initial post-incident consequence management. There are five functional elements within CBIRF 
that deploy in an emergency situation to assist in the response: 
•	 The Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) reconnaissance element, responsible for 
detecting the location of an incident site 
•	 The Decontamination element, which decontaminates personnel and equipment exposed 
to any contamination 
•	 The Medical element, which is capable of providing triage support to casualties during 
and after decontamination 
•	 The Security element, which provides security for the contaminated site as well as assets 
operating within the area 
•	 The Service support operations element, which provides shelter, food, and water so 
CBIRF can operate in a contaminated site  
U.S. National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams 
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) are designed to augment 
terrorism response capabilities in events known or suspected to involve WMD (USCG 2005). 
The WMD-CST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE incident site by 
identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising 
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on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support to facilitate 
additional resources. Each unit is made up of 22 full-time National Guard members, and consists 
of six sections:  command, operations, communications, administration/ logistics, medical, and 
survey. Members have been specially trained and equipped to provide a technical reach-back 
capability to other experts. The team integrates into the ICS in support of the local IC. Each 
WMD-CST has the capability to provide rapid detection and analysis of chemical, biological, 
and radiological hazard agents at WMD incident scenes, and is equipped with a mobile 
Analytical Laboratory System. 
WMD-CSTs are currently based in Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. By 
2007, there will be one team in every state and territory. 
2.5.5  Department of Labor/OSHA Health Response Team (HRT) 
The HRT, based in Utah, is available to provide technical assistance in the areas of industrial 
hygiene and specialized engineering (USCG 2005). The HRT is organized into four specialized 
response teams in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and structural collapse, which 
are supplemented by additional team members located throughout the country in OSHA field 
offices. The HRT is designed for, and serves to conduct, the following:  
•	 Respond to occupationally related emergencies that may involve potentially catastrophic 
releases of hazardous materials 
•	 Provide technical expertise in recognizing and evaluating health and safety hazards 
associated with a wide range of complex industrial operations 
•	 Evaluate and recommend appropriate engineering controls, and provide onsite technical 
expertise for complex, unusual, and high-priority occupational hazard investigations 
•	 Work with the Directorates of Health and Safety Standards in developing new standards, 
and design and conduct studies to obtain data that the standards development 
organizations can use to form the basis for making decisions 
•	 Maintain current national and international safety and health awareness and technological 
advances involving industry practices and specific work processes to advise OSHA 
program offices of their potential impact on existing OSHA programs 
•	 Provide national technical experts for hazardous waste site activities 
•	 Provide testimony as needed during contested cases or in the standards-setting process. 
FBI, Laboratory Division, Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) 
Located in Quantico, Virginia, the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) responds 
to criminal acts and incidents involving the use of hazardous materials, including radiological 
devices. HMRU also develops the FBI’s technical proficiency and readiness for crime scene and 
evidence-related operations in cases involving chemical, biological, and radiological materials 
and wastes (USCG 2005). While the HMRU is unlikely to be called upon to assist the OSC, 
OSCs should be aware of their role in investigating a crime scene involving radiological devices. 
40
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
3. EPA  RESPONSE 
Several different surreptitious mechanisms exist for the introduction of radioactive materials as 
part of a terrorist attack. Some of these mechanisms are: 
•  Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) 
•  Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
•  Soluble radionuclides introduced into a large drinking water supply 
•  Consumer product tampering at a factory or production site 
•  Crop sprayers being used to spread aerosols over large surface areas 
All of these mechanisms present their own special circumstances requiring the deployment of 
EPA radiological monitoring assets/resources. In the initial phase of all but the RDD/IND type 
scenario, OSCs would have a more focused effort on the radioactive contamination problem and 
less on loss of life and immediate life threatening conditions. Additionally, the OSC would have 
credible information that a radiological event occurred, and environmental monitoring for a 
specific (and likely already known) radiological substance will be required. 
In the RDD/IND scenario, first responders and OSC personnel will be concerned with life saving 
activities first and contamination/radiation issues second. For such an event there will be scant 
details about the radioactive materials present and the OSC will have minimal resources at their 
disposal for detailed measurements of these materials.  
For these reasons, this chapter focuses on an event where there is insufficient lead time to deploy 
these assets. The chapter is intended to provide OSCs with radiological response guidance when 
the Health Physicist and significant radiation monitoring assets are not yet onsite.  
The first on-scene responders to a potential terrorist threat are local officials—fire and police 
departments. Unless a terrorist attack involving radioactive material is targeted on a nuclear 
facility, it is possible that radiological aspects of the event may not be recognized by first 
responders to the scene (NCRP 2001). Because of EPA’s statutory responsibilities under the 
NCP to respond to releases of oil, hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants, local 
officials often call EPA to assist them in responding to these types of releases. It is likely that 
EPA OSCs and Superfund Technical Assistance and Response Team (START) contractors will 
be on scene during the first few hours after an incident. Therefore, it is critical that OSCs be 
equipped with the proper radiation/radioactivity detection and dosimetry instrumentation and 
understand the role they can play to support the local response effort. 
To understand the role they can play, OSCs must first understand the actions they can take with 
limited resources to provide key information that can be acted upon. A full radiological 
characterization of the incident will not happen until additional resources arrive; however, some 
general protective actions can be implemented based on limited survey data to help the local 
emergency responders maintain control of the scene and keep their radiation exposure as low as 
is practicable. The magnitude of the initiating event will determine the quantity and type of 
response assets (e.g., personnel, air monitoring equipment) that OSCs will mobilize to respond.   
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Immediate response assets will vary from region to region, but one to two OSCs and two to five 
START contractors are typical during the first few hours of an event.  
Most likely, significant state and federal radiological resources will not be on scene during the 
initial emergency response phase of an incident. Even after these resources arrive, it will still 
take some time before the magnitude of a terrorist attack involving radioactive material is 
understood. Local emergency responders plan for and respond to transportation incidents 
involving hazardous materials all the time. Protective actions that are implemented by local 
responders for hazardous materials incidents are essentially no different than actions taken for an 
incident involving the intentional dispersal of radioactive material. Local responders generally 
follow the protective actions found in the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) Emergency 
Response Guidebook when responding to hazardous materials incidents (DOT 2004). However, 
the implementation of these protective measures cannot occur until the radiological aspects of 
the site are recognized. 
Depending on the nature of the incident, local responders may be inundated with fire fighting 
and life-saving operations, so air monitoring may not occur initially. In this situation, air 
monitoring both inside and outside the exclusion zone is justified to support the implementation 
of protective actions. Radiological monitoring data should be collected to answer the following 
questions: 1) has radioactive material been detected and at what level? and 2) can it be 
transported from one area to another? This basic information will allow the Incident Commander 
(IC) to take actions that will protect the public and help the local responders control the spread of 
radioactive material before information is obtained on the nature and extent of contamination.   
Performing air monitoring in urban environments is more complicated than in rural environ­
ments. The presence of large buildings or structures creates complex wind patterns that 
emergency responders should become familiar with. The following section presents some of the 
common patterns of plume transport in urban environments. 
3.1  COMMON PATTERNS OF PLUME TRANSPORT IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 
Although not an everyday phenomenon, releases of hazardous gases and aerosols that pose a 
potential threat to human life do occur in populated urban environments. These releases may 
stem from onsite accidents, as in the case of industrial chemical releases during transport of 
hazardous chemicals (tanker truck or railroad spills), or from predetermined acts, as in the case 
of a chemical, biological, or radiological agent terrorist attack (LANL undated). 
At accident sites, emergency responders typically are responsible for maintaining order, 
determining safe zones, and performing rescue and evacuation. In the event of a toxic cloud 
release in an urban area, emergency responders need to be cognizant of the complicated transport 
and dispersion processes that occur around building structures in order to make sound decisions. 
This subsection is meant to help emergency responders, managers, and training personnel 
become familiar with some of the more common patterns of plume transport and dispersion that 
develop in built-up urban areas. The example list that follows describes common situations that 
may occur in an urban environment and gives warnings about potentially fatal consequences if 
the situation is misinterpreted. These examples are not meant to tell the emergency responder 
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what to do, but rather to warn the emergency responder that sometimes unexpected or counter­
intuitive flow phenomena may occur. The objective of the examples that follow is to give the 
emergency responder more knowledge so that he or she is better able to anticipate problems. 
It is very important to understand that, because of the complexities of urban built-up areas, it is 
difficult to generalize rules for plume transport and dispersion that work for every case. Evidence 
suggests that transport and dispersion around buildings or other structures is very complicated 
and transport and dispersion patterns may be very different depending on building shape, relative 
heights, and other factors. These examples were developed to give emergency responders a 
general idea of some of the complexities of plume transport and dispersion in built-up areas. 
Caution should be used in applying “go/no go” decisions based on the following examples. 
Apparent Wind Anomalies. The locally measured wind may not match the large-scale wind 
direction due to building-induced circulations. Because of the complicated flows that develop 
around buildings, a measurement of wind made at ground-level may not be indicative of the 
upper-level prevailing wind. Evacuation zones far downwind must be determined by the larger­
scale plume transport that follows the prevailing wind, not the local wind. 
Agent Trapping in Vortices. For winds traveling approaching a building face-on, 
concentrations of hazardous material can build up in between the buildings and take a relatively 
long time to flush out. Air contaminants can become trapped between buildings in slow moving 
vortices, thus taking longer to flush out with clean air. In most cases, wider buildings and 
narrower streets will trap the pollutant longer. 
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Agent Entrapment. Recessed entryways or architectural alcoves may trap and hold air 
contaminants for some time after the plume has passed. Even after the main portion of the plume 
has disappeared, some of the air contamination may have collected in alcoves and other zones of 
stagnation. 
On-Axis Channeling Effects. For winds parallel to the street, the plume can become contained 
within the street canyon; however, the plume can travel up side streets. If the prevailing wind 
direction is parallel to the street containing the release, contaminated air is likely to travel several 
blocks in each direction along site streets. 
Off-Axis Channeling Effects. The plumes can get channeled by streets near the source and end 
up traveling off the prevailing wind direction axis. For determining larger-scale evacuation 
zones, the plume initially may be transported in a direction off-angle from the prevailing wind. 
Once the plume gets dispersed above the buildings, it will then travel with the prevailing wind, 
but the plume’s center will be offset from the release point. 
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Eddy Transport of Agent. The air contaminant can move short distances against the prevailing 
wind direction in recirculation zones along the sides and top of buildings. Even if the source is 
determined to be downwind, contaminated air may be found at locations near the building 
upstream of the source, as the plume can travel short distances in the direction opposite the 
prevailing wind. 
Large-Scale Wind Variability. The prevailing wind switches direction occasionally, so the 
upwind safe zone may now be downwind. The prevailing wind is not fixed and under some 
circumstances can change direction quickly. Thus, monitor the prevailing wind direction so that 
safe zones can be maintained. 
Small-Scale Wind Variability. The local wind can switch directions very rapidly, causing the 
plume to switch from one side of a building to the other side in a matter of seconds. Due to the 
turbulent nature of the wind, it is very common for a plume to bounce from one side of a 
building to the other. Therefore, it may not be safe on one side of a building just because the 
plume is currently on the other side. 
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Agent Deposition. After the plume has left the area of release, the ground and building surfaces 
may still be contaminated due to deposition of the toxic agent. Because the contaminant may 
stick to surfaces, touching surfaces in the vicinity of the release point is not recommended until 
decontamination is complete. 
Indoor Effects. When the plume is passing over, it is probably safer to remain indoors. After the 
plume has passed by, it may be safer to move outdoors. For an outdoor release, modeling studies 
show that concentrations can initially be lower indoors, but then later the concentrations become 
lower outside. These relationships, however, depend upon the details of the building ventilation. 
3.2 INITIAL  RESPONSE  ASSETS 
The following is a bulleted list of air monitoring equipment that OSCs should have available to 
them while on primary response. Detailed description and operational readiness guidelines can 
be found in the Quick Start Guides (QSGs). The QSGs can be found on the OSC website at 
www.epaosc.org. 
•  Micro-R meter 
•  GM pancake detector probe 
•  Ion chamber 
•  Alpha scintillation probe 
•  Alpha/beta/gamma/neutron detector 
•  SAM-935 multi-channel analyzer 
•  Multi-Rae 5 gas monitor 
•  Data-ram particulate monitor 
•  Radeco air sampler (LB 5211 glass fiber filters) 
•  Siemens EPD Mk2 real time dosimeter 
•  Plastic wrapping materials to prevent contamination of equipments 
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•  EPD Mk2 Dosimeters 
•  Glassine envelopes 
3.3 RESPONSE  PROCEDURES 
All OSC responses to releases of hazardous material must include an assessment for the presence 
of radioactive material. Prior to any initial response to a hazardous material incident, each OSC 
should ensure that they are responding with the response assets listed in Section 3.2. Prior to 
deployment, operational checks of the radiation instruments should be performed. Follow the 
QSGs specific to each instrument. Note the background readings in your log book. The Micro-R 
and GM pancake survey meters should be placed in the front seat of the vehicle with the audible 
turned on. The survey meters should be on the lowest multiplication scale (i.e., the most 
sensitive). Arrive upwind if there is a visible smoke plume. As you arrive on scene, be sure that 
the meters are still reading background. Listen for a change in the audible tone or look at the 
meter face. If the levels are greater than twice background, wrap all meters in plastic to protect 
them from getting contaminated. Wrap only the non-detector surfaces on the pancake detector. 
Upon arrival at the scene, the OSC should obtain a situational briefing by the IC or his or her 
representative. Offer EPA air monitoring and response assets to the local response effort and 
establish EPA’s role in the incident action plan. If the response notification guidelines have been 
exceeded and the IC is not aware of the presence of radioactive material, inform the IC of these 
readings and follow the Radiological Entry/Egress procedures that follow and those that are 
presented in the Radiological Response Standard Operating Procedure 402 (RRSOP-402) 
Scoping Survey Approaches and Strategies. Remember, the scene also must be screened for 
chemical and biological agents as well as radioactive material. All EPA radiological survey data 
should be recorded on Radiological Response Survey Form 900 (RRSF-900). This form can be 
found in RRSOP-402 (available on companion CD or at www.epaosc.org). 
At any time during the response, if you encounter exposure rate levels (micro-R meter) and/or 
count rate levels (GM pancake detector) greater than the response guideline values, additional 
notifications must be made. The OSC should start the notification chain by informing the IC. 
Next the OSC should notify the Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT) Commander, 
the DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Team covering your region, and the State 
Radiation Program. Radiation technical and response support can be obtained from these entities. 
These additional notifications can be made by the Regional Duty Officer. The response notifica­
tion guidelines are 100 micro-Roentgens per hour (µR/hr) with the micro-R meter and a 
continuous deflection greater than 330 counts per minute (cpm) with the pancake detector. 
These levels refer to an ambient (i.e., a general area) reading, not a reading on a few objects or in 
small areas (i.e., contact readings). This means that as you are surveying the scene, 100 µR/hr or 
330 cpm is an ambient, continuous reading and above your previously established background 
reading. 
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3.4  RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE STANDARD OPERATING GUIDANCE (SOG) 
3.4.1  Pre-Deployment & Arrival Procedures 
As described in Chapter 2, DOE is the Coordinating Agency for certain radiological terrorism 
incidents under the NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex. This Coordinating Agency role 
transitions from DOE to EPA for cleanup and site restoration at a mutually agreeable time. One 
of the responsibilities of the Coordinating Agency is to ensure the coordination of technical data 
which includes analysis, storage and dissemination. The first DOE asset to arrive on-scene will 
typically be the Regional Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) team(s). The RAP teams do 
not have the capability to set up an electronic database. While the FRMAC has this capability, 
the EPA OSC may arrive on scene prior to the FRMAC. In this case, the EPA OSC can assist 
DOE by setting up an electronic database, i.e., SCRIBE, to store all onsite air monitoring data 
including any available EPA, DOE RAP, and state and local radiological monitoring data. 
Access to SCRIBE will be provided to DOE assets (the DOE Consequence Management 
Response Team) and the DHS IMAAC, so they can access the data remotely prior to the 
FRMAC's on-scene arrival. Once the DOE FRMAC personnel arrive and establish their own 
database capabilities, the FRMAC database will become the official Federal repository for 
radiological data. EPA will continue to store its own radiological and non-radiological data in 
SCRIBE, and continue to make the SCRIBE data available to the FRMAC. 
Pre-Deployment Operational Checks 
a. 	 Perform operational checks on Micro-R meters (i.e., model 192, 19) and pancake 
detectors (2241-2 coupled to model 44-9 pancake detector) in accordance with QSGs. 
b. 	 Place radiation meters in front seat of vehicle or dashboard with audible ‘on.= 
Arrival Procedures 
a. 	 If there is a visible smoke plume, arrive up-wind of the scene. 
b. 	 Check radiation meters against notification guidelines. The notification guidelines are an 
ambient reading of 100 FR/hr with the Micro-R meter and/or 330 cpm with pancake 
detector. (These are equivalent readings when calibrated to a 
137Cs source.) 
c. 	 If first responders have set up an exclusion zone for the public, drive outside the 
perimeter of the exclusion zone, one to two kilometers downwind, recording any readings 
above background (see Figure 3-1). Record these readings on RRSF-900. If guidelines 
are exceeded, make notifications to EPA, the RERT Commander, DOE RAP, and state 
and local radiological response programs. Notifications can be made through the National 
Response Center. Radiation data also must be reported to IMAAC for accurate, reliable 
estimates of predicted hazard areas, with associated concentrations. These models will 
serve as the foundation to support protective action decisions by the authorized 
emergency managers. 
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Figure 3.1  Sampling locations for a hypothetical 
incident at the Chicago Board of Trade. 
d. 	 Collect wipe samples of any visible dust in areas where notification guidelines were 
exceeded. Follow contamination assessment procedures in section 4 of this SOG.  
e. 	 If removable contamination exists, recommendations should be made to the IC that the 
exclusion zone be expanded and radiological protective actions implemented. Removable 
contamination is contamination deposited on the surface of structures, areas, objects, or 
personnel that can be readily spread or removed by physical means. (Any 
recommendations should be made in consultation with DOE and the RERT.) 
f. 	 Follow radiological perimeter, reconnaissance, and exclusion zone monitoring procedures 
49
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
3.4.2 Pre-Entry  Procedures 
Planning 
a. 	 Synchronize the EPA and the IC=s action objectives. 
b. 	 Establish the EPA role in the incident response plan. 
c. 	 Collect all first responder radiation data and record as Afirst responder data@ on form 
RRSF-900. 
Organize Assets and Brief Personnel 
a. 	 Establish an initial-entry team. 
b. 	 Establish a backup team. 
c. 	 Establish a decontamination team (exclusion zone exit self-surveys may have to be 
performed until additional assets arrive; see Chapter 6). 
d. 	 Brief all personnel on the required tasks to accomplish during the entry. 
e. 	 Communicate  situation,  objectives, control measures, access restrictions, and turnback 
criteria (Chapter 4). 
Safety Planning and Medical Screening 
a. 	 Develop site-specific Health and Safety Plan (HASP) (see Appendix 2). 
b. 	 Perform  medical  screening  on  entry team, backup team, and if available, decontamination 
team. 
c. 	 Radiological health and safety requirements include thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) 
badges, EPD Mk2 real-time dosimeters, and briefing on radiological turn-back levels (1.5 
Roentgens/hour). 
Equipment Calibration and Operational Checks 
a. 	 Inspect the personal protective equipment (PPE) for signs of cracks, rips, tears, or other 
defects. 
b. 	 Follow QSG for chemical agent detectors. 
c. 	 Follow the QSG for the SAM-935, Ludlum Model 43-90 alpha scintillator, and Eberline 
RO20 ion chamber. 
d. 	 Verify that your staging area is free of contamination. 
e. 	 Conduct communication checks between entry team, backup team, Lead OSC, and 
decontamination team. 
Don PPE (Level C is appropriate for radiological hazards; unknown conditions require a 
minimum of Level B.) 
a. 	 Use the buddy-team method to don PPE. 
b. 	 Inspect and verify the proper PPE fit and function. 
Entry Clearance 
a. 	 Request permission from the Lead OSC and IC to enter the exclusion zone. 
b. 	 Record time on air, entry team personnel names, and equipment taken into exclusion 
zone. 
c. 	 Entry team verifies required tasks and plan of action for entry to the Lead OSC. 
d. 	 Confirm  decontamination line is established and the backup team is ready. 
e. 	 Receive clearance and permit entry team to enter the exclusion zone. 
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3.4.3 Entry  Procedures 
Reconnaissance 
a. 	 Adjust the reconnaissance plan, as required, to meet the needs of the IC and OSC to 
ensure there is a mission justification for all entries. 
b. 	 In developing the reconnaissance plan consider the following objectives: 

1) Locations and types of hazards; 

2) Physical layouts and descriptions; 

3) Casualty status or information; 

4) Additional requirements; and 

5) Video and/or still camera pictures . 

Monitoring Initial Entry Procedure 
a. 	 Conduct non-radiological air monitoring (Multi-Rae 5 gas monitor) throughout 
operations to identify any atmospheres that are corrosive, combustible, or oxygen­
deficient; toxic substances that are immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH); and 
exposures over Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs). 
b. 	 Approach the center of the incident scene from the downwind direction. Place Radeco air 
sampler at 100 µR/hr point (follow the QSG). Place small “x” on the exterior surface of 
the filter paper. Record flow rate and start time on form RRSF-900. 
c. 	 Continue to walk in a line and record dose rate (micro-R) measurements at 100 FR/hr, 
500 FR/hr, and 1 milli-Roentgen per hour (mR/hr) level on form RRSF-900. 
Measurements should be collected at waist level. 
d. 	 With the SAM-935, collect one-minute spectrum at the 100 FR/hr location. This is a high 
enough exposure rate to identify the isotope(s). Record the identified isotope(s) and 
spectrum number on RRSF-900. The SAM-935 should be in MCA mode with the 
following isotopes enabled; 
137Cs, 
60Co, 
226Ra, 
192Ir, 
241Am, and 
239Pu. 
e. 	 Collect a wipe sample at each monitoring point location in an area that is likely to contain 
loose surface contamination. With moderate pressure, swipe an area approximately 3 
inches by 6 inches and place wipe in a glassine envelope. 
f. 	 Mark radiological monitoring location with pin flags, marking paint, or duct tape. 
g. 	 Record all readings including Global Positioning System (GPS) locations of 

measurement points on form RRSF-900. 

3.4.4  Egress Procedures 
a. 	 Exit exclusion zone through the Contamination Reduction Corridor (CRC or 

decontamination line). 

b. 	 Place hand tools and monitoring instruments taken into the exclusion zone at a table or 
inside a bucket provided in the designated equipment/instrument drop station . 
c. 	 Position the tools and monitoring equipment so that the incoming Entry Team can easily 
acquire them. 
d. 	 Remove the outer gloves and place them in a designated container. 
e. 	 Follow standard PPE doffing protocols. The order of PPE removal will depend on the 
level of protection. Step-by-step doffing and personnel decontamination procedures can 
be found in RRDSOP 601 (currently under development). 
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f. 	 Personal contamination surveys must take place in a low background environment 
Perspiration should be removed from hands and face using paper towel or other absorbent 
material. 
g. 	 If the Entry Team is using a self-frisking technique, set up the GM pancake detector with 
the window facing up and move finger tips and the palms of each hand across the 
detector. Speed is about 1 to 2 inches per second. Count rates with the GM pancake 
greater than 100 counts per minute above background reading (as a continuous 
deflection) should be considered contaminated and personal decontamination is 
recommended. 
h. 	 If no contamination is found on the hands, pick up the unit and scan the bottom of the 
feet and underside of the neck where the respirator was worn.  
i. 	 If contamination is detected on hands, feet or the underside of the neck, decontamination 
of these areas should be performed and a full body scan should follow. 
j. 	 If no contamination is found on the hands, feet and neck, a full body scan is not 

warranted. 

3.4.5 Contamination  Assessment 
Contamination Swipe Surveys 
a. 	 Survey/count the swipe samples in an area where the ambient radiation level is at normal 
(pre-event) background levels. 
b. 	 Place the filter paper on a flat non-contaminated surface and count for 15 seconds with a 
Ludlum Model 2241 on the “det 2” setting with the Ludlum Model Probe 43-90 to 
determine if alpha contamination is present. Record the result on form RRSF-900. 
c. 	 If the reading is greater than 5 times background, contamination exists. 
d. 	 To determine if loose beta/gamma contamination is present, change the Probe to the 
Ludlum Model 44-9 and switch to the “det 1” setting on the Ludlum Model 2241. Record 
the result on form RRSF-900. 
e. 	 If the reading is greater than 2 times background, contamination exists. 
Filter Paper Alpha Airborne Radioactivity Determination 
a. 	 Count the filter paper for 10 minutes with a Ludlum Model 2241 on the “det 2” setting 
using the Ludlum Probe model 43-90. Record results form RRSF-900. 
b. 	 Wait for 30 minutes and count again. If the filter paper count rate decreases by                             
approximately one-half, then the radioactivity is most likely due to radon                           
decay products. If the count rate does not decrease, then the radioactivity most                             
likely exists and Level B, or greater, respiratory protection should continue to be worn in 
this area. 
Filter Paper Beta Radioactivity Determination 
a. 	 Count the filter paper for 10 minutes with a Ludlum Model 2241 on the “det 1” setting 
with the Ludlum Probe model 44-9. Record results on form RRSF-900. 
b. 	 Wait for 30 minutes and count again. If the filter paper count rate decreases by 
approximately one-half, then the radioactivity is most likely due to radon decay products. 
If the count rate does not decrease, then the radioactivity is due to some other beta 
activity. This indicates that a radioactive airborne condition exists and Level C 
respiratory, or greater, protection should continue to be worn in this area. 
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3.4.6 Sample  Shipping/Analysis and Reporting 
Shipping 
a. 	 Prepare the sample for transport. Transfer sample collection media to appropriate 

containers and label in accordance with the chain-of-custody procedures. Record any 

pertinent information on a separate Chain-of-Custody Form for group sample transfer 

b. 	 Ship airborne radioactivity samples that are greater than twice background after 30­
minute decay to a certified lab (a list of certified labs is in development by EPA working 
in conjunction with DOE; once available, it will be posted to www.epaosc.org) and 
request the following analyses: Alpha spectroscopy for the actinides (i.e., 
234U, 
235U,
238U, 
230Th, 
232Th, 
238Pu, 
239Pu, 
240Pu, 
241Am), total strontium, and gamma spectrometry. 
c. 	 Report all survey and contamination assessment data to the IC as well as to the RERT, 

DOE RAP, and state/local radiological response programs. 

3.5 ENTRY/EGRESS  FOLLOW-UP 
3.5.1  Confirming or Negating the Presence of Removable Contamination 
It is essential for responders to confirm or negate the presence of removable contamination at the 
scene. Information about removable contamination can be used by the IC to make decisions 
about implementing protective actions in order to protect the public and maintain control of the 
incident scene. Based on early local and EPA monitoring data, the OSC can provide guidelines 
to the IC, who can then make the decision to implement predetermined protective actions to 
protect the responders and the public. 
3.5.2 Implementation  of  Immediate 
Actions  Immediate Actions to Consider 
If removable radioactive material is confirmed at the 
scene, the following additional protective actions 
should be considered: 1) evaluation of responder 
personal protection equipment; 2) restriction of 
contaminated vehicles and equipment to the exclusion 
zone; 3) sheltering and isolation of potentially 
•	 Protect emergency responders health 
and safety 
•  Evaluate responder personal protection 
equipment  
•  Rotate teams to decrease individual 
exposure 
•  Avoid contact with debris 
contaminated victims until radiation screening is  •	 Restrict contaminated vehicles and 
completed; 4) implementation of personnel radiation  equipment to the exclusion zone 
surveys for victims and responders from the exclusion  •  Shelter and isolate potentially 
zone; 5) decontamination of contaminated victims and  contaminated victims 
equipment; and 6) release of protective action  •  Implement personnel radiation surveys 
information to the public. While an OSC may not be  for victims and responders from the 
responsible for implementing each of these actions, he  exclusion zone
or she should work with the local IC to ensure that 
these steps are taken as soon as possible.  •  Decontaminate contaminated victims 
and equipment 
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Emergency Responder Health and Safety 
In the event of a RDD explosion, emergency responders (i.e., police and fire departments) carry 
the greatest risk of radiation exposure. The safety of response personnel is of the highest priority; 
therefore, responders should follow standard measures to keep their radiation exposures to As 
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels. These actions include wearing a self­
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) at all times while in a controlled area. This action should 
be strictly enforced by the local command staff. The responders also should limit the amount of 
time they risk exposure to the radiation sources by rotating teams to different areas of the 
exclusion zone. Most importantly, the response personnel should avoid moving or touching 
visible pieces of debris, which may be radioactively contaminated, and may be critical evidence 
of criminal activity. If at all possible, victims should be removed to a triage area and not treated 
in an area where debris is visible. 
Restriction of Contaminated Vehicles and Equipment 
Restricting potentially contaminated emergency response vehicles and equipment to the 
exclusion zone will help limit the spread of radioactive material contamination and help maintain 
control of the incident scene. Vehicle and personnel traffic should have one specific entry and 
egress point. Criteria for release will depend on circumstances. Only personnel and equipment 
that are surveyed should be released. If practical, any vehicles or equipment already in the 
exclusion zone should remain dedicated to the exclusion zone until it is appropriate to 
decontaminate the vehicles and equipment. 
Sheltering and Isolating Potentially Contaminated Victims 
If the presence of removable radioactive material is confirmed, the IC should coordinate with 
local authorities in considering sheltering the public for a short duration until the release is 
secured and visible dust has settled to the ground. Immediate evacuation of the public is not 
appropriate for an urban RDD scenario, because evacuating members of the public would be 
directly exposed to the airborne plume. The DOT Emergency Response Guidebook recommends 
that for large quantities of radioactive material involved in a fire (Guide 164-166), evacuate 
1,000 feet in all directions (DOT 2004). With a RDD in a major metropolitan city, this order 
could involve thousands of people, which could make this decision impracticable. In addition, 
once the RDD has occurred, the opportunity to avoid exposure by evacuation has largely passed. 
Keeping the public inside buildings will provide adequate protection against internal and external 
exposure from the plume until an orderly exit plan can be implemented. 
Implementation of Victim Radiation Surveys 
Victims will be classified according to their injuries and urgency for hospital care. The levels of 
severity for a victim’s injury are classified by first responders. The following is an example of a 
first responder classification protocol developed for the City of Chicago: 
•	 Black: Victim does not have vital signs and will be left at the scene until after                                            

other victims in critical condition are addressed 
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•  Red: Victim is in serious condition and needs immediate transport to hospital 
•  Yellow: Victim is injured and able to move but still needs transport to hospital 
•  Green: Victim does not have any injuries and does not need transport to hospital 
Transportation and treatment of injured victims should not be delayed for radiological surveys or 
decontamination. Life threatening injuries always take precedence over potential radioactive 
material contamination. If it does not delay transportation or treatment, victims should receive a 
personal radiation survey. Radiological monitoring of victims is the responsibility of the local 
responders. If a request is made for radiation monitoring and decontamination of victims, the 
OSC can request support from State Radiation Programs and HHS which, under Emergency 
Support Function #8 of the National Response Plan, is responsible for radiation monitoring and 
decontamination of victims. HHS coordinates limited federal resources to assist, as DOE 
provides support to HHS for monitoring and decontaminating victims for radiological incidents. 
Release of Information Fact Sheets to the Public 
The OSC should request the immediate deployment of a public information officer (PIO) and a 
community relations specialist to advise the OSC and integrate into the ICS. Any questions 
regarding public safety should be directed to the incident’s PIO. The PIO will provide 
information with recommendations such as bagging clothes and taking a thorough but tepid 
shower to remove any potential radiation contamination. Updated information will be provided 
via local media outlets. 
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4. HEALTH  AND  SAFETY 
Many aspects of health and safety are common to  This chapter assumes that all EPA OSCs 
every response to a hazardous materials incident.  responding to radiological incidents have 
However, the response to ionizing radiation poses  been or are enrolled in a Radiation 
a few additional unique or uncommon health and  Health and Safety Program consistent 
safety concerns that the National Response Plan’s  with the following:  
(NRP’s) Worker Safety and Health Annex 
addresses. For instance, special considerations  •  EPA’s Safety, Health, and Environ­
should be made for female workers that declare  mental Management (SHEM) 38 
they are pregnant (EPA 2006).  (SHEM Guidance No. 38) (EPA 
2006)
The NRP’s Worker Safety and Health Annex is  •  EPA’s Medical Surveillance Program
always activated for Incidents of National  Implementation Plan (EPA 2005a) 
Significance (INSs) and other situations involving  •  EPA’s Radiation Health and Safety significant worker safety and health issues. This  Implementation Plan (EPA 2005b)  Annex likely will be activated for a large-scale 
•  Nuclear Regulatory Commission  radiological incident, including a terrorist 
(NRC) regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 incident. 
standards for radiation protection. 
OSHA is the Coordinating Agency for this annex, 
and several agencies, including EPA, are Cooperating Agencies. OSHA and the Cooperating 
Agencies provide staff to support the (Incident Command Post (ICP) Safety Officer. Their 
assistance may be provided in, but is not limited to, the following areas:   
•	 Ensuring that site-specific occupational safety and health plans are coordinated and 
consistent 
•	 Identifying and assessing hazards 
•	 Conducting responder personal exposure monitoring  
•	 Providing responder medical surveillance and medical monitoring  
•	 Coordinating and managing exposure data  
•	 Developing and implementing personal protective equipment (PPE) programs 
•	 Resolving conflicts regarding worker safety and health 
4.1  DOSE LIMITING SYSTEMS 
4.1.1 Rationale 
EPA’s dose limitation system is based on three principles:  
•	 Justification. There should not be any planned occupational exposure of workers to 
ionizing radiation without the expectation of an overall benefit from the activity causing 
the exposure and an analysis of the available options and alternatives. 
•	 Optimization. A sustained effort should be made to ensure that collective doses, as well 
as annual, committed, and cumulative lifetime individual doses, are maintained As Low 
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As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into 
account. 
•	 Limitation. Radiation doses received as a result of routine and/or emergency 

occupational exposure should not exceed the Administrative Control Level (ACL) 

established under EPA’s Health and Safety Program (EPA 2006). 

4.1.2  EPA’s Usual Practices 
EPA has established an ACL and an Action Reference Level (ARL) that are based upon the 
premise that EPA employees, as a usual practice, are not radiation workers. Thus, their annual 
exposure should be controlled to levels well below those allowed to radiation workers (i.e., 5 rem 
annual dose) and more in line with those levels considered acceptable to the general public. 
•	 EPA’s ACL is 500 mrem committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from intake plus 
external whole-body dose (the combination is the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)) 
in any period of twelve consecutive months. The ACL is the maximum acceptable dose 
for an individual worker during any twelve consecutive months. If a worker has reached 
the ACL, work assignments with a potential for additional radiation exposure should be 
restricted until the ACL is again satisfied. The ACL may be exceeded with a waiver. 
SHEM 38 contains the rules regarding waivers (EPA 2006). 
•	 EPA’s ARL has been set to alert supervisors and workers to the constant need for 
maintaining good radiological protection practices, and to help ensure that long-term 
worker exposure does not exceed the ACL. The ARL has been set to 50 mrem/quarter 
whole-body external exposure or internal effective dose equivalent. Any worker’s 
exposure that exceeds this ARL will immediately trigger a supervisor notification and 
documented review of the circumstances relating to the excursion. The ARL may be 
exceeded with a waiver. Rules regarding waivers are detailed in SHEM 38 (EPA 2006). 
4.1.3  EPA’s Emergency Practices 
Emergency responders may be exposed to radiation while assuring protection of others and of 
valuable property. These exposures could be justified if the benefit for those protected outweighs 
the detriment to the worker. However, lower administrative levels should be used whenever 
possible. EPA’s OSCs are considered emergency workers, and thus the recommendations 
provided by EPA for emergency worker dose limitations issued in EPA-400 “Manual of 
Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents,” also known as the 
“PAGs” (EPA 1992a), are applicable. Table 4.1 shows the emergency worker dose levels.  
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Table 4.1 EPA Emergency Responder Dose Guidance from EPA-400 
Dose Limit TEDE
a (rem*)  Activity  Condition 
5  all None 
10  protecting valuable property  Voluntary; lower dose not 
practicable 
25  lifesaving or protection of 
large populations 
Voluntary; lower dose not 
practicable 
>25 
lifesaving or protection of 
large populations 
Only on a voluntary basis to 
persons fully aware of the 
risks involved 
a Sum of external effective dose equivalent and committed effective dose equivalent, or TEDE, to nonpregnant 
adults from exposure and intake during an emergency situation. These limits apply to all doses from an incident, 
except those received in unrestricted areas as members of the public. 
* For x and gamma radiation, Rad ~ rem  ~ Roentgen (R). 
Exceeding the administrative control level requires concurrence of the senior EPA 
official onsite, the Incident Commander, the Health and Safety Officer, or the Radiation 
Safety Officer. 
Table 4.2 provides EPA-specific gamma exposure rates (Turnback Levels) at which emergency 
responders should seek further guidance before proceeding. Responders using handheld gamma 
radiation instruments can compare their readings to the levels in the table. If the responder’s 
activities are deemed mission-justified, going into areas with levels higher than the turnbacks 
may be allowed. Exceeding EPA’s ACL requires concurrence of the senior EPA official onsite, the 
Incident Commander, the Health and Safety Officer, or the Radiation Safety Officer. Lower levels 
should be used whenever possible. 
Table 4.2 EPA Emergency Responder Gamma Exposure Rate Turnback Levels 
Time Period  Employee Type  Turnback Level  Condition 
Early Phase: 
(Release ONGOING) 
OSCs, initial EPA 
responders 
10 R/hr 
Voluntary, with supervisor 
review, for lifesaving or 
critical actions ONLY – 
evaluate anticipated 
doses against dose limits 
above 
Early Phase: 
(Release terminated) 
OSCs, RERT-
Forward, ERT and 
initial EPA 
responders 
Intermediate Phase: 
(Some data available) 
OSCs, RERT-
Forward, ERT  1.5 R/hr  Dose management 
imperative 
Late Phase: 
Cleanup 
Any EPA 
employees, RERT-
Support and Home 
Teams 
Site specific 
according to site 
health and safety 
plan 
EPA Action Reference 
Level: 50 mrem/quarter 
and Administrative Control 
Level: 500 mrem/year 
Important: DOSE MANAGEMENT should begin at 1 millirem per hour 
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Table 4.3 provides guidance specific to detecting and protecting responders in the presence of 
loose alpha or beta contamination. Alpha and beta contamination pose an internal hazard which 
may complicate the responder’s work. Additional personal protective equipment and detection 
instruments must be used. The Turnback Level of ≈ 400 cpm on the “National Buy” instruments 
are a rough approximation based on assumptions noted in the table. Caution should be exercised 
in any situation involving loose or airborne alpha or beta contamination above natural 
background. 
Table 4.3 Respiratory Protection and Alpha/Beta 
Personal protective equipment (tyvek, boots, gloves) should be worn in the presence of any 
alpha or beta contamination above natural background. 
Appropriate respiratory protection should be worn in the presence of loose alpha or beta 
contamination above natural background.  
Incidents involving airborne alpha or beta emitters require proper instrumentation as noted 
below. 
At all times, worker exposures should be As Low As Reasonably Achievable. 
Alpha on the ground turnback level  Beta on the ground turnback level 
2,000 dpm/100 cm
2 { ≈ 400 cpm with National 
Buy instrument Ludlum model 2241-2 (or 
comparable) coupled with alpha probe model 43­
90} 
10,000 dpm/100 cm
2 { ≈ 400 cpm with National 
Buy instrument Ludlum 2241-2 (or comparable) 
coupled with pancake probe model 44-9} 
Leave the area until you have protective clothing 
and respiratory protection - evaluate actions 
against dose limits 
Leave the area until you have protective clothing 
and respiratory protection - evaluate actions 
against dose limits 
Informed safety decisions regarding subsequent site activities should be made based on air 
sample analysis and nuclide identification. These values assume a static measurement on the 
ground (or a flat surface) at a distance of 1cm. Alpha-only or beta-only instruments may 
respond erroneously in a high gamma rate field – be aware! 
Informed safety decisions regarding subsequent site activities should be made based on air 
sample analysis and nuclide identification. These values assume a static measurement on the 
ground (or a flat surface) at a distance of one centimeter. Alpha-only or beta-only instruments 
may respond erroneously in a high gamma rate field (readings persist after the probe has been 
moved away from surface). 
People who are not trained in radiation response may serve as PIOs, headquarters liaisons, or 
emergency operations center personnel at the Joint Field Office or Emergency Operations 
Centers. If such personnel must be deployed to forward locations (not including field work), they 
should be issued thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) badges, but EPA’s ACL of 500 mrem/year 
should not be waived. 
4.1.4 EPA’s  Radiation Site Practices 
Once the emergency response is over and site cleanup activities are ongoing, under the newly 
revised SHEM 38 guide, normal administrative dose levels and criteria apply to EPA employees. 
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It should be noted that OSHA’s regulations differ in subtle but significant ways (especially 
pertaining to dose levels) from the NRC’s regulations that apply to sites with licensed material. 
Thus, the OSCs should ensure that the site-specific Health and Safety Plan is consistent with 29 
CFR 1910.1096. 
The OSHA regulations include several areas that must be addressed by the Health and Safety 
Manager, including: 
•  Exposure of individuals to radiation in restricted areas  
•  Exposure to airborne radioactive material 
•  Precautionary procedures and personal monitoring 
•  Immediate evacuation warning signals 
•  Posting requirements and exceptions from posting requirements 
•  Shipping issues with radioactive materials 
•  Storage of radioactive materials 
•  Waste disposal 
•  Notification of any incidents and overexposures 
•  Employee records 
For example, under 29 CFR 1910.1096, a radiation worker is required to take radiation safety 
training as well as site-specific health and safety training. Environmental surveillance programs, 
such as air monitoring, may be required depending on the nature of the work. Internal contami­
nation surveillance programs, such as bioassays, may be required depending on the nature of the 
work. External whole body radiation monitoring, such as using a TLD badge, will be required for 
workers expected to exceed 10% of their gamma whole body exposure limit. 
Note that the START contracts beginning in FY 2006 require the contractor to maintain a 
radiation program that is consistent with the 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. 
4.2 DOSIMETRY 
4.2.1  External Dosimetry Requirements 
All OSCs are issued a TLD badge as well as an electronic dosimeter. OSCs are expected to wear 
both when responding to sites. In addition, if OSCs integrate with a Federal Radiological 
Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) response, they may be asked to wear an additional 
TLD badge processed by a Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program (DOELAP) 
or National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredited processor. 
FRMAC may provide a dose report to each participant’s home organization after the conclusion 
of the individual’s activities. However, FRMAC dosimetry does not replace the TLD and 
electronic dosimeters issued by EPA. The EPA dosimetry record serves as the dose of legal 
record. Electronic dosimeters are useful for monitoring dose to an individual on a daily basis, 
thereby providing greater assurance that exposures are ALARA. Electronic dosimeters may not, 
however, be used as a legal dose of record. Guidance for wearing external dosimeters (including 
TLD and electronic dosimeters) includes the following: 
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•	 The dosimeter must be worn on the chest area on or between the waist and the neck 
unless otherwise instructed by health and safety personnel. 
•	 The dosimeter is to be worn only by the individual to whom it was issued. Lost, 
damaged, or contaminated dosimeters must be reported immediately to the Health and 
Safety staff.  
•	 If a participant discovers that his/her dosimeter is missing while in a radiological area, 
he/she should immediately leave the area, then notify the team leader and report the 
missing dosimeter to the Health and Safety Manager. A new TLD or electronic dosimeter 
will be issued by Health and Safety as appropriate.  
•	 Dosimeters must be returned or exchanged at the time designated by the Health and 
Safety Manager, upon request, or at the end of the operation. 
4.2.2  Internal Dosimetry 
Participants exposed to loose (i.e., removable) radioactive material or who work in areas where 
radioactive material may be inhaled may be asked to submit bioassay samples and participate in 
whole-body, lung, or wound counting. The term bioassay refers to the assessment of the quantity 
of radioactive material present in the body. A bioassay may be used to verify the performance of 
a respirator and to ensure that the appropriate protection factor is applied. The evaluation of an 
individual’s CEDE is based on bioassay data rather than air concentration values unless bioassay 
data are unavailable or inadequate, or internal dose estimates based on representative air 
concentration values are demonstrated to be as, or more, accurate.  
If necessary, EPA’s Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) and Safety, Health, and 
Environmental Management Program (SHEMP), working with REAC/TS, develop a site­
specific Bioassay Plan for inclusion in the site-specific Health and Safety Plan. The Health and 
Safety Manager is responsible for performing preliminary CEDE estimates based on air sampling 
results. Dose assessments, based on bioassay results, are assigned after samples have been 
collected and analyzed. Personnel should be notified promptly of a confirmed positive bioassay 
result and dose assessments with subsequent refinements.  
Bioassays may be required during general operations initiated in response to an occurrence to 
determine if there has been an intake of radioactive material. Bioassay sampling may also be 
requested as a follow up to a known intake in order to quantify the intake and monitor the status 
of the radioactivity. The data are used to refine the dose assessment, depending on the radio­
nuclide, method of ingestion/inhalation, and biological half-life. 
Whether or not bioassay is warranted is usually based on the following considerations, but 
bioassays may be requested as a precautionary measure at the discretion of Health and Safety 
Manager in the field: 
•	 Amount of material released and the respirable fraction 
•	 Amount of time the person was in an airborne radioactivity area 
•	 Whether respiratory protection and anti-contamination measures were employed 
•	 Level of the resuspension factor 
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The internal dose assessment program involves tracking and reviewing air monitoring results to 
determine trends, and collecting nasal smears or nose blow samples, urine samples, or fecal 
samples to monitor intakes of transportable radionuclides. Additionally, in vivo measurements 
are used to monitor the deposition of non-transportable radionuclides. The internal dose 
assessment program should be designed to rapidly detect a release of radioactive material and/or 
a breach of respiratory protection. 
Two types of bioassays are used. There is the in vivo bioassay, which involves counting living 
tissue, and there is the in vitro bioassay, which involves counting samples, such as urine, blood, 
phlegm, and nasal smears. 
In Vivo Bioassay Measurements 
In vivo techniques consist of direct measurements of gamma or X-radiation emanating from the 
body from contamination that has been ingested, inhaled, or injected into the body. Even without 
a baseline measurement, this method is very useful for any radionuclide that emits or has 
daughters that emit photons of sufficient energy to escape the body. The photon flux must be 
large enough for measurement in a reasonable time period, even though the quantity of material 
in the organ is very small. In vivo measurements may also be useful for thyroid, wound, or post­
intake whole-body counting. Whole body counts, lung counts, thyroid counts, and biological 
sampling should be performed as soon as practical after a suspected intake of a photon emitter. 
Some examples of appropriate non-routine in vivo bioassays are: 
•	 Lung counts following a suspected intake of thorium, uranium, or any of the transuranics 
(lung counts are not as sensitive as analysis of bioassay samples) 
•	 Whole body counts for detecting most gamma-emitting fission and activation products 
•	 Thyroid counts for suspected radioiodine uptakes 
•	 Urine and feces sampling and whole body counting to detect and assess intakes of the 
actinides 
In Vitro Bioassay Measurements 
The amount of material present in the body is estimated using the amount of materials present in 
excretions or secretions from the body, such as urine, blood, breath, sputum, sweat, saliva, hair, 
nasal discharges, tissue, and feces. Laboratory personnel may need training, vaccinations, and 
equipment appropriate for working with potential blood-borne pathogens, such as hepatitis. Fecal 
bioassays typically are used for alpha-emitting radionuclides if a lower minimum detectable 
activity is required. However, during a rapid deployment, acquiring fecal samples may be 
impractical; therefore, urine bioassays may be the method of choice for most applications. As a 
default, a one-liter (or 24-hour) sample should be collected prior to exposure to contaminants (as 
practical), and then every two weeks during exposure, and once again at the conclusion of 
activities. Sampling frequencies can be adjusted, based upon the unique circumstances. A urine 
bioassay may be required for detection of pure beta-emitters, such as 
90Sr and 
89Sr. Calculation 
requires knowledge and use of metabolic models that allow sample activity to be related to 
activity present in the body. The resulting dose calculations used to quantify committed and 
effective dose equivalents are estimates, representing an average. This is due partly to the use of 
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default values for measurements that cannot be made readily, such as mass of particular organs, 
volumes of particular fluids, metabolic rate, in lieu of actual values for each individual involved. 
4.3  RECORDING OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES  
In addition to participating in an EPA Radiation Health and Safety Program (consistent with 
EPA’s Medical Surveillance Program Implementation Plan) and any site-specific medical 
monitoring/dosimetry program, EPA workers who receive any type of known occupational 
exposure above the ARL or ACL (or local control limit) must report the exposure immediately to 
their direct supervisor. All known radiation exposure above the ARL or ACL (or local control 
limit) should be reported to the Regional Safety Officer (RSO)/SHEMP Manager or designee as 
soon as possible so that further exposure monitoring or dose assessments can be completed. The 
worker also must submit the following two forms to their supervisors:  
•  Cover Memo to EPA Form 1440-9, Supervisor’s Report of Accident/Illness 
•  EPA Form 1440-9, Supervisor’s Report of Accident/Illness 
The worker’s supervisor should complete the forms and provide copies to the RSO/SHEMP 
Manager or designee, who in turn ensures that any other required forms are completed and any 
other necessary parties are notified of the occupational exposure, as required. 
If a worker reports an accident or illness, it is that worker’s responsibility to consult the 
RSO/SHEMP Manager or designee for advice and to inform the supervisor if he or she wants or 
needs follow-up medical evaluation, treatment, or time off from work. The RSO/SHEMP 
Manager shall begin procedures for follow-up care or worker’s compensation as warranted. The 
worker’s supervisor shall retain approval authority in worker’s compensation and follow-up 
medical care cases. In an emergency situation in which immediate medical care is warranted, the 
appropriate forms may be submitted after the emergency medical care has been provided. 
4.4  RADIATION AREA LIMITS 
4.4.1  Usual Work Practices 
Under normal situations, any area in which radiation levels exceed those in Table 4.4 will be 
considered a radiation area and controlled accordingly. Any area in which contamination levels 
exceed those in Table 4.4 will be considered a contamination area and controlled accordingly. 
During a response to a significant uncontrolled release (e.g., RDD) other (higher) criteria may be 
appropriate, particularly during the early and intermediate phases of a response. 
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Table 4.4 Radiation Area Limits* 
Area  Level  Distance from 
Ground 
Radiation Area  5 mrem < X > 100 mrem in 
one hour 
30 centimeters 
High Radiation Area  100 mrem < X > 500 rad in 
one hour 
30 centimeters 
Very High Radiation Area  X > 500 rad in one hour  1 meter 
*based upon 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 835 
4.4.2 Emergency  Practices 
ALARA should be maintained during emergencies. No exposure should be permitted without a 
mission justification. However, during an emergency, as noted above in Section 4.1.3, allowable 
dose levels may be increased. Zoning the event scene into hot, warm, and cold zones will help 
reduce radiation exposures and aid in controlling the spread of contamination. The size of the 
event scene determines the size of the zones and the control points needed. Because site-specific 
conditions may vary widely, responders should choose reasonable exposure rate (gamma) or 
activity concentration (alpha/beta) levels for the zone boundaries. The turnback levels, provided 
in Table 4.2, may be helpful in evaluating these boundaries. When possible, the outer perimeter 
of the warm zone should be established. This is where contamination levels are at or near 
background when measured with a count rate instrument. If establishing an outer perimeter is not 
practical because of the size of the event, adjustments can be made. The warm zone can be 
utilized for decontamination efforts. The cold zone barrier should be established at a location 
where all access to and from the warm zone will be continuously monitored and all personnel are 
accounted for (logged in and out). 
4.5  HOTLINE AND DECONTAMINATION 
In an incident involving radioactive materials or radioactivity, as in any event where contami­
nation is present, a clear demarcation line must be established. This line establishes the 
controlled area. It is across this control line where field responders must don and doff PPE and 
exposure monitoring devices. It also is across this line where field samples are accepted through 
the sample control mechanism. The hotline and sample control structure ensures that 
contamination is not transferred from the controlled areas to the greatest extent possible, and 
provides a first opportunity to perform quality assurance and quality control measures on 
samples coming in from the field. Procedures and processes consistent with EPA’s Standard 
Operating Safety Guides should be followed (EPA 1992b). Similarly, responders and equipment 
should be monitored and decontaminated prior to removal from contaminated zones. 
Personnel and equipment surveys must be performed in a low-background environment with the 
appropriate survey instrument. Surface contamination can usually be detected by direct monitor­
ing methods; however certain situations require the use of indirect methods, such as swiping. The 
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monitoring method must have sufficient sensitivity to detect the contaminant of concern at the 
level needed. (See Chapter 5 for equipment selection and relevant procedures).  Currently, there 
are no specific “clearance” levels set for EPA’s release of previously contaminated materials. 
However, EPA is currently participating in the development of an interagency MARSAME 
(Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment) supplement to 
the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM; EPA 2000a), 
which will include an appendix that summarizes disposition criteria from five federal agencies 
for various materials (e.g., scrap metals, building debris, dispersible bulk materials, furniture). 
Public review of the draft MARSAME is expected in 2006. 
4.6  DEVELOPMENT OF THE HASP 
EPA has developed a tool called the Environmental Response Team Chemical/Biological/ 
Nuclear Health and Safety Plan (ERT CBN-HASP) Wizard (available at www.epaosc.net) to 
assist OSCs or their designees in developing a Health and Safety Plan for radiation emergency 
responses. In addition, OSHA, with EPA support, has developed EHASP, available at 
www.dol.osha.gov. Although the current version of this document is intended for use at longer­
term sites, an emergency response version is under development. Appendix 2 contains an 
example HASP.  
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5. 	 RADIOLOGICAL  STANDARD  OPERATING 
PROCEDURES 
The procedures described in this chapter were developed to provide uniformity of actions by all 
EPA regions and their contractors in response to a significant radiological incident. This discus­
sion assumes that a full response is necessary and that the Incident Command System (ICS) is in 
place. Personnel are expected to be trained in and follow these procedures, or obtain permission 
from the OSC prior to deviating from them. Compliance with these procedures provides assur­
ance that information collected in the field will be consistent, of good quality, and compatible for 
integration into the FRMAC (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center). 
Specific procedures for implementing the instrumentation setup, collection of samples, and 
monitoring of various media are in a companion compact disc (CD) that will be posted on 
www.epaosc.gov.  
Radiological monitoring is conducted with standardized instrumentation to determine the actual 
and potential hazards from radiation and contamination. Generally speaking, the same instru­
ments are used in the early, intermediate, and late phases of a response to a radiological incident. 
However, the critical information requirements vary by phase. As a result, the use of  radiologi­
cal monitoring instruments and reporting of radiological monitoring data may vary depending on 
a number of factors, including time available, controls in place, and significance of the release. 
Guidance on which instruments may be required in various phases of the response can be found 
in Chapter 3. 
The instrumentation used to collect monitoring data must meet quality assurance requirements in 
order to provide with certainty that the data are valid for the intended purpose. The purpose for 
monitoring is defined by the OSC. 
An approach for defining the type, quantity, and quality of data is described by the Data Quality 
Objective (DQO) process (Section 5.5 Data Quality Objectives). The DQO process is recom­
mended for each phase of a response to define the monitoring tasks that are to be conducted by 
field monitors. 
5.1 	 RADIATION FIELD SURVEYS 
During an emergency response, one of the first tasks is to determine if radioactive material is 
present. If radioactive material is present, data collection is initiated to (1) determine the type of 
radiation; (2) identify the specific radionuclide(s); and (3) determine the relative abundance of 
the radionuclide(s). Once this information is obtained, a more thorough survey can be performed 
by sampling and taking direct measurements. The survey design should delineate the location 
and concentration of the radioactive material. This information provides the basis for deter­
mining the risk associated with the radioactive material, and guides further remedial action 
decisions. 
A field survey should assure the effectiveness, efficiency, and defensibility of the data collected. 
The type, quantity, and quality of the data collected should support the decision-making process, 
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and therefore promote the efficient use of resources by eliminating unnecessary or overly precise 
survey data. However, before an instrument is put to use in the field, DQOs must be established 
to assure that the proper instrument is selected for the appropriate field survey. The data quality 
requirements for each type of survey are different because the end use of the data is different. 
(Section 5.3 Data Quality Levels) 
Field surveys fall into four broad categories: 
•  Operational surveys 
•  Release surveys 
•  Remediation surveys 
•  Special surveys 
5.1.1 Operational  Survey 
Operational surveys include routine investigation of areas with established quantities of 
radioactive materials, as well as surveys conducted to determine the potential presence of 
unknown quantities of radioactive materials. Boundaries, postings, and controls are based on 
operational surveys. To determine the relative quantity of radiation, operational surveys require a 
functional instrument that is not necessarily qualified to provide precise measurements. Data 
collected during operational surveys requires instrument quality control and checks that 
correspond to data quality levels (DQL) 1-3, depending on the expected use of the survey data 
(Section 5.3 Data Quality Levels). 
5.1.2 Release  Survey 
Release surveys are conducted to allow materials that have been in a contamination or airborne 
radioactivity area to be unconditionally released or cleared. Because release limits are precisely 
defined and generally close to background, a calibrated instrument with a current determination 
of the detection limit is required. Data collected during release surveys require instrument quality 
control and checks that correspond to DQL 1. 
5.1.3 Remediation  Survey 
Remediation surveys include: (1) scoping surveys that are used to confirm the presence of 
radioactive materials; (2) characterization surveys that are used to minimize the uncertainty in 
remediation plans; (3) remedial action surveys that quantify the progress of the remedial actions; 
and (4) final or release surveys to confirm that the remediation effort was effective. Data 
collected during remediation surveys requires instrument quality control and checks that 
correspond to DQLs 1 and 2 depending on the expected use of the data. 
5.1.4 Special  Survey 
Examples of special surveys include source leak tests, transportation surveys, and preoperational 
surveys to develop the area background. Data collected during special surveys requires 
instrument quality control and checks that correspond to DQLs 1 and 2, depending on the 
expected use of the data. 
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5.2 PROCEDURES 
The companion CD, which will be posted on the Internet, contains Radiological Response 
Standard Operating Procedures (RRSOPs) and associated forms for use in supporting radio­
logical field activities. The RRSOPs are consistent with the radiological procedures and data 
reporting formats used by FRMAC. They were developed with the intention of using the 
National Incident Management System concepts and principles that will enable responders at all 
levels to work together effectively to manage domestic incidents.  
The procedures have been organized into the following Series to allow for the addition of new 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and to provide a method for keeping similar SOPs 
together: 
•  100 Series 	 Instrument Management 
•	 200 Series  Alpha scintillation, gas proportional, and Geiger Mueller detectors 

operation and quality control 

•  300 Series 	 Exposure rate instruments operation and quality control 
•  400 Series 	 General survey techniques and approaches 
•  500 Series 	 Sampling methods (air, water, soil, subsurface, and sediment) 
•  600 Series 	 Entry and egress area controls 
Quick Start Guides and the Radiological SOPs augment each other. Quick Start Guides have 
been developed to describe how to put an instrument into operation. The RRSOPs describe how 
to use the instrument to collect data that meets the DQLs described in Section 5.3. The SOPs are 
more specific and directive than the Quick Start Guides in regard to setting up and using instru­
ments. The data acquired from the use of the SOPs are quantitative in nature and provide 
defensible records. 
The Quick Start Guides typically discuss putting monitoring instruments into field use. They are 
useful tools for a field worker, who must initialize the appropriate instrument as expeditiously as 
possible to rapidly screen an area for radiological hazards within defined limits. The field worker 
may then be directed to conduct a brief survey. The survey results allow the OSC to prioritize 
work efforts. If the area does not have elevated radiation levels, other potential hazards may be 
addressed. Conversely, if elevated radiation is detected, then the OSC knows that the area must 
be adequately controlled and managed.  
One Quick Start Guide deals with Air Sampling, which should be included in the preliminary 
evaluation of an area since airborne concentrations of radioactive material are seldom detectable 
with radiation survey instruments. Other types of sampling, including water sampling, may be 
required on a case-by-case basis as directed by the OSC. 
A number of the SOPs refer to the Radiological Point of Contact, who is the senior or designated 
Health Physicist for the response. This person may be the OSC or a Health Physicist from the 
Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA) or another organization within EPA. The Radio­
logical Point of Contact may be the Region Radiation Safety Officer. The Radiological Point of 
Contact is designated by the OSC. 
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In 2004, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER) approved the 
National Buy strategy, a program that standardizes the procurement of radiological monitoring 
instrumentation for EPA’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). This innovative procure­
ment program has provided a realistic means to uniformly train personnel, exchange or augment 
equipment from region to region as necessary, and effectively minimize maintenance and 
calibration costs. The standardized instruments provide consistent data if used in a prescribed 
manner. These SOPs provide that uniformity. 
The following SOPs will be updated regularly based on a number of sources: 
•  Lessons learned 
•  Equipment modifications 
•  Input from parallel organizations 
•  Review comments from users 
Ongoing training is necessary to maintain familiarity with the SOPs. It is too late to learn the 
content of applicable SOPs at the scene of an incident. Effective training requires a walkthrough 
of the procedures using the actual equipment and forms. This training is reinforced by field 
exercises using developed scenarios that test certain SOPs. 
5.3  DATA QUALITY LEVELS 
For planning purposes, this guide establishes DQLs 1-3 for monitoring with radiation detection 
instrumentation. These DQLs apply a graded approach for collecting radiation data. Level 1 
represents the highest quality of data, while Level 3 represents the lowest. Table 5.1 defines each 
level, and describes instrument use, DQO data requirements, field surveys, and appropriate 
quality controls and checks. 
Table 5.1 Data Quality Levels and Instrument Quality Checks 
Data  Data Quality Objectives-  Instrument Use  Instrument quality controls and 
Quality  Data Requirement  checks 
Level 
1  • Data is used for risk 
assessment 
• Data is used for inter­
agency comparability 
• Data is generated for 
regulatory compliance 
• Measurement 
• Operational surveys 
• Release surveys 
• Remediation 
surveys 
• Special surveys 
• Instrument is calibrated annually or 
has a technical basis document 
• Representative background is 
established where the instrument 
control checks are performed 
• Prior to use, a control chart is 
developed with a reproducible 
geometry and quality control (QC) 
source at the field logistics center or 
instrument storage  
• A QC source check is performed 
before and after field use 
• A source response check is 
performed and documented at 
scheduled times during field use. 
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Data  Data Quality Objectives-  Instrument Use  Instrument quality controls and 
Quality 
Level 
Data Requirement  checks 
2  • Data is used to monitor 
changing conditions within 
defined boundaries 
• Data is specific to an 
operation or activity 
• Data is comparable to 
other data collected at this 
scene 
• Measurement 
• Operational surveys 
• Remediation 
surveys 
• Special surveys 
• Instrument is calibrated annually or 
has a technical basis document  
• Representative background is 
established where the instrument 
control checks are performed. 
• A source response check is 
performed and documented before 
and after field use and at scheduled 
• Data is used to provide 
immediate recognition of 
unexpected changes in 
radiation levels or quality 
times during the use of the 
instrument in the field. 
3  • Data is obtained quickly 
• Data is used to determine 
if controls for radioactive 
materials are necessary 
• Detection 
• Operational surveys 
• Instrument is calibrated annually or 
has a technical basis document 
• Prior to use, a background value is 
determined  
• Data is comparable only to 
other data collected by 
this instrument during this 
use 
• Prior to use, a source response 
check is performed to verify that the 
instrument responds to the radiation 
of interest 
From Table 5.1, it can be concluded that DQL 1 qualified instruments are used to release items 
following decontamination procedures. DQL 3 instruments are used early on to determine if 
there is a radiological hazard, and if so, the general areas of the most concern. DQL 2 
instruments are used for most monitoring operations, pre-job and post-job surveys, and other 
support. 
5.4  DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT 
When radiological data collection is required, a Data Quality Assessment (DQA) should be 
performed after the data collection is complete. DQA is the scientific and statistical process of 
evaluating: (1) whether the results of an environmental data collection effort are of the right type, 
quality, and quantity to support their intended use; and (2) whether DQOs established for the 
data have been met. Data quality, as a concept, is meaningful only when it relates to the intended 
use of the data. Therefore, the context for using the data set must be established as a yardstick for 
judging whether or not the data are adequate. 
DQA can answer two fundamental questions:  
1. 	 Can the decision (or estimate) be made with the desired confidence, given the quality of the 
data set? 
2. 	 How well can the sampling design be expected to perform over a wide range of possible 
outcomes? If the same sampling design strategy is used again for a similar study, will the 
data support the same intended use with the desired level of confidence, particularly if the 
measurement results turn out to be higher or lower than those observed in the current study?  
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The DQA process involves first verifying that the assumptions under which the data collection 
design and DQOs that were developed have been met, and then taking appropriate corrective 
action if the assumptions have not been met. The DQA process evaluates how well the data 
collected support the type of decision that must be made and whether scientifically valid and 
meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the data.  
To the extent possible, the DQA methods and procedures outlined in EPA’s Guidance for Data 
Quality Assessment, Practical Methods for Data Analysis (EPA QA/G-9) should be followed 
(EPA 2000b). Forms associated with the procedures provide a means for documenting the data 
that will be reviewed in the DQA. Forms should be controlled to prevent loss or alteration. 
The OSC typically assigns the DQA role to a knowledgeable support person who maintains the 
data that has been collected, evaluates its quality, and recommends additional sampling needs.  
5.5  DATA QUALITY OBJECTIVES 
Establishing DQOs is a major part of the planning process for work assignments that require the 
collection or use of environmental measurements, samples, and data. EPA’s DQO process, 
described in Guidance for the Data Quality Objectives Process (EPA QA/G-4), should be 
followed to ensure that the type, quantity, and quality of data are sufficient to meet overall work 
assignment objectives (EPA 1994).  
The DQO process includes: (1) clarifying study objectives and decisions to be made based on the 
data collected; (2) defining the most appropriate type of data to collect; (3) determining the most 
appropriate conditions for collecting the data; and (4) specifying acceptable decision error limits 
based on the consequences of making an incorrect decision. The DQO process consists of seven 
steps: 
•  Step 1—State the problem 
•  Step 2—Identify the decision 
•  Step 3—Identify inputs to the decision 
•  Step 4—Define the boundaries of the study 
•  Step 5—Develop a decision rule 
•  Step 6—Specify tolerable limits on decision errors 
•  Step 7—Optimize the design for obtaining data 
The DQO process offers a systematic approach to planning. All seven steps of the DQO process 
may not be applicable to all radiological data collection activities. Examples include activities 
where specific decisions cannot be identified or studies that are exploratory in nature. In these 
situations, the steps of the DQO process that are applicable to help plan the data collection effort 
should be used. 
The following is an example of the DQO process applied to the release of a piece of equipment 
from a contaminated area following decontamination: 
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Step 1—State the problem 
Determine if a piece of potentially contaminated equipment can be unconditionally 
released from a contamination area. 
Step 2—Identify the decision 
If the contamination on the item is less than published standards, the item can be 
unconditionally released from the contamination area. 
Step 3—Identify inputs to the decision 
Removable contamination and total contamination values must be less than published 
values. 
Step 4—Define the boundaries of the study (what to survey) 
Removable alpha and beta contamination over representative portions of the equipment. 
Total alpha and beta contamination over the entire surface of the piece of equipment. 
Only the surfaces that could potentially be exposed to airborne radioactivity require 
survey. 
Step 5—Develop a decision rule 
The piece of equipment can be unconditionally released if no 100 cm
2 sampled area 
exceeds the removable contamination criteria for either alpha or beta contamination and 
the average total contamination is less than the release criteria (with no individual reading 
exceeding three times the release criteria for total contamination when averaged over one 
square meter). 
If either of these criteria is not met, the equipment will be returned for further 
decontamination, continue to be used in the contamination area, or disposed as 
radioactive waste as determined by the OSC. 
Step 6—Specify tolerable limits on decision errors 
The measurements are to be within 95% confidence that contamination will not be 
present above the release criteria if the measurement indicates that contamination does 
not exceed the release criteria (Type I error). 
The measurements are to be within 95% confidence that contamination does exceed the 
release criteria if the measurement indicates that the release criteria has been exceeded 
(Type II error). 
Step 7—Optimize the design for obtaining data 
Develop one square meter survey grid on the equipment.  
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Collect one swipe from each square meter of surface area potentially exposed to the 
atmosphere.  
Record the highest total contamination measurement in each survey grid. 
Document the survey grid on the item with pictures or sketches in accordance with 
survey procedures. 
5.6 QUALITY  ASSURANCE 
Data quality is based on the accuracy and precision of a particular instrument, the geometry of a 
source, the activity concentration of the source, and the methods used to collect the data. 
Methods used to collect data are typically described in formally documented monitoring 
procedures and provide the basis for personnel training. Such procedures are included in the 
companion CD. 
Instrument accuracy and precision is evaluated by the ability of the instrument to respond to 
radioactive material in a predictable manner specific to the location (environment), concentra­
tion, geometry, and other factors that can affect the response of the particular instrument. 
Background can change from one geographical location to another, and can change over 
relatively short distances, primarily due to differences in the exposed geological strata. The area 
of the response needs to be evaluated for background before meaningful data can be collected. 
This process is documented in Procedure RRSOP-401. 
Checks are performed on instrumentation prior to its use, then periodic function checks are 
performed to ensure the equipment remains in a ready state. The level of effort given to these 
checks varies with the DQL. DQL 3 checks are simple and quick, while DQL 1 checks are much 
more demanding. 
5.6.1  Quality Control Procedures 
Instrument-specific quality control procedures involve calibration, maintenance, functional 
checks, etc. Quality control requirements have been incorporated into the procedures found in 
the companion CD. Terms, such as “calibration,” that are used in the procedures have specific 
meanings as described in the following sections. 
5.6.2 Calibration 
Instrument calibration involves exposing an instrument to a radiation field of known intensity 
while adjusting the controls on the instrument to match the intensity. The radiation character­
istics of the source should be traceable to an official standards laboratory, such as the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
The objective of calibration is to adjust or determine the response or reading of an instrument 
relative to a series of conventionally true values for radiation sources or to determine the activity 
of a radiation source relative to a standard or conventionally true value. 
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Radiological monitoring instrument calibration is usually required annually (or more frequently 
if recommended by the manufacturer’s specifications). A technical basis is required for any 
instrument whose calibration is scheduled at a frequency greater than annually. In addition, 
calibration may be necessary following maintenance or adjustment of parameters that affect an 
instrument’s operation. More frequent instrument calibration may be required when the 
instrument is used under harsh field conditions. 
Radiological instrument calibration is normally performed at two points on each scale. If a scaler 
instrument is not calibrated on each scale, a Special Use Tag should be placed on the instrument 
indicating which scales are not calibrated. However, if the instrument does not have scales, it 
should be calibrated at (1) a point above the maximum expected reading, (2) a point near the 
detection limit, and (3) a point near the expected routine operating region. Before using an 
instrument, check the calibration tag for any use restrictions. 
Instruments are calibrated with a specific cable and detector combination. The instrument, cable, 
and detector combination should not be changed unless specifically documented by the 
instrument manual or calibration certificate. It is generally permissible to change a cable in the 
field without recalibration provided the replacement cable is the same type AND length of the 
original. 
Equipment is marked to indicate calibration status. Equipment that is out of calibration is tagged 
or segregated until repaired, recalibrated, or replaced. A record of calibration history should be 
documented and available to the user of the instrument.  
Calibration is normally not performed in the field for survey instruments. Calibration may be 
performed for laboratory-based measurement equipment after the equipment has been relocated 
to the field, often in a mobile laboratory. However, functional checks are performed in the field 
to verify that the instrument is performing within prescribed tolerances. 
5.6.3  Manufacturer’s Instructions and Procedures 
Quality operations should be performed in accordance with the manufacturer’s published 
instructions or procedures. Manufacturer instrument manuals normally accompany a radiological 
monitoring instrument from the warehouse to the field location, especially if the instrument may 
be transferred to another person for use.  
5.7 RADIOACTIVE  SOURCES 
5.7.1 Source  Response 
Each operational instrument should be checked with a source at least daily or prior to use. In 
ratemeter mode, instruments should exhibit a response within 20% of the expected reading when 
exposed to a source in a constant and reproducible manner. Sources that are used in scaler mode, 
including instruments used to count smear and air samples such as the Ludlum 3030, should 
exhibit a response within three standard deviations of the mean value. 
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Sources used for quality control measurements should have energies similar to those of the 
expected radionuclides. Ideal sources should have a long half-life (on the order of years), be 
physically stable (fixed or encapsulated within an appropriate material), have a unique serial 
number or marking, and be in the same or similar geometry as the measurements collected. 
Once the instrument has been shown to respond within tolerance, it is permissible to obtain 
generic reference readings for a specific source in a specified geometry. This is accomplished by 
collecting a statistically significant number of background readings and source readings using a 
jig to provide reproducible results. The average source reading and control limits can then be 
placed on a chart (Section 5.8.6 Control Charts). Any future checks with that source in the 
specific jig (or an equivalent jig) are then recorded on the chart and compared with the control 
limits. Net counts are used in these determinations to minimize the influence of background. 
Sources used for instrument functional checks, including check sources, should be maintained on 
a source inventory. Sources should be tracked by radionuclide, activity, and serial number, if 
applicable. Sources should be stored only in approved locations. Instruments with affixed 
sources should be included in the source control program. Sources should only be used by 
personnel with appropriate training so that exposures are minimized and the source is not 
damaged by improper handling. Sources that are lost should be reported to the OSC, and an 
effort made to locate the missing source. Radioactive sources used for quality assurance 
measurements are defined in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Radioactive Sources 
Source Type  Definition  Handling Procedures  Use 
Calibration 
sources 
(e.g., 
137Cs,
60Co, 
230Th,
90Sr) 
• Source traceable to 
NIST or another 
recognized standard 
• Unique serial number 
• Calibration certificate 
Handled with gloves or Teflon 
tipped tweezers to avoid 
accidentally removing 
radioactive material as well as 
to avoid depositing foreign 
material such as grease, dirt, 
etc., on the surface of the 
• In defined, 
uncontaminated areas 
• Used for QC of DQL 1 
source 
QC source 
(e.g., 
137Cs,
60Co button 
sources, 
90Sr,
230Th or other 
plated sources) 
• Radiation emission rate 
and quality are well 
known 
• Unique serial number 
• May or may not have 
calibration certificates 
Handled with gloves or Teflon 
tipped tweezers. 
Small (microCi) sealed sources 
(other than plated or otherwise 
exposed radioactive surface) 
can be handled by hand without 
gloves. 
• Can be used in 
contaminated areas if 
they are checked for 
removable 
contamination before 
being put back into 
service. 
• Used for QC of DQL 2 
Check source 
(e.g., lantern 
mantle or piece 
of orange 
Fiesta-ware) 
• Source used to confirm 
the satisfactory 
operation of a 
radiological monitoring 
instrument 
May be handled with hands, 
although plated sources should 
be handled with gloves if 
possible. 
• In contaminated areas 
• Used for QC of DQL 3 
• May have serial 
numbers 
• Typically do not have 
calibration certificates 
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5.7.2  Source Positioning Jigs 
Source positioning jigs, or source jigs, are instrument-specific calibration devices that provide a 
constant and reproducible geometry for performing a source response check. The instrument or 
probe is placed on a jig that has a particular radioactive source in a fixed location. The use of a 
source jig eliminates the source-instrument variability factor in the determination of instrument 
response to a certain radiation type. 
Multiple readings of an instrument/probe are taken in a jig with a given source to provide 
statistically valid instrument readings. From these readings, a control chart is developed.  
The source and the jig (or an equivalent jig) that was used to develop the control chart should 
accompany the instrument to the field for the performance of quality control checks for the 
appropriate DQL. 
5.8 INSTRUMENT  TESTS 
A test is a procedure whereby an instrument, component, or circuit is evaluated against certain 
criteria for satisfactory operation. Tests that are performed on instruments include performance 
tests, source response checks, functional checks, and “as found readings.”  Specific test control 
measures are defined in the instrument-specific quality control procedures. 
5.8.1 Performance  Test 
A performance test is an evaluation of the performance of an instrument in response to a given 
influence quantity. 
5.8.2  Source Response Check 
A source response check compares the instrument response to a source to determine whether or 
not the instrument is still functional within an acceptable range. 
5.8.3 Functional  Check 
A functional check is performed to determine that an instrument is operational and capable of 
performing its intended function. Such checks may be qualitative, and may include a battery 
check, zero setting, or a source response check. Functional check requirements for specific 
instruments are documented in procedures or as instructions on forms or logs. 
5.8.4 As  Found  Readings 
After an instrument has been in the field, it is returned to the organization that owns the instru­
ment. “As found readings” are performed by the organization upon the return of an instrument 
that has been in field use to provide assurance that the instrument performance did not change 
during use. “As found readings” are taken using the same source and geometry that were used to 
develop control charts, perform routine functional tests, etc., prior to the use of the instrument. 
As found readings for instruments used in ratemeter mode should be within 20% of the expected 
reading. If the as found reading exceeds +20%, the data collected by that instrument since its last 
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source response check are to be evaluated for validity. Readings/measurements taken by this 
instrument may need to be taken again. If measurements need to be retaken, maintain the initial 
set of readings, as well as follow-up or repeat readings/measurements, making appropriate 
notations on the data. 
As-found readings also are performed when an instrument is submitted for recalibration. The 
Calibration Facility conducts as found readings using certified sources prior to making any 
adjustments to the instrument. Recalibration as found readings for instruments used in the 
ratemeter mode should be 10% of the conventionally true value. 
5.8.5 Detection  limit 
The detection limit is defined as the smallest concentration of radioactivity in a sample that can 
be detected with a 5% probability of not detecting radioactivity, when in fact it is present (Type 1 
error) and also a 5% probability of erroneously detecting radioactivity, when in fact none was 
present (Type 2 error). The detection limit is defined by a statistically valid instrument response 
after appropriate calibration factors have been applied. The detection limit should be calculated 
for instruments that are used to measure low levels of radiation.  
The detection limit may be calculated and expressed as Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA). 
MDA is defined as the smallest quantity of radioactivity that can be measured under specific 
conditions. It depends on the lower limit of detection and on the counting efficiency of a 
counting system. MDA is often used interchangeably with the minimum detectable concentration 
(MDC), which is the minimum detectable activity measured in concentration units. Calculations 
for MDA and MDC should be provided in technical basis documents. A number of the forms in 
the procedures require the determination of MDA. The calculated MDA should be compared to 
the data requirements to assure that the instrument is appropriate for its intended use prior to the 
survey. 
Some procedures require the determination of an instrument MDA based on the background, 
instrument efficiency (from the calibration certificates), count time, and probe, or measurement 
size. MDAs are typically determined for instruments that will be used to measure contamination, 
but they are generally not determined for instruments that will measure gamma or neutron 
radiation levels. 
5.8.6 Control  Charts 
Control charts should be developed for each instrument used to make measurements 
corresponding to DQL 1 or 2. The control chart is typically based on an average instrument 
reading of a quality control source that is counted in a reproducible geometry. When an 
instrument is put into service and will be used to take DQL-1 or DQL-2 measurements, a control 
reading should be taken with the instrument, the appropriate QC source, and jig. The results of 
the check are then plotted on the control chart. For DQL-1 measurements, another check is 
performed at the conclusion of the readings, and that value is plotted on the control chart as well. 
For instruments that are in routine use, control charts typically have a one-week duration. 
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Controls are based on percent variation from the average for ratemeter mode instruments. An 
instrument used in ratemeter mode is operational if it meets the criteria defined in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Control Chart Criteria for Ratemeter Mode 
Criteria Action 
< 10% of the average  Instrument can be used 
> 10 to < 20% of the average  Two more readings should be taken 
< 10% of the average for both  Instrument can be used 
subsequent readings 
> 10% to < 20% of the average  Should be evaluated by a Health 
        for both subsequent readings  Physicist 
> 20% of the average  Instrument fails and should be returned for 
maintenance or recalibration 
Controls are based on an evaluation of standard deviation from the norm for scaler mode 
instruments. Typically, an instrument is operational if it meets the criteria defined in Table 5.4. If 
the quality control check is outside the acceptable limits, additional data may need to be 
collected. 
Table 5.4 Control Chart Criteria for Scaler Mode 
Criteria Action 
< 2 standard deviations  Instrument can be used 
> 2 to < 3 standard deviations  Two more readings should be taken 
< 2 standard deviations for both 
subsequent readings 
Instrument can be used 
> 2 to < 3 standard deviations for both  Should be evaluated by a Health Physicist 
subsequent readings 
> 3 standard deviations  Instrument fails and should returned for 
maintenance or recalibration 
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6. STABILIZATION/DECONTAMINATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Stabilization and decontamination usually begin when: 
•	 Emergency response functions for lifesaving or rescue are complete 
•	 The event site has been secured and there is assurance that the site is stable 
•	 The incident involves a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device 
(IND) that activates the National Response Plan (NRP)
4 
•	 Entry and egress locations are specifically designated 
•	 Personnel decontamination stations have been set up 
•	 Vector/animal control has been established to minimize inadvertent transport of radio­
active materials from the contamination reduction zone to the support zone 
The following information, which comes from various quantitative and qualitative sources, 
should be available to the OSC to plan and implement stabilization and decontamination: 
•	 Identity of the radionuclide(s) 
•	 Matrices that are affected (e.g., concrete building surfaces, epoxy-coated floors) 
•	 Proposed methods of disposal of contaminated material 
•	 Types of containers available for disposal 
•	 Work completed to immediately identify or stabilize hot spots or easily dispersible 

radioactive materials 

•	 Radiation survey maps of the various zones 
Because they are most likely to be part of a RDD, the radionuclides specifically addressed in this 
chapter are 
137Cs, 
90Sr, 
60Co, 
241Am, 
226Ra, 
192Ir, 
238Pu, and 
240+239Pu. Their chemical properties, 
related field detection techniques, relevant environmental factors, and decontamination 
approaches are described. The techniques for stabilization, decontamination, or mitigation of 
fixed contamination of materials to be left in place fall into two distinct categories with various 
subgroups as shown in Table 6.1 (EPA undated). 
The planning processes for decontamination, mitigation, or stabilization should include long­
term as well as immediate requirements, costs, and infrastructure needs. A list of topics to 
consider is shown in Table 6.2. Information about the distribution, mass concentration, surface 
activity, and exact types of radionuclides present can be obtained from quantitative instruments. 
Much of this type of information comes from samples sent to analytical laboratories. 
4 When events do not activate the NRP, the OSC takes responsibility for decisions regarding 
access, decontamination, disposal, and ultimately, the release of the area for normal use.  
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Table 6.1 Chemical and Physical Decontamination/Mitigation Techniques 
Techniques  Brief Description of the Techniques 
Chemical 
Chelation and Organic 
Acids 
Chelating agents like EDTA, oxalic acid, or DTPA are applied to 
complex/solubilize the radionuclides deposited on a surface. 
Strong Mineral Acids  Acids like nitric or hydrochloric are used to oxidize and complex radionuclides 
by dissolution of the surface layer of the substrate. 
Chemical Foams, 
Surfactants, or Gels 
These materials are used to change the primary adsorbed film of material on 
the substrate so that it can be removed by wiping, dissolution, or vacuuming. 
Oxidizing/Reducing 
Agents 
Depending upon the particular radionuclide, this is an application of a specific 
reagent that changes the chemical oxidation state of the radionuclide, making it 
soluble. 
TechXtract  A proprietary three-step process that involves a liquid application that 
penetrates the surface of the substrate and then is worked into the surface with 
an abrasive material. A rinse material is sprayed onto the surface and then 
vacuumed off. 
Physical/Mechanical 
Strippable Coatings  These are latex type materials that are sprayed onto a surface. The material is 
allowed to dry and then peeled off in a single sheet. The radionuclides that 
were on the surface become incorporated into the sprayed on coating and are 
removed when the coating is peeled off. 
Centrifugal Shot 
Blasting 
The technique uses metallic or ceramic shot to remove the outer surface of a 
substrate. The shot is recycled to a container for reuse. 
Concrete Grinding  High integrity materials are used to remove the outer surface of concrete for all 
three of these techniques. The idea is to remove those radionuclides that are 
only embedded on the outermost surface. 
Concrete Shaving/ 
Cutting 
Concrete Spalling 
Dry Ice Blasting  Tiny pellets of solid carbon dioxide are impinged on the surface of a substrate 
to mechanically remove a thin film of material. The carbon dioxide evaporates 
to reduce the total waste volume. 
Dry Vacuuming or 
Wiping 
High-suction vacuum cleaning to remove loose debris or loosely adhered 
material; dry wiping to remove materials in the same way. 
Scabbling  Metallic pins are used to mechanically erode the outermost surface of hard 
materials like concrete. 
Grit Blasting  Sand or iron shot the same size as sand is used to mechanically erode a hard 
surface. 
High Pressure Water   Water is directed at impervious surfaces at up to 20,000 psig (pounds per 
square inch gauge) to mechanically dislodge materials. This technique can be 
used with or without chemical additives for complexation/desorption. 
Steam Cleaning/ 
Vacuuming 
High temperature and slight pressure mechanically dislodge particulates from 
impervious surfaces. 
Sponge (Soft Media) 
Blasting 
Soft, polymeric spheres of very small diameter are impinged on a surface of a 
substrate that would be destroyed by harsher physical means such as shot 
blasting or grinding. 
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Table 6.2 Additional Decontamination Response Issues 
If Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3 has been activated under the NRP, define EPA and 
USACE roles for debris management. 
Identify contractors and Basic Order Agreements (BOAs) for decontamination contractors. 
Discuss removal strategy for radioactive waste materials. Consider the increased rate of 
exposure to workers as the wastes are co-located, and how rapidly these waste concentration 
areas need to be removed for final disposal. 
Minimize the spread of contamination. 
Evaluate the potential re-contamination of areas that were decontaminated during the 
emergency phases. 
Establish awareness of EPA policies on: population monitoring, human decontamination, 
Protective Action Guides (PAG) determination, and personal property monitoring and 
decontamination (cars, computers, lawn mowers, etc.). 
Evaluate clean-up of locations or materials required for critical infrastructure, and establish a 
priority list. 
Familiarize personnel in the organization with the generic decontamination technologies 
available and the limitations or advantages of each. Form consensus on the best technology to 
use for each application. 
Identify staging areas for storage or decontamination of cars and equipment. 
6.2 CESIUM-137  (
137CS) 
6.2.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Cesium is a silvery white metal that melts at 82°
ºF. It is very chemically reactive and rapidly 
oxidizes from the metal (zero oxidation state) to the +1 oxidation state when exposed to air or 
moisture. Metallic cesium is preserved usually by storing it in an inert atmosphere or in an inert 
liquid (like mineral oil) because exposure of metallic cesium to air can cause a significant 
conflagration that is typically treated as a Class D fire. It is unlikely that metallic cesium, as a 
source, will be encountered. 
The chemical properties of cesium are analogous to those of sodium. It is present only as the +1 
cation in aqueous solution. Cesium salts, including the oxide, are soluble in water. The most 
commonly encountered form of cesium is CsCl, which is deliquescent; it dissolves in the 
moisture that it absorbs when exposed to moist air. Ion exchange resins have a higher selectivity 
for cesium than for the other cations in the Group I series of elements. Thus, one effective 
method of cesium removal from water is through ion exchange.  
The two most radiation dose significant radioisotopes of cesium are 
134Cs (half-life 2.1 years) 
and 
137Cs (half-life 30 years). Generally speaking, 
134Cs is unlikely to be present at a RDD 
incident due to its relatively short half-life, and the fact that only a very small amount of it is 
used for commercial purposes. 
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The concentration of 
137Cs in surface soil samples (less than 15 cm below the topsoil) in the 
continental United States is on average about 0.6 pCi/g. The source for this terrestrial 
137Cs is 
from atmospheric fallout originating from above-ground nuclear weapons testing between 1950 
and 1978. Exterior building surfaces can be expected to contain small quantities of this cesium 
source based on continued fallout and re-suspension of surface soils. 
Devices that contain 
137Cs, such as a medical irradiator or a cesium source from a liquid scintil­
lation counter, have CsCl powder in a sealed container. Most cesium sources encountered are in 
this form, which is easily dispersible when the container is breached. The particle size that might 
be experienced depends to a large extent on the size of the explosive device and the heat it 
generates during detonation. High temperature detonation causes cesium to volatilize, vaporize, 
and then re-condense when it passes through its phase transition temperature upon expanding 
into the atmosphere. The majority of the particle sizes are likely be 0.5 to 100 microns. 
6.2.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Cs-137 is a long-lived (half-life 30 years), pure beta emitting nuclide (0.511 MeV βmax of 
principle beta) that decays to short-lived 
137Ba (half-life 2.6 minutes) that emits a 662 keV 
gamma ray. For most general area surveys, detectors that respond to the 662 keV gamma ray of 
137Ba are used. For surface area contamination surveys, detectors that respond to the 
137Cs beta 
particle or to the 662 keV gamma ray of 
137Ba are used. 
Without knowledge of the radioactive source, a general area gamma survey (refer to RRSOP­
402) can be conducted with Ludlum Models 192 and 19 Micro-R Meter for gamma exposure 
rates between 1 and 5,000 µR/hr or 0.001 to 5 mR/hr. Terrestrial gamma background exposure 
rates vary according to soil type and geographical area but are normally between 3 and 9 µR/hr. 
The upper range (1,000 to 5,000 µR/hr) of the Model 192 Micro-R Meter responds to exposures 
that are approximately 100 to 1,000 times typical terrestrial background levels. If the upper 
response range of this instrument is exceeded, the Eberline Model RO20 should be used. This 
unit has a gamma response of 5 to 50,000 mR/hr. General surveys with either meter should be 
conducted holding the unit at waist height and slowly walking through the potentially 
contaminated area.  
For gamma-emitting, nuclide-identifying scoping surveys of potentially contaminated ground 
(refer to RRSOP-402), the SAM-935 with the NaI detector will typically be the instrument of 
choice. The survey meter-probe should be calibrated with an extended 
137Cs source prior to use. 
The SAM-935 unit has software that performs nuclide identification and spectral analysis. As 
recommended in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual 
(MARSSIM), the detector should be held close to the ground surface (~6 cm or 2.5 inches) and 
moved in a serpentine pattern while walking at a slow speed (i.e., typically 0.5 m/s (~1.5 ft/s) or 
slow enough to detect the desired investigation level).  
For surveying of potentially contaminated surfaces (refer to RRSOP-402), the Ludlum 2241 with 
44-9 alpha/beta probe can be used. Use of this survey meter-probe combination will facilitate 
converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter response 
conversion to surface activity should take into account the 12 cm
2 active surface area of the 44-9 
probe. The probe should be held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the surface under investigation 
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and moved slowly (<5 cm/s or <2 in/s). It should be noted that the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 
thick window) will respond to both alpha and beta particles. A thin plastic (or mylar) covering 
(~8 mg/cm
2) of the probe face will absorb alpha particles, thus rendering the probe a beta-only 
detector. The unit should be calibrated using a 
137Cs source whose dimensions match the area to 
be surveyed using this instrument. 
6.2.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
The analysis for 
137Cs normally does not require sample preparation, as it is a high energy 
gamma emitter. It can be detected to about 5 pCi/g of solid material when a 1 kg sample is 
counted for about 100 minutes on a high-purity germanium detector. There may be minor sample 
self-shielding concerns with large concrete or steel samples. However, all other matrices do not 
significantly diminish the 661 keV gamma rays. 
This detector counting time represents only a portion of the radiological holding time (i.e., no 
sample preparation or data reduction times are included). The laboratory turn-around time 
(TAT), which includes the radiological holding time, is the summation of the times for sample 
logging at the laboratory, sample preparation, counting of the prepared sample, data processing, 
final data review by lab technical personnel, and transmittal of a data report. The time taken to 
ship the sample to the laboratory is not normally included in the laboratory TAT but should be 
considered as part of the overall TAT (i.e., from field shipping to receipt of data report). The 
time required for these ancillary functions are dictated by the data quality objectives for the 
event. 
6.2.4 Environmental  Factors 
Decontamination processes for 
137Cs may be thwarted by the environmental conditions that 
follow the RDD event. Much of what is known about the decontamination of surfaces involves 
studies of dry deposition resulting from a detonation. The subsequent environmental conditions, 
such as wind, rain, snow, freezing rain, or high humidity, affect how the radionuclides adhere or 
incorporate into the material. These environmental factors affect the decontamination process. 
Thus, stabilization should be performed as soon as practicable to surfaces that are susceptible to 
these environmental factors, making subsequent decontamination easier. As an example, 
consider a RDD that has been detonated outdoors adjacent to buildings comprised of limestone 
surfaces. The force of the detonation drives the radioactive cesium into the building surface, but 
it only penetrates a few tenths of a millimeter. This surface is susceptible to continued degrada­
tion by acid rain. If the surface is allowed to become wet, the cesium becomes fixed in the 
limestone matrix and penetrates it more deeply.  This causes cesium to bind to the material, 
likely increasing the time and cost of decontamination. 
6.2.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
The solubility of cesium is a very important factor when cesium is the only contaminant (Table 
6.3). Hot water can effectively decontaminate a surface with low porosity (i.e., one that water 
will not penetrate). Surfaces, such as polished non-porous marble and epoxy-coated walls or 
floors, fall into this category. Expeditious cleanup of these surfaces and collection of the liquid 
used for cleanup mitigates the spread of contamination to storm sewers and sanitary systems. 
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Materials that are porous, such as concrete, unpainted plaster, limestone, and cement, should not 
be treated with any liquid solutions because they are able to draw water into the medium’s 
interior via capillary action. Porous materials provide a conduit for soluble ions like cesium to 
penetrate the medium to much greater depths. Thus, decontaminating with water solutions only 
confounds the cleanup. When scabbling is used initially, less building material has to be 
removed, thereby minimizing waste and saving time and money. 
Table 6.3 Potential Techniques for Cesium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non 
porous 
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam 
Plaster 
or Dry 
Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Scabbling Hot  Water  Sponge  Hot Water  Sponge  Mild  Hot 
Decon  Blasting  with  Blasting  Abrasive  Water 
Technique  Surfactant  (Roto 
Peening) 
Secondary  TechXTract®  Strippable  Cement  Sponge  Mild  Strippable  Sponge 
Decon  Coating  Cutting  Blasting  Abrasive  Coating  Blasting 
Technique 
6.3 STRONTIUM-90  (
90SR) 
6.3.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Strontium is a silver-white metal that reacts in air and water to form the oxide. Its two valence 
states are zero and +2, and it is chemically similar to calcium, magnesium, barium, and radium. 
Ionic strontium forms compounds in the environment that tend to make it slightly insoluble to 
very insoluble. Specifically, carbonates, sulfates, and phosphates are insoluble but are easily 
dissolved using dilute acids. The subsequent solution can have the strontium removed by 
exchange onto a cation resin. 
Strontium’s has two principal isotopes of concern are 
89Sr (half-life 50 days) and 
90Sr (half-life 
29 years). Sr-89 can be produced via an accelerator and also is a prominent fission product. Its 
short half-life usually excludes it from the scenarios that an OSC might encounter. The current 
environmental concentration of 
90Sr in soil due to atmospheric deposition from the weapons 
testing era is about 0.05 pCi/g. Sr-90 decays to 
90Y, which has a half-life of 64 hours. Within two 
weeks after the production of 
90Sr, the activity due to the 
90Y increases to equal that of the 
90Sr if 
no chemical speciation occurs. 
Sr-90 has many industrial uses, including a General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS)-Radioisotope 
Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). These devices contain thousands of curies of 
90Sr, and an 
equivalent amount of 
90Y due to secular equilibrium. The chemical composition of strontium in 
these sources is the oxide, which is usually in the form of pellets or discs. If strontium in this 
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form were to be part of a RDD, the initial aerosol color following the explosion might be 
crimson as a result of the strontium excitation. 
6.3.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Sr-90 is a long-lived (half-life 28.6 years) pure beta emitter (0.55 MeV βmax) that has a short­
lived 
90Y decay product (half-life 64 hours) that is also a pure beta emitter (2.3 MeV βmax). The 
high energy of the 
90Y beta particle allows the 
90Sr to be detected using an open window GM 
tube or a pancake probe. Self-shielding will be of little concern when performing surface 
evaluations for this contaminant. Since 
90Sr does not emit a gamma ray, gamma detectors, such 
as a Micro-R meter or survey meter with a gamma probe, are ineffective in measuring 
90Sr 
contamination unless the contamination is extremely high. Under this circumstance, the decay of 
90Y may create sufficient Bremstrahlung photon radiation from the interaction of the high-energy 
2.3 Mev beta particle with the matrix under investigation.  
When surveying small general areas or potentially 
90Sr contaminated surfaces, the Ludlum 
2241with 44-9 alpha/beta probe can be used (refer to RRSOP-402). Use of this survey meter­
probe combination facilitates converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of 
Bq/cm
2). The meter response conversion to surface activity should take into account the 12 cm
2 
active surface area of the 44-9 probe. The probe should be held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the 
surface under investigation and moved slowly at a speed of ~1.5 ft/s for small area surveys and < 
5 cm/s or < 2 in/s for objects. The probe should be held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the surface 
under investigation and moved slowly at a speed of ~1.5 ft/s. It should be noted that the open 44­
9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 thick window) will respond to both alpha and beta particles. A thin plastic 
(or Mylar) covering (~8 mg/cm
2) of the probe face will absorb alpha particles, thus rendering the 
probe a beta-only detector. The unit should be calibrated using a 
90Sr source whose dimensions 
match the area to be surveyed using this instrument. 
6.3.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
Sr-90 is a pure beta emitter. As such, it requires chemical separation from its matrix, as well as 
any other beta emitters (like naturally occurring radionuclides of radium, lead, and bismuth), to 
provide the most accurate assessment of the 
90Sr contamination. Matrix dissolution for 
90Sr 
should take from one-half to two hours depending on the size of the sample and the matrix. 
Analytical separations may take up to several hours using either precipitation or ion exchange. In 
order to achieve detectable concentrations as low as 300 pCi/g using a 1 kg sample size, count 
times will take on the order of 5 hours using liquid scintillation (this assumes that the technique 
requiring the in-growth of 
90Y is not used and only 
90Sr is present). Thus, a reasonable estimate 
of total radiostrontium concentration could be made in about 2 days.  
This detector counting time represents only a portion of the radiological holding time; no sample 
preparation or data reduction times are included. The laboratory TAT, which includes the radio­
logical holding time, is the summation of the times for sample logging at the laboratory, sample 
preparation, counting of the prepared sample, data processing, final data review by lab technical 
personnel, and transmittal of a data report. The time taken to ship the sample to the laboratory is 
not normally included in the laboratory TAT but should be considered as part of the overall 
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TAT, from field shipping to receipt of data report. The time required for these ancillary functions 
is dictated by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.3.4 Environmental  Factors 
The presence of 
90Sr means that 
90Y also will be present. Thus, any environmental conditions 
that can cause chemical speciation of these radionuclides will cause them to “separate.”  For 
example, 
90Sr deposited on a non-porous marble surface that is affected by acid rainwater allows 
the strontium to remain deposited (as the insoluble carbonate), but the yttrium would be mobile 
enough to cause an apparent decontamination. Since the 
90Sr then reestablishes secular equili­
brium with 
90Y, the total activity, hours to days later, appears to increase. This kind of increase/ 
decrease in activity can cause considerable confusion unless the strontium and yttrium are fixed 
on the surface and not susceptible to migration. 
6.3.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
Strontium forms complexes with several different chelating agents, such as ethylenediamintetra­
acetic acid (EDTA). However chelating techniques on porous or calcium- or magnesium-based 
materials may simply drive the contamination deeper into the material. Thus, caution should be 
used on porous surfaces, such as limestone and wood, or building materials containing calcium 
or magnesium. When chelating agents are not applicable, a solid shaving technique should 
remove contamination effectively while minimizing the structural impact to the building. Table 
6.4 presents several approaches for decontaminating various surface materials. 
Table 6.4 Potential Techniques for Strontium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non 
porous 
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or 
Dry Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Scabbling Chemical  Sponge  Chemical  Sponge  Mild  Chemical 
Decon  Decon  Blasting  Decon  Blasting  Abrasive  Decon 
Technique  (complexing  (complexing  (Roto  (complexing 
agent)  agent)  Peening)  agent) 
Secondary  TechXTract® Strippable  Concrete  Sponge  Concrete  Strippable  Sponge 
Decon  Coating  Shaving  Blasting  Shaving  Coating  Blasting 
Technique 
6.4 COBALT-60  (
60CO) 
6.4.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Cobalt is a grey-white metal that has two stable oxidation states: zero and +2. Oxidation state +3 
is unstable and easily reduced in the natural environment to +2. Cobalt changes state easily in 
acidic solutions containing cation resins. It also complexes with organic acids like EDTA that 
can be used to remove cobalt from contaminated surfaces. 
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Chemical forms of cobalt that might be encountered as a result of a RDD are the metal (as solid 
discs or pins) or the oxide (as a powder or compressed disc). A diagram that identifies a pin 
configuration is shown in Figure 6.2. Cobalt metal is double-encapsulated in stainless steel (KO­
33 or KO-36) and sealed by argon arc welding. Table 6.5 shows three different capsule sizes. 
The small diameter of these encapsulated sources makes them easily transportable. The high 
specific activity means that only a small quantity can create widespread contamination. 
Cobalt has two principal radioisotopes of concern, 
58Co (half-life 71 days) and 
60Co (half-life 
5.27 years). As with the other radionuclides, the short-lived 
58Co is an unlikely contaminant 
resulting from a RDD. Co-60 is a beta-gamma emitter that emits two high-energy gamma rays 
for 100% of the decays. For this reason, 
60Co is easily detectable. However, these emitted 
gamma rays present a problem (in terms of required shielding) when attempting to stabilize 
contaminated areas or collect contaminated material and centrally locate the contaminated 
material. 
Figure 6.1 Example of an Encapsulated Radioactive Source 
Recommended working life: 20 years 
Quality control: Ultrasonic test ”A”  Vacuum bubble test 
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Table 6.5 Capsule Sizes 
CoS-44 HH 
CoS-43 HH 
11 
Overall dimensions 
D [mm]  L [mm] 
11  451 
220  7 
Active dimensions 
d [mm]  h [mm]
7  437 
207  60  1622 
Maximum equivalent 
activity 
TBq  Ci 
130  3510 
CoS-45 HH  11  81.5  7  69  17  459 
6.4.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Co-60 is a long-lived (half-life 5.27 years) beta emitting nuclide (0.318 MeV βmax of principal 
beta) that also emits several gamma rays (1173 keV and 1332 keV). For the general area surveys, 
detector probes that respond to the 1173 keV and 1332 keV gamma rays are used. For surface 
area contamination surveys, detector probes that respond to either beta particles or to the 1173 
keV and 1332 keV gamma rays are used. 
Without knowledge of the radioactive source, a general area gamma survey can be conducted 
with a Ludlum Model 192 Micro-R Meter for gamma exposure rates between 1 and 5,000 µR/hr 
or 0.001 to 5 mR/hr. Terrestrial gamma background exposure rates vary according to soil type 
and geographical area but are normally between 3 and 9 µR/hr. The upper range (1,000 to 5,000 
µR/hr) of the Model 192 Micro-R Meter responds to exposures that are approximately 100 to 
1,000 times typical terrestrial background levels. If the upper response range of this instrument is 
exceeded, the Eberline Model RO20 should be used. This unit has a gamma response of 5 to 
50,000 mR/hr. General surveys (refer to RRSOP-402) with either meter should be conducted 
holding the unit at waist height and slowly walking through the potentially contaminated area.    
For gamma-emitting, nuclide-identifying scoping surveys of potentially contaminated ground, 
the SAM-935 with the NaI detector is typically the instrument of choice. The survey meter-probe 
should be calibrated with an extended 
60Co source prior to use. The SAM-935 unit has software 
that performs nuclide identification and spectral analysis. As recommended in MARSSIM (EPA 
2000a), the detector should be held close to the ground surface (~6 cm or 2.5 inches) and moved 
in a serpentine pattern while walking at a slow speed (i.e., typically 0.5 m/s (~1.5 ft/s) or slow 
enough to detect the desired investigation level). 
The Ludlum 2241with 44-9 alpha/beta probe may be used to survey potentially contaminated 
surfaces. Use of this survey meter-probe combination facilitates converting the observed count 
rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter response conversion to surface activity 
should take into account the 12 cm
2 active surface area of the 44-9 probe. The probe should be 
held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the surface under investigation and moved slowly (<5 cm/s or 
<2 in/s). It should be noted that the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 thick window) responds to both 
alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) covering (~8 mg/cm
2) of the probe face 
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absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the probe a beta only detector. The unit should be 
calibrated using a 
60Co source with dimensions that match the area to be surveyed. 
6.4.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
Analysis of 
60Co is routinely performed via gamma ray spectrometry. Samples that follow the 
decontamination may be analyzed without any chemical separation to concentrations of ~10 
pCi/g using a 1 kg sample and counting for approximately 1 hour using a HPGe. There may be 
minor sample self-shielding concerns with large concrete or steel samples. However all other 
matrices do not significantly diminish the 1173 and 1332 keV gamma rays. 
This detector counting time represents only a portion of the radiological holding time (i.e., no 
sample preparation or data reduction times are included). The laboratory TAT, which includes 
the radiological holding time, is the summation of the times for sample logging at the laboratory, 
sample preparation, counting of the prepared sample, data processing, final data review by lab 
technical personnel, and transmittal of a data report. The time taken to ship the sample to the 
laboratory is not normally included in the laboratory TAT but should be considered as part of the 
overall TAT, from field shipping to receipt of data report. The time required for these ancillary 
functions are dictated by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.4.4 Environmental  Factors 
The most likely fate of cobalt in the environment is its oxide state, which can be difficult to 
dissolve. Generally, the most effective methods for dissolving the oxide are nitric or 
hydrochloric acid, or ammoniacal EDTA. 
6.4.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
Removal of cobalt with aqueous solutions that lack a complexing agent or a strong acid causes 
the formation of colloidal cobalt that cannot be filtered easily, ion exchanged, or concentrated 
into a waste form. 
Cobalt is easily solubilized by mineral acids and chelating agents that are readily available. The 
resultant solution also may be reduced in volume via ion exchange onto either a cation or anion 
resin (depending on the chemical used). The use of acids for chemical decontamination of metal 
surfaces also dissolves at least part of the metal surface. While this aids in the removal of the 
radionuclide, it also creates an additional mass of waste from the dissolved metal. Table 6.6 
presents cobalt decontamination techniques. 
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Table 6.6 Potential Techniques for Cobalt Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non 
porous 
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or 
Dry Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Scabbling Strippable Sponge  Chemical  Sponge  Strippable  Strippable 
Decon  Paint  Blasting  Decon  Blasting  Paint  Paint 
Technique  (complexing 
agent) 
Secondary  Concrete  Sponge  Concrete  Grit Blasting  Concrete  Chemical  Sponge 
Decon  Cutting  Blasting  Cutting  Cutting  Decon (con- Blasting 
Technique  centrated 
mineral acid) 
6.5 AMERICIUM-241  (
241AM) 
6.5.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Americium is a silvery white metal that exists in the +3 oxidation state when found in environ­
mental samples. It generally is not very soluble in surface or ground water and its chemistry is 
quite unique. It does not form many complexes with organic chelating agents and is not easily 
ion-exchanged using ordinary cation exchange resins.  
Am-241 is a manmade metal that is produced from the decay of 
241Pu. Am-241 in the environ­
ment came from the atmospheric suspension of the radionuclide following weapons testing from 
the 1950s to 1978. As such, it is in the form of microscopic dust.  
Am-241 is used in some medical diagnostic devices and in a variety of industrial and commercial 
devices that measure density and thickness. Am-241 is also used commercially in mixtures with 
beryllium metal as low-flux neutron sources. The alpha emission from the americium yields a 
nuclear reaction with the beryllium to yield a neutron. If used as a RDD, such a source would 
have the added hazard of finely divided beryllium. The approximate size of a single such source 
is a cylinder about 3 inches in diameter and about 6 inches long. Am-241 sources (approximately 
100 pCi) are also present in smoke detectors that are sold over-the-counter. 
Am-241 may be electroplated onto a nickel metal disc as either an alpha or gamma source. Am 
241 used in industrial, medical, or commercial devices is generally electroplated onto a 
coin-sized metal or plastic disc. The 
241Am source present in a smoke detector is inside a 
metal cylinder that is about the size of a pencil eraser. Most Ionization Chamber Smoke 
Detectors (ICSD) sold today use an oxide of 
241Am as the radioactive source (see Figure 6.3). 
The typical activity for a modern residential ICSD is approximately 1 µCi, while the activity in 
one used in public and commercial buildings might be as high as 50 µCi. 
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Figure 6.2 Am-241 Smoke Detector Source 
The size of the enclosed source is about equal to a U.S. penny. 
6.5.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Am-241 is a long-lived (half-life 433 years), alpha particle emitting (5.2 MeV) nuclide that also 
emits a low-energy photon (59.5 keV) of low abundance (~36 %). Since 
241Am is a weak photon 
emitter, it may be possible to detect higher-level activities of this radionuclide using the Berkley 
Nucleonic SAM 935 coupled with a portable “thin-windowed” sodium iodide detector. However, 
gamma detectors, such as a Micro-R meter, are inefficient and ineffective in measuring 
241Am 
contamination unless the contamination is extremely high. General surveys (refer to RRSOP­
402) with this instrument and detector should be conducted holding the unit at 15 inches above 
the surface to be surveyed and slowly walking through the potentially contaminated area. 
Alpha surveys (refer to RRSOP-402) can be made on surfaces that americium has not penetrated. 
Generally, this technique is not applicable to those situations (like soil) where even minor 
penetration of the radionuclide into the matrix has occurred. In most cases, porous (e.g., wood) 
and volumetric (e.g., soil and water) contamination cannot be detected by scanning for alpha 
activity. When surveying potentially smooth, non-porous contaminated surfaces (e.g., painted 
concrete, metal, glass), the Ludlum 2241 with the 43-90 alpha scintillation probe or the 44-9 
alpha/beta probe can be used. Use of these survey meter-probe combinations facilitates 
converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter response 
conversion to surface activity should take into account the active surface area of the 43-90 
scintillation probe of 100 cm
2 and the 44-9 probe of 12 cm
2. For alpha surveys, the probes should 
be held within 1 cm (<½ inch) from the surface under investigation and moved slowly (<5 cm/s 
or <2 in/s). The 43-90 probe detects only alphas, whereas the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 thick 
window) responds to both alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) covering (~8 
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mg/cm
2) of the 44-9 probe face absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the 44-9 probe a beta-only 
detector. The differential reading between the total response of the open window and the covered 
window is due to alpha contamination. Both probes should be calibrated using a matching area 
calibrated 
241Am source. Corrections for surface roughness should be applied to the calibrations 
and field readings (EPA 2000a). For volumetric materials, samples are collected in the field and 
sent to a laboratory for analysis (EPA 2000a). 
6.5.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
Gross alpha survey of samples indicating positive activity needs to be assessed for americium. 
Although americium emits a gamma ray a small percentage of the time, it is of low energy. Thus, 
it is unlikely that gamma survey field instruments (like an RO-020) will be used to detect 
americium in samples for cleanup levels.  
If an alpha survey indicates positive activity and subsequent analysis is required to confirm the 
presence of americium, gamma spectrometric analysis is the most expeditious method to use 
since no sample preparation is required, and the 
241Am gamma ray is distinctive. However, 
depending upon the density of the medium and the concentration, gamma spectrometry may not 
accurately assess the concentration levels needed. Additionally, most high purity germanium 
detectors (HPGe) do not have thin, low Z detector covers that also reduce the ability to detect a 
59 keV gamma ray. A 1 kg sample of soil counted for 100 minutes on a HPGe detector with 
normal aluminum housing can detect about 100 pCi/g of 
241Am. 
Alpha spectrometry requires chemical separation of the americium from all other transuranic 
elements. Acid or base dissolution and several chemical separation steps are necessary to achieve 
that separation. The counting interval required for analysis to a level of 50 pCi/g using a 5 g 
sample is about 20 hours. Thus, the total chemical and radiological analysis time is on the order 
of 2 days. This represents only the sample processing and detector time. The total TAT needs to 
include the shipping time, sample logging at the laboratory count time, data processing, and final 
data review by lab technical personnel. The time required for these ancillary functions is dictated 
by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.5.4 Environmental  Factors 
Americium has a very low solubility. If dispersed in the environment, it forms small particulate 
material that can be easily dispersed into the air if the particulate material dries out. Because 
241Am is an alpha emitter, it is a serious concern. Drying out 
241Am deposits should be avoided 
when possible. 
6.5.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
Americium has a low solubility in water, and few chelating agents form strong complexes with 
isotopes of that radionuclide. If water is used as the medium for decontamination, solutions 
containing phosphates or oxalates should be avoided, as both of these can cause americium to 
precipitate.  
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Americium forms insoluble compounds in environmental media. Because of the limited number 
of chelating agents or strong acids that can successfully solubilize americium, physical methods 
of removal are more practicable. Table 6.7 presents several decontamination approaches. 
Table 6.7 Potential Techniques for Americium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non 
porous 
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or 
Dry Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Scabbling Sponge Cement  Hot Water  Concrete  Hot Water  Hot Water 
Decon  Blasting  Cutting  Wash  Shaving  Wash  Wash 
Technique 
Secondary 
Decon 
Technique 
TechXtract
® Hot  Water 
Wash 
TechXtract
®  Scabbling  TechXtract
®  Chemical 
Decon with 
Acid 
Sponge 
Blasting 
6.6 RADIUM-226  (
226RA) 
6.6.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Radium’s two oxidation states are zero and +2, and it is chemically similar to calcium, 
magnesium, and strontium. The metal is silvery-white, which darkens to black upon exposure to 
air. If exposed to high temperatures, such as during a RDD event, the initial color observed from 
the conflagration might be crimson due to the excitation of radium atoms. Radium solubility will 
depend on the presence and the concentration of the chemically similar elements. Thus, the 
carbonates and sulfates of radium will be very insoluble. The presence of other elements in the 
radium group, like calcium or magnesium, also will have a significant effect on its solubility. If 
these materials are present, radium will coprecipitate with them. Cation resin materials exchange 
radium in acidic solution, and this reaction can be a significant factor in the treatment of aqueous 
wastes contaminated with radium. Although radium may be complexed with EDTA, it is more 
readily complexed with diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (DTPA). 
Radium has three radioisotopes that have the potential for being detected during a radiological 
incident: 
226Ra, 
228Ra, and 
224Ra. Although the isotope of concern, radiologically, is 
226Ra 
because of its long half-life (the other two are short-lived and could not amass a significant 
quantity), the presence of the other two isotopes and their radioactive progeny can cause 
significant interference when evaluating contamination levels of 
226Ra. 
Ra-226’s first decay product is 
222Rn, a noble gas that has a short half-life (3.8 days). The 
subsequent decay products are non-volatile alpha and beta emitters. If 
226Ra is present from a 
RDD, it would also contain all the decay products of 
226Ra at the same concentration due to the 
establishment of secular equilibrium in the source material. The volatility of the radon will cause 
redeposition of the other decay products based on temperature and meteorological conditions. 
This can occur over short periods (hours to days). 
95
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Ra-228 and 
224Ra are decay products of 
232Th and are naturally occurring (as are 
226Ra and its 
decay products). Ra-224 decays to 
220Rn, which behaves similarly to 
222Rn. Rn-220 also has 
short-lived decay products that are both alpha and beta emitters. 
For these three radionuclides of radium, it is important not only to assess the changing activity 
due to the delayed build-in based on the parent-daughter relationships of the radionuclides, but 
also the absolute amount of each. The time delay to build-in activity will be the same whether or 
not the source is a natural effect or the result of a RDD. The critical factor will be the total 
concentration of each. 
6.6.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Ra-226 is a long-lived (half-life 1,600 years), alpha particle emitting (4.784 MeV, 94.4% 
abundance) nuclide that also emits a low-energy photon (186 keV) of low abundance (~3.3 %). 
The short-lived decay products, which reach some level of secular equilibrium with 
226Ra within 
weeks, emit numerous easily detected alpha and beta particles and gamma rays. The short-lived 
decay product nuclides include 
222Rn, 
218Po, 
218Bi, and 
218Pb. For general area surveys and 
surface contamination surveys, instruments with detector probes that respond to either gamma 
rays (principally 352, 609 and 1764 keV) or beta particles (numerous betas having βmax greater 
than 0.60 MeV) are used. 
Without knowledge of the radioactive source, a general-area gamma survey (refer to RRSOP­
402) can be conducted with a Ludlum Model 192 Micro-R Meter for gamma exposure rates 
between 1 and 5,000 µR/hr or 0.001 to 5 mR/hr. Terrestrial gamma background exposure rates 
vary according soil type and geographical area but are normally between 3 and 9 µR/hr. The 
upper range (1,000 to 5,000 µR/hr) of the Model 192 Micro-R Meter responds to exposures that 
are approximately 100 to 1,000 times typical terrestrial background levels. If the upper response 
range of this instrument is exceeded, the Eberline Model RO20 should be used. This unit has a 
gamma response of 5 to 50,000 mR/hr. General surveys (refer to RRSOP-402) with either meter 
should be conducted holding the unit at waist height and slowly walking through the potentially 
contaminated area. 
For gamma-emitting, nuclide-identifying scoping surveys of potentially contaminated ground 
(refer to RRSOP-402), the SAM-935 with the NaI detector is typically the instrument of choice. 
The survey meter-probe should be calibrated with an extended 
226Ra source prior to use. The 
SAM-935 unit has software that performs nuclide identification and spectral analysis. As 
recommended in MARSSIM (EPA 2000a), the detector is held close to the ground surface (~6 
cm or 2.5 inches) and moved in a serpentine pattern while walking at a slow speed (i.e., typically 
0.5 m/s (~1.5 ft/s) or slow enough to detect the desired investigation level). 
When surveying potentially contaminated surfaces, the Ludlum 2241with 44-9 alpha/beta probe 
can be used to detect the 
226Ra alpha particle and the beta and alpha particles from the short-lived 
decay products. Use of this survey meter-probe combination facilitates converting the observed 
count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter response conversion to surface activity 
should take into account the 12 cm
2 active surface area of the 44-9 probe. The probe should be 
held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the surface under investigation and moved slowly (<5 cm/s or 
<2 in/s). It should be noted that the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 thick window) responds to both 
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alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) covering (~8 mg/cm
2) of the probe face 
absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the probe a beta-only detector. The unit should be 
calibrated using a 
226Ra source whose dimensions match the area to be surveyed with this 
instrument. 
Alpha surveys may be conducted on surfaces where 
226Ra or decay products do not penetrate the 
matrix (refer to RRSOP-402). Generally, this technique is not applicable to those situations (like 
soil) where even minor penetration of the radionuclide into the matrix has occurred. In most 
cases, porous (e.g., wood) and volumetric (e.g., soil and water) contamination cannot be detected 
by scanning for alpha activity. For surveying potentially smooth, non-porous contaminated 
surfaces (e.g., concrete, metal, drywall), the Ludlum 2241 with the 43-90 alpha scintillation 
probe or the 44-9 alpha/beta probe may be used. Use of these survey meter-probe combinations 
facilitates converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter 
response conversion to surface activity should take into account the active surface area of the 43­
90 scintillation probe of 100 cm
2 and the 44-9 probe of 12 cm
2. For alpha surveys, the probes 
should be held within 1 cm (<½ inch) from the surface under investigation and moved slowly. 
The 43-90 probe detects alphas only, whereas the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 thick window) 
responds to both alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) covering (~ 8 mg/cm
2) of 
the 44-9 probe face absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the probe as a beta only detector. The 
differential reading between the total response of the open window and the covered window 
indicates alpha contamination. Both probes should be calibrated using a matching area calibrated 
226Ra source with the short-lived decay products in equilibrium. Corrections for surface rough­
ness should be applied to the calibrations and field readings (EPA 2000a). For volumetric 
materials, samples are collected in the field and sent to a laboratory for analysis (EPA 2000a). 
6.6.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
Analysis for 
226Ra in environmental samples is most often performed using the “Deemanation” 
method. This method involves chemical isolation and precipitation of radium followed by the 5­
21 day in-growth of the 
222Rn daughter. The sample is counted using a special scintillation 
detector. It takes at least 7 days to complete the analytical separations and counting. However, 
for levels that are much higher than those normally experienced (factor of at least 20), 
226Ra can 
be analyzed directly using gamma ray spectrometry. With a HPGe detector, a 10-hour count, and 
a sample size of about 200 g, concentrations of 2 pCi/g should be achievable. 
The analysis represents only the sample processing and detector time. The total TAT needs to 
include the shipping time, sample logging at the laboratory, count time, data processing, final 
data review, and data reporting by lab technical personnel. The time required for these ancillary 
functions is dictated by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.6.4 Environmental  Factors 
The environmental factors that affect radium are similar to those affecting strontium. By the time 
decontamination efforts start, radium will be in equilibrium with its decay products (a total of 
five stopping at radium-C (
214Po)). Thus, the measurement of decontamination should take into 
account all of the radionuclides that may be present in the decay chain, not just radium (an alpha 
emitter) or its decay products (both alpha and beta emitters). 
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Allowing surfaces that contain radium contamination to be affected by environmental factors, 
such as acid rain, will exacerbate cleanup efforts since acid rain tends to drive radium and its 
decay products deeper into most surfaces. 
6.6.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
Solutions containing carbonates, sulfates, or phosphates should be avoided, as these precipitate 
radium and potentially ‘fix’ the radionuclide on the surface that is to be decontaminated. 
Potential techniques for decontaminating surfaces with radium are summarized in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 Potential Techniques for Radium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non 
porous 
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or Dry 
Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary 
Decon 
Technique 
Scabbling Hot  Water 
with DTPA 
Concrete 
Cutting 
Hot Water with 
EDTA 
Sponge 
Blasting 
Hot Water 
Rinse 
Hot Water 
Rinse 
Secondary  N/A N/A N/A  TechXtract® TechXtract® Strippable  N/A 
Decon  Paint 
Technique 
6.7 IRIDIUM-192  (
192IR) 
6.7.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Iridium is a shiny, silvery-white, very dense metal that does not rust/react when exposed to 
normal environmental conditions. Iridium can exist in several different oxidation states but only 
under strongly oxidizing conditions. Iridium radioisotopes are always present in the elemental 
form if detected in the environment. Ir-192 used in medicine is in the form of tiny seeds, each 
about the size of a grain of rice. Industrial gauges hold pencil-like metal sticks of solid 
192Ir or 
small pencil-like tubes that contain pellets of 
192Ir. Ir-192 sources are made of iridium in the 
elemental state. 
Iridium has a very high melting point and tensile strength that cause the iridium source to be very 
inert. This means that it will not disperse into fine particulates. The size of these sources is 
similar to that of the sealed 
60Co sources seen in Figure 6.2. The iridium surface may become 
black following a conflagration, but iridium most likely will remain as discrete particles, visible 
without magnification. 
6.7.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Ir-192 has a half-life of 74 days and decays by electron capture 4.7% of the time with the 
emission of numerous gamma rays of low abundance and by a beta particle emission, and 95.3% 
of the time with principal gamma rays of 296, 308, 317, and 468 keV. For most general-area 
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surveys, detectors that respond to the gamma rays are used. For surface area contamination 
surveys, detector probes that respond to the 
192Ir beta particles 0.536 MeV (41.4% abundance) 
βmax and 0.672 MeV (48.3% abundance) βmax are used. 
Without knowledge of the radioactive source, a general area gamma survey (refer to RRSOP­
402) can be conducted with a Ludlum Model 192 Micro-R Meter for gamma exposure rates 
between 1 and 5,000 µR/hr or 0.001 to 5 mR/hr. Terrestrial gamma background exposure rates 
vary according soil type and geographical area but normally are between 3 and 9 µR/hr. The 
upper range (1,000 to 5,000 µR/hr) of the Model 192 Micro-R Meter responds to exposures that 
are approximately 100 to 1,000 times typical terrestrial background levels. If the upper response 
range of this instrument is exceeded, the Eberline Model RO20 should be used. This unit has a 
gamma response of 5 to 50,000 mR/hr. General surveys with either meter should be conducted 
holding the unit at waist height and slowly walking through the potentially contaminated area.    
For gamma-emitting, nuclide-identifying scoping surveys of potentially contaminated ground 
(refer to RRSOP-402), the SAM-935 with the NaI detector is typically the instrument of choice. 
The survey meter-probe should be calibrated with a 
192Ir source prior to use. The SAM-935 unit 
has software that performs nuclide identification and spectral analysis. As recommended in 
MARSSIM, the detector is held close to the ground surface (~6 cm or 2.5 inches) and moved in a 
serpentine pattern while walking at a slow speed, typically 0.5 m/s (~1.5 ft/s) or slow enough to 
detect the desired investigation level.  
For surveying of potentially contaminated surfaces (refer to RRSOP-402), the Ludlum 2241with 
44-9 alpha/beta probe can be used. Use of this survey meter-probe combination facilitates 
converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter response 
conversion to surface activity should take into account the 12 cm
2 active surface area of the 44-9 
probe. The probe should be held less than 2 cm (~1 inch) from the surface under investigation 
and moved slowly (<5 cm/s or <2 in/s). It should be noted that the open 44-9 probe (1.7 mg/cm
2 
thick window) responds to both alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) covering (~8 
mg/cm
2) of the probe face absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the probe a beta-only detector. 
The unit should be calibrated using a 
192Ir source whose dimensions match the area to be 
surveyed using this instrument. 
6.7.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
The most effective method of analysis for iridium is by gamma ray detection. The likelihood of 
finding low concentrations of this radionuclide are minimal because the metallic state is the only 
readily available form. The only sample preparation involves putting the sample in a calibrated 
geometry before counting. A two-hour count time on a HPGe detector will identify the presence 
of 
192Ir at about 25 pCi/g for a 1 kg sample. 
This detector counting time represents only a portion of the radiological holding time (i.e., no 
sample preparation or data reduction times are included). The laboratory TAT, which includes 
the radiological holding time, is the summation of the times for sample logging at the laboratory, 
sample preparation, counting of the prepared sample, data processing, final data review by lab 
technical personnel, and transmittal of a data report. The time taken to ship the sample to the 
laboratory from the field to receipt of the data report is not normally included in the laboratory 
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TAT but should be considered as part of the overall TAT. The time required for these ancillary 
functions is dictated by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.7.4 Environmental  Factors 
The inert nature of the iridium, and its high-density, make it unlikely that any environmental 
parameters will alter its spread or affect its removal. 
6.7.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
If iridium were dispersed as a result of a RDD, the material would be fine insoluble particulate 
matter. The most serious condition to avoid is the rapid surveying of such an area. ‘Hot’ particles 
like this could easily be overlooked if the scan speed is too rapid. 
The inert nature of iridium metal makes decontamination procedures involving wash solutions 
impracticable. Its physical form causes the material to impinge onto a surface and potentially 
become deeply imbedded. This generally means that the most successful decontamination 
techniques use physical removal of discrete masses. Although methods like scabbling or roto­
peening may be considered, they create a large amount of solid waste, most of which is not 
contaminated. Potentially, the best method of decontamination would be to use a survey 
instrument to locate the hot spots and confine decontamination efforts to these localized areas. 
This approach saves time and money on waste disposal. It is likely that simple mechanical 
techniques, like using forceps on an extension arm, will provide the most effective 
decontamination technique for 
192Ir contamination.  
Chemical techniques are not expected to be effective on removing 
192Ir, since 
192Ir is very inert. 
For smooth, non-porous surfaces where the radionuclide is not embedded, the most effective 
cleanup technique is either high-pressure hot water or dry vacuuming. 
A technique to remove iridium that should also be considered is decay in place. Since iridium’s 
half-life is short, 1-2 years might be sufficient for radioactive decay to be effective. Table 6.9 
presents various iridium decontamination techniques. 
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Table 6.9 Potential Techniques for Iridium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
Cement 
Stone 
(non-porous
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or 
Dry Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Concrete  Concrete  Concrete  Concrete  Concrete  Hot Water   Hot Water 
Decon  Grinding  Grinding  Grinding  Grinding  Grinding 
Technique 
Secondary  Hot Water  Hot Water  Hot Water  Hot Water  Hot Water  Hot Water  Concrete 
Decon  Grinding 
Technique 
6.8  PLUTONIUM-238 AND -239 (
238PU AND
   (239+240)PU) 
6.8.1 Chemical  Properties/Form 
Plutonium is a highly reactive gray metal that exists in the +3, +4, +5, and +6 oxidation states in 
addition to the metallic state. The oxidized metal surface takes on a yellow appearance. In dilute 
aqueous solution, all four oxidation states of plutonium exist. Its chemistry, as with those of the 
other transuranics, is unique. It may be ion exchanged by both cation and anion resins, dependent 
upon its oxidation state and the presence of complexing agents. The radionuclides of principal 
concern are 
238Pu (half-life 88 years) and 
239+240Pu (half-lives of 24,000 and 6,600 years, respect­
ively). The isotopes of 239 and 240 are routinely analyzed as the total of activity of the two 
radionuclides because their alpha particle energies are so close that they cannot be distinguished 
using normal counting techniques. The isotope 
238Pu is very commonly used in radioisotope 
thermoelectric generators, such as the one seen in Figure 6.2. Both isotopes may be found in 
environmental samples at very low concentrations due to the atmospheric testing that took place 
in the 1950s through 1978. 
6.8.2  Field Detection Techniques 
Pu-238 and 239/240 are relatively long-lived alpha particles emitting (> 5.1 MeV) nuclides. 
Although 
239Pu also emits a low-energy X-ray (13.6 keV) of low abundance (~4 %), the low 
energy photon can only be detected in the field with special low-energy photon detectors not 
available to routine field survey teams. Therefore, general area surveys cannot be conducted for 
these plutonium isotopes unless specialized equipment and specially trained personnel are 
available. 
Alpha surveys can be made on surfaces where there is no depth of penetration of the plutonium 
into the matrix (refer to RRSOP-402). Most likely, this technique will not be applicable to those 
situations (like soil) where even minor radionuclide depth penetration occurs. In most cases, 
porous (e.g., wood) and volumetric (e.g., soil and water) contamination cannot be detected by 
scanning for alpha activity. When surveying potentially smooth, non-porous contaminated 
surfaces (e.g., concrete, metal, drywall), the Ludlum 2241 with the 43-90 alpha scintillation 
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Figure 6.3 General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS)  
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) 
probe or the 44-9 alpha/beta probe can be used. These survey meter-probe combinations 
facilitate converting the observed count rate to surface activity (units of Bq/cm
2). The meter 
response conversion to surface activity should take into account the active surface area of the 43­
90 scintillation probe of 100 cm
2 and the 44-9 probe of 12 cm
2. For alpha surveys, the probes 
should be held within 1 cm (<½ inch) from the surface under investigation and moved slowly 
(<5 cm/s or <2 in/s). The 43-90 probe detects alphas only, whereas the open 44-9 probe (1.7 
mg/cm
2 thick window) responds to both alpha and beta particles. The thin plastic (or Mylar) 
covering (~8 mg/cm
2) of the 44-9 probe face absorbs alpha particles, thus rendering the probe a 
beta-only detector. The differential reading between the total response of the open window and 
the covered window is from alpha contamination. The unit should be calibrated using a 
238Pu, or
239+240Pu source whose dimensions match the area to be surveyed with this instrument. 
Corrections for surface roughness should be applied to the calibrations and field readings (EPA 
2000a). For volumetric materials, samples are collected in the field and sent to a laboratory for 
analyses (EPA 2000a). 
6.8.3 Contract  Laboratory Turn-Around-Time 
The chemistry of plutonium is quite complex. A solution of plutonium initially of one oxidation 
state undergoes several different disproportionation and oxidation-reduction reactions until all 
four of the above oxidation states are present. This peculiar chemistry for plutonium requires 
sample storage and analytical separations with significant types of chemical additives to ensure 
that plutonium maintains the proper oxidation state for analysis and separation. The anticipated 
laboratory time using chemical separations and alpha spectrometry on a one-gram sample is one 
day to achieve detectable levels of 100 pCi/g of the plutonium isotopes. 
Chemical separation and detector counting time represents only a portion of the radiological 
holding time (i.e., no sample preparation or data reduction times are included). The laboratory 
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TAT, which includes the radiological holding time, is the summation of the time required for 
sample logging at the laboratory, sample preparation, counting of the prepared sample, data 
processing, final data review by lab technical personnel, and transmittal of a data report. The 
time taken to ship the sample to the laboratory is not normally included in the laboratory TAT 
but should be considered as part of the overall TAT. The time required for these ancillary 
functions is dictated by the data quality objectives for the event. 
6.8.4 Environmental  Factors 
Plutonium is not only a multivalent metal, but depending upon environmental conditions, it may 
change oxidation state. Thus, the decontamination technique used must take into account its 
several potential states and is the reason for the selection of physical techniques as the primary 
decontamination method in the Table 6.10 below. 
6.8.5 Decontamination  Approaches 
Dry deposition of plutonium is most likely to result in surface contamination. Because of its 
ability to change oxidation states, chemical means of decontamination may drive the plutonium 
further into the matrix. Therefore chemical decontamination techniques should be avoided. In 
most cases, physical removal techniques are likely to be the most effective methods. Physical 
removal requires significant planning for the use of respiratory protection because of the high 
dose that can be caused by alpha deposition inside the body. 
Table 6.10 Potential Techniques for Plutonium Decontamination 
Matrix 
Concrete 
or 
cement 
Stone 
(non-porous
marble or 
granite) 
Stone 
(lime)  Macadam  Plaster or 
Dry Wall 
Steel 
(uncoated) 
Painted 
Surfaces 
Primary  Concrete  Hot Water with  Concrete  Scabbling Concrete  Hot Water  Strippable 
Decon  Cutting  Complexing  Cutting  Cutting  with  Coating 
Technique  Agent  Complexing 
Agent 
Secondary  Scabbling Strippable  Sponge  Hot Water  Sponge  Strippable  Grit Blasting 
Decon  Coating  Blasting  with Com- Blasting  Coating 
Technique  plexing 
Agent 
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7. CLEANUP  PLANNING 
This chapter describes cleanup planning aspects that should be considered throughout the early 
and intermediate phases of incident response. It does not include a complete cleanup how-to 
process, but rather references documents that provide such information.  
Planning for site cleanup and restoration should begin as soon as possible after an incident, 
because activities undertaken as part of the initial and intermediate response will be vital to the 
successful recovery of the contaminated area and will have an impact on the eventual cleanup.  
Recovery and site restoration become the dominant tasks once the initial protective measures are 
in place, the incident is stabilized, and the initial site characterization is complete. Conversely, if 
actions are taken in early phases without consideration of the cleanup, those actions could 
seriously complicate cleanup and the eventual disposition of waste. Therefore, it is important to 
have some initial plan for site cleanup and restoration early in the process. Generally, 
development of a detailed recovery strategy begins during the intermediate phase of the 
radiological incident response. 
7.1  RECOMMENDATION FOR RECOVERY AFTER RDD/IND INCIDENTS 
For Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) incidents, the 
guidance for cleanup and recovery contained in the document titled Application of Protective 
Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) 
Incidents (RDD/IND PAG Application) should be used (DHS 2006). The RDD/IND PAG 
Application guidance provides an optimization process for establishing recovery and cleanup 
exposure levels. As described in the guidance, optimized exposure levels should be established 
for a site on an incident-specific basis. 
The RDD/IND PAG Application guidance does not include a pre-established numeric guideline 
for cleanup, such as a cancer risk range or a millirem dose limit. Instead, the DHS has proposed 
the use of an optimization process that considers the overall welfare of the public while estab­
lishing cleanup levels consistent with social, economic, and health protection factors. EPA 
participated in the development of the guidance and has committed to using it for RDD/IND 
planning. In developing the guidance, the Federal Government recognized that experience from 
existing programs, such as the EPA Superfund program, NRC standards for decontamination and 
decommissions to terminate a plant license, and other national and international recommenda­
tions, will be useful in planning the recovery and restoration efforts following a RDD or IND 
incident. This guidance allows the consideration and incorporation, as appropriate, of any or all 
of the existing programs.  
The RDD/IND PAG Application guidance addresses the extremely broad range of situations that 
can occur under various RDD and IND scenarios. This range of situations may be from light 
contamination of a single street or building to the widespread destruction of a major metropolitan 
area that could be potentially worse than the bombings of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. This range of 
situations is larger than those addressed by most existing programs or recommendations. 
Ultimately, the RDD/IND guidance will be incorporated by EPA into a revised PAG Manual that 
currently is under development. 
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The optimized exposure level is the exposure level at which the risks from radiation exposure are 
offset by the benefits of the activities associated with the exposure, such as allowing people to 
return to their homes and offices. Optimization is a decision-making process that seeks to 
consider and balance many factors. Most existing state and federal site cleanup programs that 
address either radionuclides or chemicals use some type of optimization approach, although it is 
not always referred to as such. For example, EPA’s Superfund remedial program uses nine 
remedy selection criteria when evaluating remediation options for National Priorities List (NPL) 
sites. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses an As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
(ALARA) approach for decommissioning of licensed facilities. Both of these are optimization 
approaches. Additionally, the Framework for Environmental Health Risk Management 
(Framework) written by the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and 
Risk Management (PC-97) served as the philosophical base for the optimization process 
described in the RDD/IND PAG Application document (PCC 1997).  
Under a recovery phase optimization approach, the evaluation of cleanup alternatives should 
consider and factor in all relevant variables, such as the areas impacted (e.g., size, location 
relative to population), the types of contamination (e.g., chemical, biological, radiological), 
human health, public welfare, technical feasibility, costs, and available resources to implement 
and maintain remedial options, long-term effectiveness, timeliness, public acceptability, and 
economic effects (e.g., on residents, tourism, business, and industry). 
During the optimization process, standards from existing cleanup programs, such as EPA’s 
Superfund and NRC’s decommissioning programs, should be considered as benchmarks (see 
Table 7.1). The optimization process allows stakeholders to help decision makers choose from a 
variety of dose and/or risk benchmarks identified from state, federal, or other sources (e.g., 
national and international advisory organizations) as goals or starting points in the analysis of 
remediation options. The benchmarks that may be useful for analysis of remediation options and 
cleanup levels may increase or decrease depending on site-specific circumstances and balancing 
of other relevant factors. 
If the chosen benchmark has an optimization process built into it, then the optimization process 
associated with the benchmark being used to determine final cleanup levels should be used. For 
example, if the CERCLA criteria are used as a benchmark, then the nine remedy selection 
criteria should be used in the optimization process. If the NRC or DOE dose criteria are used as a 
benchmark, then the ALARA process should be used in the optimization process.  
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Table 7.1 Selected Examples of U.S. Benchmarks for Potential Use in Evaluating 
Long-Term Cleanup Exposure Level Options During the Late Phase
1, 2 
Example Organizations or 
Cleanup Programs 
Summary of selected program-specific human health protection goals or 
concepts as applied to the cleanup of radiological contamination 
NRC Agreement State 
Decommissioning Programs 
Varies across states. Usually, decommissioning programs seek to achieve: 
– 25 mrem/yr primary dose limit 
– 100 mrem/yr allowable exemption 
– Lower levels based on the ALARA concept. Some states have more stringent 
dose limits (e.g., 19, 15, or 10 mrem/yr) 
State Environmental 
Department Contaminated 
Site Cleanup Programs 
Varies across states. Usually, programs seek to achieve risk-based goals or a 
range of acceptable risk outcomes. Goals typically: 
– fall within a risk range of 10-4 to 10-6 excess lifetime cancer risk 
– rely on a hazard index of one (or less) for non-cancer effects 
– include meeting existing applicable or relevant environmental 
regulations/standards. Some states have single risk-based standards or goals 
(e.g., 10-4, 10-5, or 10-6). 
NRC and DOE 
Decommissioning and Site 
Remediation Programs 
Site cleanups seek to achieve: 
– 25 mrem/yr primary dose limit 
– 100 mrem/yr allowable exemption 
– Lower levels based on the ALARA concept. (For further information, see 10 
CFR 20 Subpart E; and DOE Order 5400.5) 
EPA Superfund Remedial 
Site Cleanup Program3 
Generally, remedial actions achieve human exposures that meet: 
– 10-4 to 10-6 excess cancer risk 
– Hazard Index of one or less for non-cancer toxicity 
– All Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs). These 
may be waived under specific circumstances. (For further information see: 40 
CFR 300.430) 
1Table presents examples only. Final cleanup goals and/or actual cleanup outcomes for a particular incident may vary 
depending on the circumstances of the incident. No single cleanup target is recommended for all possible incidents. 
2Although many response programs often articulate target cleanup goals or limits in planning guidance, whether or not these 
levels are met or exceeded on a response-specific basis generally depends on the program context and the site-specific 
circumstances. Levels and concepts in this table are presented for illustration only and should not be applied to a specific 
incident cleanup without a thorough understanding of their derivation and application in the originating programs. Users 
should be aware that EPA has determined that most of these other benchmarks should not be used to establish 
cleanup levels at Superfund Remedial sites [EPA OSWER Directive 9200.4-18, NTIS Order Number (PB97 963210), 
Establishment of Cleanup Levels for CERCLA Sites with Radioactive Contamination,” August 22, 1997 (EPA 1997)].  
3Under CERCLA’s remedial program requirement, section 105(d) provides that, if a petition for assessment is filed, and no 
preliminary assessment (PA) of the release has been conducted within 12 months of the petition’s receipt, then EPA must 
either complete a preliminary assessment, or explain why an assessment is not appropriate. (See also 40 CFR 300.42(b)(5).) 
Similarly, section 105(d) requires an evaluation of a release or threatened release under the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) if 
the preliminary assessment indicated it may pose a threat to human health or the environment. 
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Optimization activities are quantitative and qualitative assessments applied at each stage of site 
recovery decision making—from evaluation of remedial options to implementation of the chosen 
alternative. Evaluation of options for the late phase of recovery after a radiological incident 
should balance all of the relevant factors. Some factors to consider include the following (all may 
not be relevant in all circumstances): 
•	 Areas impacted (e.g., size, location relative to population) 
•	 Types of contamination (including chemical and biological, if relevant, in addition to 
radiological) 
•	 Other hazards present 
•	 Human health 
•	 Public welfare 
•	 Ecological risks 
•	 Actions already taken during the early and intermediate phases 
•	 Projected land use 
•	 Preservation or destruction of places of historical, national, or regional significance 
•	 Technical feasibility 
•	 Wastes generated 
•	 Waste disposal options and costs 
•	 Available resources (and costs) to implement and maintain cleanup options 
•	 Potential adverse impacts (e.g., to human health, the environment, and the economy) of 
cleanup options 
•	 Long-term effectiveness 
•	 Timeliness 
•	 Public acceptability, including local cultural sensitivities 
•	 Economic effects (e.g., tourism, business, and industry) 
Determining the optimized exposure level for recovery requires consideration of the net health 
benefits of reducing radiation exposure to selected levels and the burdens that the dose reduction 
places upon society. It is important to involve technical experts, representatives of the affected 
population, and other stakeholders in this process. As appropriate for the site-specific circum­
stances, technical and stakeholder working groups may be formed to focus on recovery and site 
restoration issues. The designated OSC may or may not be a part of these groups, although other 
experts in EPA may participate. Workgroup membership should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Smaller incidents may not require the establishment of formal working groups, but appropriate 
stakeholders should be involved in the optimization process. The working groups should draw 
upon the expertise of various technical disciplines, members of the affected areas, government 
agencies, and public interest groups. At a minimum, people with the following expertise should 
be included: 
•	 Health physics and radiation protection 
•	 Environmental fate and transport sciences 
•	 Decontamination technologies 
108 OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
•	 Radiation measurements 
•	 Site-specific demographics, land uses, and local public works 
•	 Local community needs, wants, and wishes (e.g., strategic planning) 
•	 Government 
The working groups should be organizationally and functionally flexible, as the needs of the 
specific situation dictate. State and local public officials also need to be included in the process. 
In some cases it may be feasible to have a single group that includes all the relevant skills and 
knowledge. Under other circumstances, it may be desirable to have separate groups of technical 
experts, local community members, other stakeholders, and government officials. Suggested 
organizational structures can be found in the Framework for Environmental Health Risk 
Management (PCC 1997). 
7.2 	 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECOVERY AFTER RADIOLOGICAL 
INCIDENTS OTHER THAN RDDs AND INDs 
Radiological incidents that are not RDDs or INDs may be cleaned up like any other EPA cleanup 
site. Existing EPA cleanup processes should be used for non-RDD incidents addressed under 
EPA’s NCP authorities. 
For non-RDD/IND incident recovery, no nationwide standards currently exist for removal 
actions at radiologically contaminated sites. Removal and cleanup programs, depending on the 
site-specific circumstances and regional policies, have the flexibility to select cleanup levels 
based on a number of processes: 
•	 The same method recommended above for RDD/IND 
•	 Previous EPA Removal Actions 
•	 A streamlined version of the process delineated in the RDD/IND PAG Application 
guidance 
•	 Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs) or other levels known as 
To Be Considered (TBCs) 
•	 Methods used by the NRC in their decommissioning program 
•	 Methods used by the DOE in the cleanup of their sites 
•	 The optimization processes that are inherent in some of the benchmarks provided in 
Table 7.1 
Any of these methods allow an optimized exposure level or levels to be selected that best suit the 
characteristics of the radiological incident and the particular needs of the affected community. 
There may be issues beyond the radiological contamination situation that need to be considered. 
For example, the presence, nature, type, and size of non-radiological hazards may have an impact 
that must be considered. In some circumstances, these non-radiological problems could be larger 
or more significant than the radiation exposure hazard. These issues will vary from incident to 
incident. 
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Several EPA publications provide information that may be relevant to EPA OSCs as they begin 
the cleanup process. Potentially relevant guidance for making Superfund remedy decisions in 
general may be found at: http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/guidance/remedy/index.htm. 
EPA CERCLA guidance documents for addressing radionuclides under the removal and/or 
remedial program may be found at:  
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/resources/radiation/index.htm. 
7.3  THINGS TO KEEP IN MIND DURING THE RESPONSE 
•	 Cleanup after a nationally significant event is likely to be a politically driven process and 
the choice of a waste disposal site may be politically driven. 
•	 Start developing a waste disposition plan early in the response (see Chapter 8). 
•	 Starting with local priorities, the cleanup can be broken into manageable units. Refer to 
the Defense Nuclear Agency’s 1993, On-Scene Commander’s Guide to Site Restoration 
for more information. 
•	 Public perception and media attention will affect decision making in all stages of the 
response. 
•	 Get input early in the stabilization and characterization process from the waste facility 
that takes the waste. Use this input to plan for sampling, surveys, removal, and 
packaging. Avoid double and triple handling of waste materials to reduce worker 
exposures. 
•	 Cleanup levels may vary depending on occupancy factors and the nature of contamina­
tion throughout an incident site (e.g., an outside building surface 30 feet above ground 
may not have to be decontaminated to the same degree as the same building’s surface at 
three feet above ground). 
•	 Chemical, biological, and hazardous materials characterization must be done 

simultaneously with radiological characterization.

•	 Site characterization should be informed by waste acceptance criteria (see Chapter 8). 
•	 Materials moved during stabilization may be kept temporarily in a waste staging area. 
•	 For an onsite waste staging area, radiation shine may affect site surveys. 
•	 For an off-site waste staging area, perimeter monitoring and security will be required. 
•	 Strippable coatings should all have been tested for chemical/hazardous material content 
to ensure they can be disposed of along with radioactive waste. 
•	 Water decontamination methods require collection of water, storage, and 
treatment/solidification before disposal. Radioactive waste facilities do not accept water 
or any liquid forms of radioactive waste. In the emergency phase of a large response, 
decontamination water should only be collected to the extent practical. 
•	 If low-level or cleared materials are going to solid waste landfills, plan on doing at least 
as much characterization for these materials as for the radioactive waste. 
•	 Transuranics (such as 
241Am) are not allowed in any commercial radioactive waste 
facilities. Special disposal through DOE facilities must be arranged. 
•	 Waste characterization can be set up creatively with specialized equipment (e.g., running 
truckloads of material through large plastic scintillation detectors and using Monte Carlo 
and MicroShield calculations to ensure accurate reporting). 
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8. 	 WASTE  DISPOSITION 
8.1 	 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This chapter is intended as an advanced planning guide for the management of radioactive waste 
and debris generated during the cleanup and decontamination of a major radiological incident. It 
addresses the key topics and elements to consider when planning for the disposition of the radio­
active and mixed waste generated from cleanup and decontamination activities in the aftermath 
of a Radiological Dispersal Device/Improvised Nuclear Device (RDD/IND) incident (as discus­
sed in Chapter 2). The RDD/IND scenario assumes that: 1) states and local governments have 
requested significant federal assistance; and 2) DOE is the initial Coordinating Agency under the 
National Response Plan (NRP), with EPA assisting DOE before becoming the Coordinating 
Agency for environmental cleanup and site restoration. This chapter assumes that decisions have 
not been made about where to dispose of the radioactively contaminated waste from a RDD 
scenario. 
The extent of such a terrorism-related event can only be characterized after it has unfolded. 
Therefore, this chapter, by necessity, is general in nature and is intended as a guide for future 
discussions and planning between government agencies involved in the response to a RDD 
event. It briefly identifies key government agencies’ roles and responsibilities with regard to 
waste management.   
By law, radiological waste is differentiated into different types and classes based on its source 
(or activity). For some types of waste, there may be no commercial disposal facility available. 
This chapter assumes that both commercial and DOE sites may take the waste and therefore 
addresses planning considerations for disposal at both commercial and DOE facilities. 
8.2 	 KEY GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
•	 State and Local Officials. State and local officials in the affected jurisdiction should 
participate in the Incident Command Post (ICP), provide a representative to the Unified 
Command (UC), and take part in waste management decision making. In addition, state 
and local officials in the jurisdiction that will be receiving the waste for interim 
management or final disposition need to be consulted. 
•	 EPA. EPA initially assists the Coordinating Agency before the Coordinating Agency 
responsibility transitions to EPA. The OSC should join the UC in the Incident Command 
Post (ICP) before transitioning to the Coordinating Agency role for the cleanup phase. As 
explained in Chapter 2, a Stafford Act declaration is likely in response to a RDD/IND 
scenario. Under the Stafford Act, the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10–Oil and 
Hazardous Materials Response Annex likely will be activated, giving EPA the lead for 
decontamination activities, environmental cleanup, and site restoration. EPA becomes the 
federal agency responsible for waste management associated with these activities (first in 
a support role to DOE and later as the Coordinating Agency). 
•	 DOE. During a RDD/IND incident, DOE is the initial Coordinating Agency and 
participates in the UC in the ICP. Therefore, DOE has a role in waste management 
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decision making through the UC. DOE may have additional personnel assisting in other 
sections of the ICP, as appropriate, including sections that may be assigned responsibility 
for waste management. DOE participation in the ICP is expected to continue as a 
supporting agency after the Coordinating Agency role transitions to EPA. If a decision is 
made to use DOE facilities for interim or permanent waste disposition, appropriate DOE 
personnel must be involved. DOE personnel assigned to the Operations and Planning 
Sections of the ICP are responsible for waste management to facilitate proper waste 
characterization and ensure that the packaging meets DOE facility waste acceptance 
criteria. 
•	 USACE. During a RDD/IND incident, USACE is the primary federal agency designated 
to handle emergency removal of contaminated debris within the “debris zone,” under 
ESF #3–Public Works and Engineering Annex. USACE coordinates with ESF #10/EPA 
to define the “debris zone” and manage the contaminated debris. In addition (and separate 
from ESF #3), USACE supports EPA under ESF #10 for RDD/IND responses, and plays 
a key role in managing waste and debris generated as a result of ESF #10 
decontamination, environmental cleanup, and site restoration activities.  
8.3 KEY  PERSONNEL 
Because waste management activities during a RDD/IND are significant, they likely will be 
managed under a separate Disposal Unit or similar group in the Operations Section of the ICP. 
Technical specialists in the Environmental Unit of the Planning Section provide support to the 
Disposal Unit. 
8.3.1  Unified Command/OSC/Site Project Manager  
Depending on the cleanup phase, the UC/OSC/Site Project Manager is responsible for providing 
overall direction of the cleanup effort. 
8.3.2  Waste Management Manager 
The Waste Management Manager is responsible for establishing a program that demonstrates 
control of waste processes and for maintaining waste traceability documentation. The Waste 
Management Manager works with: 
•	 Radiological Characterization Personnel who are responsible for developing waste stream 
characterization methods and defining radiological quantification requirements 
•	 Chemical Characterization Personnel who are responsible for identifying and 

characterizing hazardous waste materials/items

•	 Waste Packaging and Transportation Personnel who are responsible for ensuring that 
waste items are appropriately packaged and meet the requirements for transportation 
•	 Sampling Crew who are responsible for developing data quality objectives, sampling 
plans, sample acquisition, sample preparation and shipment, and defining requirements 
for data validation 
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8.3.3  Health and Safety Officer 
The Health and Safety Officer or designee has overall responsibility for ensuring a safe work 
zone for personnel involved with the cleanup effort, members of the public, and the environment. 
He or she works with: 
•	 Health Physicists who are responsible for defining health and safety aspects associated 
with ionizing radiation 
•	 Radiological Survey Technicians who are responsible for performing radiation surveys in 
association with radioactive waste generation, management, characterization, packaging, 
certification, and shipment 
•	 Hazardous Material and Control Personnel who are responsible for identifying and 
defining health and safety aspects associated with hazardous materials 
8.3.4  Waste Management Quality Assurance Officer 
The Waste Management Quality Assurance Officer oversees quality assurance of the waste 
management processes, ensures that personnel are appropriately trained, and ensures that items 
and services are appropriately procured. The Quality Assurance Officer works with: 
•	 Data Validation Personnel who are responsible for ensuring that radiological and 

chemical sampling data are appropriate for waste characterization purposes 

•	 Waste Package Certifier, for DOE disposal only 
•	 Waste Certification Official, for DOE disposal only  
The Waste Package Certifier and Certification Official are responsible for ensuring that the 
waste meets the requirements for disposal at a selected DOE disposal site. As required by DOE 
Order 435.1, all DOE disposal sites must have written and approved waste acceptance require­
ments. Also, wastes disposed of at DOE sites must be certified, by signature, as being compliant 
with these requirements. 
8.3.5  Local, State, and Federal Assistance/Oversight Personnel 
Local, state, and federal assistance and oversight personnel are responsible for providing general 
oversight with regard to requirements instituted by local, state, and other federal bodies. 
8.4  WASTE DISPOSITION PROCESS 
8.4.1 Overview  of Cleanup Activities 
Cleanup involves the discovery, initial scoping, and cleanup of potential waste material related to 
the waste stream generation process. 
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8.4.2 Interface  Requirements and Chain of Command 
Critical to a successful response is the integration of the waste disposition process into the 
Planning and Operations Sections of the Incident Command System (ICS) and coordination with 
site personnel and the Treatment, Storage, and Disposal (TSD) facility. 
8.4.3 Prerequisites  to Waste Disposal 
Documentation 
Prior to the commencement of cleanup activities, a considerable quantity of investigative and 
radiological/chemical survey information has to be generated. Thus, a waste management plan 
that addresses how radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes will be handled, packaged, and 
characterized during the waste removal and characterization process is a prerequisite to waste 
disposal. 
If the waste is disposed of at a commercial or DOE facility, sufficient information and documen­
tation must be available to demonstrate that the waste will not be considered hazardous under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) or by the state where it was generated. In 
some cases, not enough information is available to begin the preliminary disposition process. In 
this case, a comprehensive characterization plan may be required and implemented as a prerequi­
site to the disposition process. Other prerequisite documentation may involve waste packaging 
strategies, health and safety plans, contingency plans, quality assurance, and waste certification 
plans. 
Approvals 
Approvals related to health and safety will be needed from local, state, and federal agencies. 
Approvals and signatures are required as prerequisites in order to acknowledge the involvement 
of the appropriate government agencies. 
8.4.4 Implementing  Procedures 
Health and Safety 
Several health and safety procedures should be followed during the cleanup. They include the 
operation, calibration, and maintenance of radiation and chemical survey instrumentation; 
internal and external dosimetry; personal protective equipment; radiation work permits; and 
industrial work permits. 
Waste Characterization 
Procedures need to be developed to define how the chemical, physical, and radiological 
properties of the waste will be determined and to document and specify how radiological 
quantification will be performed on a per package basis. 
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Waste Packaging 
Procedures need to be developed to specify how waste will be packaged using acceptable types 
of packaging materials, how prohibited items will be segregated, and which documents are 
required to demonstrate traceability of waste from the point of generation through package 
certification. 
Waste Certification (DOE Disposal Only) 
Procedures specifying the roles, responsibilities, and controls in place are required to ensure that 
radioactive waste is generated, packaged, characterized, and certified in a manner that preserves 
the requirements for off-site DOE disposal. 
Waste Transportation 
Procedures that demonstrate controls are in place to ensure that DOT requirements are met for 
radioactive waste transported over public roads and/or railways are required. 
Quality Assurance  
Procedures that demonstrate implementation of an effective quality assurance/quality control 
program, including personnel training and qualification, document control, records management, 
work processes, design control, procurement, inspection and acceptance testing, and 
management and independent assessments are required. 
8.4.5 	 Application of MARSSIM (graded approach for waste characterization 
purposes) 
Process Knowledge  
The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM; EPA 2000a) 
was developed through the interaction of four federal agencies: DOE, DoD, NRC, and EPA. 
Many of the terms and guidance in MARSSIM are appropriate for RDD/IND incidents. 
MARSSIM is most appropriate for use in determining if a remediated site has met the cleanup 
standards that show the site is safe for public/industrial reuse and for identifying and characteri­
zing contaminated media. In a simplistic sense, MARSSIM provides a roadmap that begins with 
historical, qualitative information and allows personnel to determine data gaps that may be filled 
with more quantitative information through scoping and characterization surveys.  
Historical information or process knowledge should be applied to characterizing radioactively 
contaminated materials. Data acquired from first responders and other personnel initially present 
at an event provide the necessary information to determine 1) if nuclear materials are present or 
were used in the event; and 2) from a qualitative sense, if radiation exposure and/or airborne 
activity levels are safe for more intrusive testing. 
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Scoping Surveys 
Information gained from historical data [process knowledge] allows identification of data gaps 
that can be further assessed through scoping surveys. During the scoping phase, a more refined 
radiological assessment is conducted to determine the nature and extent of contamination (e.g., 
application of probes, such as field alpha and gamma spectroscopy, tritium monitors). Scoping 
surveys also may be used to provide semi-quantitative information that is useful when making 
preliminary disposition and packaging determinations. For example, assume that a site has been 
identified as having very low alpha contamination and no RCRA hazardous materials, and a field 
gamma spectrometer (e.g., NaI counter) indicates the presence of 
137Cs at the 660 keV peak. This 
information may be sufficient to determine that the waste may be packaged as low-level waste, 
meeting the requirements of either Envirocare of Utah (provided it is Class A waste) or the 
Nevada Test Site. The following types of tools and/or steps may all be used in performing a 
scoping survey: 
•  Alpha and Beta/Gamma Surveys 
•  Field Gamma and Alpha Spectroscopy 
•  Hazardous Material Screening 
•  Identification and Segregation of Prohibited Items 
•  Visual Examination 
Characterization Surveys 
In association with, or in addition to, the scoping surveys, characterization surveys provide even 
more rigorous information that allows identification of isotopic abundances and provides a 
means for quantifying nuclide content in a given package or waste lot. Here, nuclide abundances 
may be determined through laboratory analyses involving various radioanalytical methods (e.g., 
isotopic uranium (U), Pu, Am, curium (Cm), neptunium (Np), gamma spectroscopy, liquid 
scintillation counting). Package activities may also be determined in this phase through the 
application of one or more quantifycation methods (e.g., swipe to curie, nondestructive assay, 
gross radiation measurement). As an example, assume that the same scenario as that used above 
for scoping surveys applies, and the laboratory analysis of the samples indicates the presence of 
137Cs with minor impurities of 
238Pu, 
241Am, and hydrogen-3 (
3H) greater than 1% of the total 
activity. Then the analytical data could be used to establish an isotopic distribution with 
137Cs 
scaling factors relating all other nuclide contributions. Waste packages could then be nondestruc­
tively assayed using a high purity germanium detector in which 
137Cs concentrations are 
estimated. Scaling factors may be applied to estimate concentrations of 
238Pu, 
241Am, and 
3H. 
8.4.6 TSD  Selection 
Disposition of waste articles requires an in-depth knowledge of the waste material and know­
ledge of various TSD facility acceptance criteria. For CERCLA sites, the NCP’s “Off-Site Rule” 
(40 CFR 300.440) also applies, although OSCs may determine during an emergency action that it 
is necessary to transfer waste off-site without following the Off-Site Rule. In many cases, pre­
liminary disposition may be determined during or at the conclusion of the scoping surveys. In 
other cases, more in-depth knowledge or investigation (e.g., sampling) may be warranted to 
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characterize the waste prior to disposing of it. OSCs should initiate communication with 
potential TSD facilities during the planning phase. The waste management plan should identify 
the documentation needed for the disposition and include any initial agreements with TSD 
facilities. Selecting a TSD should include the following: 
•	 Evaluation of characterization data against TSD acceptance criteria—use of preliminary/ 
screening data from process knowledge and/or scoping surveys (radiological, chemical, 
physical) 
•	 Coordination with TSD facility 
•	 Cost and time considerations 
The costs associated with packaging, transportation, and disposal at the selected TSD facility 
should be evaluated to determine the most effective disposal path. If, for instance, the Nevada 
Test Site and Envirocare of Utah are possible disposition sites for the waste, a cost analysis 
should be conducted for these sites. 
8.4.7  Packaging, Characterization, and Shipment 
The waste disposition plan should address the logistics, personnel, and responsibilities associated 
with characterizing, packaging, and shipping radioactive waste materials. Disposition planning 
should include waste sent to temporary storage (an interim storage location) while awaiting final 
characterization data and preparation of the final characterization documents that verify compli­
ance with the acceptance criteria of the TSD (for commercial TSD facilities). Planning should 
include the following tasks: 
•	 Preparation of the documentation for shipping 
•	 Package selection 
•	 Preliminary certification (for shipment only) 
•	 Ship waste to TSD 
8.4.8 Waste  Certification (for DOE TSD only) 
As discussed previously, wastes destined for a DOE facility must be certified in accordance with 
DOE Order 435.1. Compliance with this order involves preparing the final characterization data 
and certification paperwork and coordinating with the Waste Certifying Official who accepts 
waste for disposal. 
8.5  SELECTED TSD FACILITY ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Waste acceptance criteria can vary widely depending on the TSD facility to be used. The waste 
management plan should include the criteria and the steps needed to meet them. It is critical that 
OSCs select a waste disposition expert early in the response to take the responsibility for deter­
mining the availability of TSD facilities and meeting the facility’s acceptance criteria. Example 
TSD facilities and some general information regarding their operation is provided below: 
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Barnwell, South Carolina 
State-owned & licensed, contractor-operated. Accepts LLW Classes A-C from all U.S. 
generators except those in Rocky Mountain and Northwest Compacts. After June 30, 2008 it will 
only accept from Atlantic compact states. For further information and assistance contact: 
Corporate Office 

Chem-Nuclear Systems 

140 Stoneridge Drive 

Columbia, SC 29210 

(803) 256-0450 

Barnwell Waste Brokers List: 

http://www.energy.sc.gov/PDFs/broker_list_03.pdf 

Hanford, Washington 
Facility resides on DOE Hanford property, operated by U.S. Ecology, licensed by State of 
Washington. Accepts waste from the Northwest and Rocky Mountain compacts; LLW Classes 
A-C; NARM and Exempt wastes; Prohibited wastes include mixed waste, unprocessed liquids, 
limits on oils and SNM, etc. (check with site). For further information and assistance contact:  
Mike Ault - Facility Manager 

mault@americanecology.com

(509) 377-2411 Phone 

(509) 377-2244 Fax 

US Ecology Inc. 

1777 Terminal Drive 

Richland, WA 99352 

Envirocare - Clive, Utah 
Private facility licensed and permitted by Utah and NRC. Accepts Class A LLW & 
NORM/NARM; PCB radioactive waste; asbestos-contaminated waste; 11e.(2) byproduct 
material. Receives, treats, and disposes of mixed waste, designed to receive both bulk (e.g., 
intermodals, gondolas, etc.) and non-bulk (e.g., drums, boxes, etc.) containers. For further 
information and assistance contact: 
Envirocare Govt. Programs 

605 North 5600 West 

Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 

Client Service Managers: 

Chris Lee: (801) 649-2079 

Jose Jerez: (801) 649-2053 
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Waste Control Specialists (WCS) - Andrews, Texas 
Private facility licensed and permitted by State of Texas. Accepts for storage, treatment and/or 
disposal: Class A, B, C and Greater-than-Class-C (GTCC) LLW; 11e.(2) byproduct material; 
NORM/NARM; Special Nuclear Material; TSCA wastes; RCRA hazardous and solid wastes; 
Mixed low-level waste. 
WCS can receive and treat the following wastes:  Hazardous and non-hazardous wastes mixed 
with Class A, B, C, and Greater than Class C (GTCC) LLW, and transuranic radioactive waste 
(TRUW); MLLW with a high volatile organic compound content can be treated on a case-by-
case basis; inorganic waste streams including acids, bases, and wastes contaminated with metals; 
organic waste streams (with concentration limitations); water-reactive inorganic materials, such 
as elemental lithium, sodium, etc., and shredded debris that can be treated by methods other than 
encapsulation. For further information and assistance contact: 
Waste Control Specialists, LLC 
Three Lincoln Center 
5430 LBJ Freeway 
Suite 1700 
Dallas, TX 75240 
Contact: Michael Lauer 
Phone: (972) 450-4284 
E-Mail: mlauer@valhi.net 
Nevada Test Site 
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office manages operations at the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS), which include disposal operations.  NTS disposal operations include 
disposal of low-level, mixed, and transuranic waste generated at approved DOE and defense 
industry sites across the United States. For more information contact; 
DOE 
National Nuclear Security Administration 
Nevada Test Site Office 
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9. COMMUNITY  OUTREACH 
The initial focus during a radiological emergency response is to eliminate immediate and 
potential threats to the public. Equally important is providing the news media, public officials, 
and the impacted community with updated information on potential hazards (radiological and 
non-radiological), evacuation plans, health concerns, and the status of the response. Terrorism 
poses special concerns by creating additional fear and anxiety throughout a community.  
A Joint Information Center (JIC) is a facility established to coordinate all incident-related public 
information activities. Public Information Officers (PIOs) or Public Affairs Officials from all of 
the responding agencies and organizations co-locate at the JIC. In some cases, a JIC may be a 
virtual network between responding agencies and organizations. The PIOs work closely with 
elected officials, community leaders, health care community members, social and support 
groups, advocacy groups, the news media, and other stakeholders during an emergency situation. 
The JIC provides rumor control and prepares and disseminates accurate and validated informa­
tion to the public.  
This chapter provides suggestions and tools for consideration by people handling communica­
tions and outreach during a response to a radiological incident. These include: 
•	 Overview of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)/National Response Plan 
(NRP) JIC 
•	 JIC roles and responsibilities 
•	 JIC checklists 
•	 Suggestions for communicating risk 
•	 Assistance from special teams 
9.1  OVERVIEW OF THE NIMS/NRP JOINT INFORMATION CENTER 
As described in Chapter 2, the National Response Plan provides a framework for managing 
Incidents of National Significance (INSs). During an incident, federal, state, local, and tribal 
authorities share responsibility for communicating information regarding the incident to the 
public. These actions are a critical component of incident management and must be fully 
integrated with all other operational actions to ensure that the public is kept abreast of the 
situation and any protective measures that they should consider taking. All public and media 
questions should be routed to the incident JIC. 
During the early phase of a response, state and local officials are responsible for communicating 
with the public. If asked for assistance or if an incident is declared an INS, federal agencies work 
with state and local officials to set up a JIC. During an INS, DHS becomes the lead federal 
agency; however, the state, local, and tribal officials retain primary responsibility for communi­
cating health and safety instructions to their citizens. 
During the initial stages of an incident, a virtual JIC may be established to coordinate informa­
tion among local responders and federal agencies. Communication would be through 
121
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
technological means, such as conference calls and e-mail, thereby allowing communication 
activities to be organized across the country, if necessary. 
A radiological emergency is likely to involve a complex, multi-agency response. For an INS, 
which a RDD is likely to be deemed, it is possible that a federal JIC will be established by DHS 
with the Joint Field Office where public affairs officials from all involved organizations work 
together to develop and disseminate information to the public and media. It also is possible that 
local officials will decide to establish a separate JIC. In that case, it will be imperative that the 
JICs communicate in order to provide consistent, timely messages to the public.  
9.2  JOINT INFORMATION CENTER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The JIC structure is designed to work equally well for large or small situations and can expand or 
contract to meet the needs of the incident. Under NIMS, the JIC is led by the PIO, who has the 
following responsibilities: 
•	 Staff the JIC. Under the NIMS, the PIO will be responsible for all JIC activities unless 
the JIC staff is expanded and assigned responsibilities accordingly. At the top of the JIC 
structure are the PIO, then the Assistant PIO/JIC Manager, then Assistant PIO for 
Internal Affairs, and Assistant PIO for External Affairs. Personnel can be added in roles 
such as data gathering, production, and dissemination assistants. The National Response 
Team’s JIC Manual (NRT 2000) includes models showing how to staff a JIC.  
•	 Gather Incident Data. JIC personnel must develop an effective method for obtaining 
up-to-date information from appropriate Incident Command System (ICS)/Unified 
Command (UC) personnel while staying within the ICS structure. Communications 
between JIC members is imperative. Since cell phone and land-line service circuits can 
become quickly overloaded in a crisis, the use of satellite and two-way radio 
communications should be arranged. Gathering information also involves capturing video 
and photographs that can be used by the response organization as well as the media.  
•	 Know the Audience. Understanding the demographics of the impacted community will 
help overcome communications barriers and ensure information from the JIC is received 
and understood. Look for factors such as non-English speakers, cultural differences, and 
age range to help determine communications methods. GIS software and demographic 
databases may be helpful for this analysis. Community leaders are another source of 
demographic and community data. 
•	 Inform the Public. The main role of the JIC is to provide quick, accurate, and consistent 
information about the incident to the public and media. This involves gaining and 
maintaining public trust and confidence by involving community leaders and media to 
ensure timely and coordinated release of information. The media is the best source of 
reaching the public. Make your messages clear, concise, and honest. Admit when 
mistakes have been made or when information is not known. Promise to seek out the 
answers as soon as possible. Be aware of the various deadlines for different media, such 
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as print, television, and radio. Use all channels of information to distribute your 
messages, including the Internet.  
•	 Receive Feedback. Obtaining community feedback will provide response agencies with 
insight into community information needs and expectations. Actively seeking feedback 
will inform the JIC of rumors and misinformation. Correcting erroneous perceptions is 
essential to staying credible and in control during a crisis. This feedback also will keep 
the Incident Commander (IC) and Command Staff informed of public affairs issues that 
could negatively impact the response.  
9.3  JOINT INFORMATION CENTER CHECKLISTS 
Effective emergency communications requires that communicators be prepared, available, and 
credible. Use the following checklists or similar organizational tools to help prepare for handling 
emergency situations. 
Personal Needs 
Resources 
 Credentials  and  Forms 
 Bank  Card 
Cell Phone/Satellite Phone/Blackberry/Pager 
Medication (if applicable) 
Family Contact Information 
Change of Clothes 
Snacks 
General Logistics 
Resources 
Location (set up by state) 
Chairs 
Desks 
Phones 
 Hotline/1-800  line 
 Cell  Phone/Blackberry/Pager 
 Satellite  Phone 
Computers 
Internet 
E-mail 
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Printers 
Paper (printers, photocopier, note taker) 
Ink 
Pens/Pencils 
 Fax  Machine 
Photocopier 
Whiteboard/Large Post-it Note Pads 
 Thick  Markers 
JIC Inquiry Form (used to track media and public questions and comments) 
Debris Notification Form 
Relevant Fact Sheets (those already generated) 
Local Phone Book 
Maps and/or Mapping Software 
Camera (digital is preferable for easy dissemination) 
Video Camera (digital is preferable for easy dissemination) 
Film 
Batteries 
Extension Cords/Power Cords 
Media Contact List 
JIC Contact List (how to contact field PIOs) 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Contact List (phone and fax for specific 
individuals) 
Area Command/Unified Command Contact List (phone and fax for specific individuals) 
Press Conference Logistics 
Resources 
Location 
Podium 
Microphone 
Banner (EPA and/or other) 
Chairs 
Media Sign-in Sheet 
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JIC Personnel 
Name Role  Contact  Information 
Security 
Clearance-
Y/N 
Information Officer 
Assistant Information 
Officer 
Assistant Information 
Officer for External 
Assistant Information 
Officer for Internal 
Field PIO for Site #1 
Field PIO for Site #2 
Field PIO for Site #3 
Data Gathering Assistant 
Product Assistant (writing 
press releases) 
Support Assistant #1 
Support Assistant #2 
Webmaster 
Scientific/Technical Expert 
9.4 SUGGESTIONS  FOR  COMMUNICATING RISK 
Risk communications is based on the concept that “perception is reality.”  Perceived risks must 
be taken seriously, and risk communicators must be sympathetic, honest, and accessible to 
inquirers. Keeping messages clear and concise is the best way to communicate with a concerned 
audience. 
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When communicating during a crisis, you should: 
•  Show compassion 
•  Tell the audience what you know and do not know about the incident 
•  Inform them of the actions being taken to remedy the situation 
•  Explain protective actions that they should consider taking 
•  Set a timeframe for getting the audience more information 
It is important to know your audience because different audiences (e.g., employees, reporters, 
local politicians) may need different types of information. Anticipate what information people 
need and research the most effective method to get it to them. Use the media, town hall meetings, 
and press conferences, and hand out flyers door-to-door if that is what will be most successful. 
Remember that a local official often will have more credibility within a community. Therefore, it 
may be helpful to enlist such individuals to serve as spokespersons for various issues. For 
example, involve a local medical professional in communicating risk about public health 
concerns. It also is important to remember that, although individual spokespersons are helpful in 
communicating particular risks, it is critical that the JIC present a consistent message. 
Avoid jargon and technical terms that may be confusing to the general public. For example, to 
scientists, using a conservative model to estimate risk provides an extra measure of caution to 
ensure safety. To many people, a conservative model might imply a limited effort or a desire to 
preserve the status quo. To scientists, contaminant levels well below standards are considered to 
be safe. To the general public, the term “below standards” means low quality or unacceptable. 
Respond to people’s concerns about their personal risk. 
The term “risk” poses inherent communication issues between the public and responders. Most 
importantly, “risk” means different things to different people. The public’s concern is personal 
risk. They want an answer to: “What is going to happen to me and my loved ones?” The public 
looks to responders to provide them that answer. The responders evaluate risk as a conservative 
estimate of the probability of cancer incidence. The perceived difference between personal risk 
and population risk makes putting risk into perspective a difficult job for responders. The 
following are suggestions for helping the public understand risk: 
•  Respond to people’s concerns about their personal risk. 
•  Emphasize that risk estimates are conservative and protective, not predictive. 
•  Put data in perspective and try to express risk in different ways. 
•  Use comparisons to put risk in perspective. 
To assist in developing communications tools, a variety of fact sheets are included in Appendix 
3. The fact sheets cover both general guidance topics (protection action guides, sheltering-in-
place) and information on specific radionuclides of concern.  
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Myths about Radiation 
Radiation is an unfamiliar subject for a large portion of the general public. Popular culture has 
taught people that radiation can turn a man into “The Hulk” and, in sludge form, can turn a turtle 
into a ninja. Many people know that radiation causes cancer, and since the events of 9/11, the 
news media have kept nuclear weaponry at the forefront of the public’s mind. Many people view 
radiation as an invisible killer.  
A large portion of the public carries the misconception that small amounts of radiation are 
known to cause cancer. Responders act under the assumption that there is no level of exposure 
that carries no risk of health effects. Even though there is continuing debate in the scientific 
community on the topic, we work under this assumption for the protection of the public. 
Communicating cancer risk to the public, while working under the assumption that no level of 
exposure is “safe” and that the science has not confirmed radiation risk from small exposures, 
will be a difficult challenge during any radiological emergency. 
People fear what they do not understand. This is why it is so important to be conscientious when 
creating and delivering messages about radiation. The public’s concerns are real whether or not 
they are warranted. Treat them with respect by answering their questions with honest, easy-to-
understand answers. 
The Psychosocial Effects of a Radiological Terror Incident 
In dealing with the public after a terrorist incident involving radioactive material, such as a 
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), it is important to note that the effects of such an incident 
may be more widespread than they appear. Because a RDD involves dispersal of an invisible 
agent and is the result of an intentional act, the potential exists for a great deal of psychosocial 
stress to occur in the wake of such an attack. Research indicates that the long-term psychological 
effects from a RDD could be more widely damaging than the physical effects of low-level 
radiation exposures resulting from the actual incident. The range of psychological effects 
produced by a RDD could extend from common, transient stress reactions caused by natural and 
human-made disasters to chronic stress induced by the invisible nature of radiation (NCRP 
2001). 
9.5  ASSISTANCE FROM SPECIAL TEAMS 
Special Teams are available to assist federal agencies in emergency communications, community 
involvement, and outreach. In addition to those Special Teams specifically included in the NCP, 
other federal assets are available to assist with conducting outreach. This section describes who 
they are and how to reach them for assistance. 
Superfund Emergency Communications and Outreach Team 
EPA has developed an Emergency Communications and Outreach Team (ECOT) that is avail­
able to support EPA regional emergency responses, specifically during national disasters and 
other significant events that require public outreach for extended periods of time. ECOT is a 
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resource for building trust and credibility in the community. Its members are experienced 
Superfund community involvement and public affairs specialists. ECOT members can travel to 
an incident and support or lead communications efforts on-scene, or they may consult by phone 
or email to suggest strategies for effective community interaction. For additional information, 
contact Virginia Narsete, EPA Region 5, at 312-886-4359 or narsete.virginia@epa.gov. 
EPA Radiation Protection Division’s Center for Radiation Information 
The Center for Radiation Information (CRI), located in the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air 
(ORIA) in the Office of Air and Radiation (OAR), is a headquarters-based team of communi­
cations and outreach specialists responsible for supporting the Radiation Program’s public 
information and communications efforts. During a radiological emergency, CRI also provides 
public outreach support to ORIA’s Radiological Emergency Response Team. For additional 
information contact Jessica Wieder at (202) 343-9201 or wieder.jessica@epa.gov. 
USCG Public Information Assist Team 
The Public Information Assist Team (PIAT) consists of four emergency communications profes­
sionals who are available to federal OSCs during incidents receiving high media or public 
attention. Their primary function is to support emergency communications during accidents or 
premeditated release of oil or hazardous materials. This specialized team also is deployed to 
airplane crashes, floods, hurricanes, and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. 
PIAT members are qualified to set up a JIC and fill the PIO, Assistant PIO, and JIC Coordinators 
positions during a major event. The team can be deployed on two hours notice and will bring all 
equipment needed to establish and fully operate a JIC. They provide Incident Commanders with 
public information strategies, skills, and risk communications tools to help inform the public and 
media. For more information, contact the National Strike Force Coordination Center at (252) 
331-6000. 
DOE Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 
DOE’s Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) provides 24-hour 
direct or consultative assistance with medical and health physics problems for local, national, 
and international accidents. The REAC/TS program provides a radiological emergency response 
team, which consists of physicians, nurses, health physicists, coordinators, and support 
personnel, to provide first-line responders with consultative or direct medical assistance and 
radiological assistance at the REAC/TS facility or at the accident site. Specifically, the team has 
expertise in and is equipped to conduct: 
•	 Medical and radiological triage 
•	 Decontamination procedures for external contamination and internally deposited 

radionuclides, including chelation therapy 

•	 Diagnostic and prognostic assessments of radiation-induced injuries 
•	 Radiation dose estimates by methods that include cytogenetic analysis, bioassay, and in 
vivo counting 
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For additional information, review the REAC/TS web site at http://www.orau.gov/reacts/ or 
contact Pat Cooley at (865) 576-3131 or cooleyp@orau.gov.  
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APPENDIX 1. DEFINITIONS 
ALARA stands for “as low as reasonably achievable.” It is a safety concept indicating that every 
reasonable effort must be made to maintain exposures as far below the applicable limits as 
practical. 
Alpha Particle. A particle with a +2 charge made up of two neutrons and two protons emitted by 
certain radioactive nuclei. Alpha particles can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such 
as a sheet of paper, and pose no direct or external radiation threat; however, they can pose a 
serious health threat if ingested or inhaled. 
Beta Particle. A particle emitted by certain radioactive nuclei, which can have a +1 charge 
(positron) or a –1 charge (negatron). Both particles have the mass equivalent to that of an 
electron. Beta particles can be stopped by thick pieces of aluminum. They can pose a serious 
direct or external radiation threat and can be lethal depending on the amount received. They also 
pose a serious internal radiation threat if inhaled or ingested. 
Contamination Reduction Zone (or Warm Zone). The transition area between the exclusion 
and support zones. This area is where responders enter and exit the exclusion zone and where 
decontamination activities take place. See also exclusion zone and support zone. 
Decay, Radioactive. The decrease in the amount of any radioactive isotope with the passage of 
time due to the spontaneous emission of radiation from the atomic nuclei (either alpha or beta 
particles, often accompanied by gamma radiation) and consequent transformation to a different 
chemical form. 
Dirty Bomb. Commonly refers to a device that spreads radioactive material by exploding a 
conventional (non-nuclear) explosive, such as dynamite. Because they do not involve the 
sophisticated technology required to create a nuclear explosion, dirty bombs are much simpler to 
make than a true nuclear bomb. 
Dosimeter. A small portable instrument (such as a film badge, thermoluminescent, or pocket 
dosimeter) for measuring and recording the total accumulated personal dose of ionizing 
radiation. 
Exclusion Zone (or Hot Zone). The area with actual or potential contamination and the highest 
potential for exposure to hazardous substances. See also support zone and contamination 
reduction zone. 
FRP (Federal Response Plan). The FRP established the basic mechanisms and structures for 
provision of federal assistance to a state and its affected local governments impacted by a 
catastrophic disaster or emergency situation. The FRP has been superseded by the issuance of the 
National Response Plan. 
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FRMAC (Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center). An operations center 
usually established near the scene of a radiological emergency from which federal field 
monitoring and assessment assistance is directed and coordinated. 
Gamma Rays. High-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted by certain radionuclides when 
their nuclei transition from a higher to a lower energy state. These rays have high energy and a 
short wave length. A radionuclide which emits gamma rays can be qualitatively and 
quantitatively identified because the energy of the gamma radiation is defined by the 
radionuclide present. 
Half-life. The time in which one half of the atoms of a radioactive isotope disintegrate into 
another nuclear form. Half-lives vary from billionths of a billionth of a second to billions of 
years. Also called physical or radiological half-life. 
Health Physics. A scientific field that focuses on radiation protection of humans and the 
environment. Health Physics uses physics, biology, chemistry, statistics and electronic 
instrumentation to help protect individuals from any damaging effects of radiation. 
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incident. DHS defines an IND as an illicit nuclear weapon 
bought, stolen, or otherwise originating from a nuclear state, or a weapon fabricated by a terrorist 
group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear weapons material that produces a nuclear explosion. 
National Incident Management System. A system that provides a consistent nationwide 
approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity. 
National Response Plan. The National Response Plan (NRP) establishes the basic mechanisms 
and structures for provision of federal assistance to a state and its affected local governments 
impacted by a catastrophic disaster or emergency situation. Issued by DHS in December 2004, it 
supersedes the Federal Response Plan and several other federal emergency response plans, 
including the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. 
Photon. A discrete “packet” of pure electromagnetic energy. Photons have no mass and travel at 
the speed of light. The term “photon” was developed to describe energy when it acts like a 
particle (causing interactions at the molecular or atomic level), rather than a wave. Gamma and 
X-rays are photons. 
Protective Action Guide. A protective action guide tells state and local authorities at what 
projected dose they should take action to protect people from exposure to unplanned releases of 
radioactive material into the environment. 
Radiation Sickness (Syndrome). The set of symptoms that result when the whole body (or a 
large part of it) has received an exposure of greater than 50 rads of ionizing radiation. The 
earliest symptoms are nausea, fatigue, vomiting, and diarrhea. Hair loss, hemorrhaging, 
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inflammation of the mouth and throat, and general loss of energy may follow. If the exposure has 
been approximately 1,000 rad or more, death may occur within two to four weeks. 
RDD (Radiological Dispersal Devices). A RDD is any device that causes the purposeful 
dissemination of radioactive material across an area without a nuclear detonation. The mode of 
dispersal typically described as a RDD is an explosive device coupled with radioactive material 
(also known as a “dirty bomb”). 
Roentgen (R). A unit of exposure to ionizing radiation. It is an indication of the strength of the 
ionizing radiation. One Roentgen is the amount of gamma or x-rays needed to produce ions 
carrying 1 electrostatic unit of electrical charge in 1 cubic centimeter of dry air under standard 
conditions. 
RAD (Roentgen Absorbed Dose). A basic unit of absorbed radiation dose. It is being replaced 
by the 'gray,' which is equivalent to 100 rad. One rad equals the dose delivered to an object of 
100 ergs of energy, per gram of material. 
REM (Roentgen Equivalent Man). A unit of equivalent dose. Rem relates the absorbed dose in 
human tissue to the effective biological damage of the radiation. Not all radiation has the same 
biological effect, even for the same amount of absorbed dose. 
Stafford Act. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides 
authority for the Federal Government to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide 
assistance to save lives and protect public health, safety, and property. 
Support Zone (or Cold Zone). The area of the site that is free from contamination and that may 
be safely used as a planning and staging area. See also exclusion zone and contamination 
reduction zone. 
Transuranic. Elements with atomic numbers higher than uranium (92). For example, plutonium 
and americium are transuranics. 
X-rays. High-energy electromagnetic radiation emitted by atoms when electrons fall from a 
higher energy shell to a lower energy shell. These rays have high energy and a short wave length. 
X-rays are very similar to gamma rays.  
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HEALTH AND SAFETY PLAN (HASP) FOR 
Chicago Radiological Response 
CHEMICAL AGENTS 
Unknown 
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 
Unknown 
RADIOLOGICAL ISOTOPES 
cesium-137, cobalt 60 (unconfirmed) 
Response Name: Chicago Loop Emergency Response 
NRC Spill Report No.  798567 
Location: Chicago and Clark Street 
Date of Operations: 7-14-06 through ? 
Prepared by:  U.S.EPA 
Organization:  U.S EPA Region 5 Emergency Response 
Approved by: Mark Colvin 
Organization:  U.S. EPA Region 5 
Title: OSC 
Date Prepared: 5/19/2006 
Title:  Region 5 SHEMP Manager 
Date Approved: 5-19-06 
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1.  POLICY, ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SCOPE OF WORK 
1.1 POLICY 
This health and safety plan (HASP) establishes the procedures and requirements to ensure the health and safety of response 
team members for the above-referenced location.  This plan must and will be updated as conditions and events change.  It is 
the response team=s responsibility to ensure the health and safety of its members, the public, and the environment during the 
performance of work it conducts. 
After reading this plan, applicable team members shall read and sign the Health and Safety Plan Acceptance.  This HASP has 
been developed for use by those agencies and team members who have signed the acceptance form, and is not intended for 
use by firms not associated with the response teams efforts.  Subcontractors are responsible for developing and providing their 
own safety plans. 
This HASP has been prepared to meet the following applicable regulatory requirements and guidance: 
Applicable Regulation/Guidance 
GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE (OSHA Act, Section 5(a)(1)): Under the 'General Duty' clause of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, section 5(a)(1) states that each employer 'shall furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm to his employees.' 
LOG AND SUMMARY OF OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES (29 CFR 1904.24): This regulation 
requires that each employer maintain a log of all recordable occupational injuries and illnesses and that the 
information be recorded in the log within six working days of the receipt of the information.  Form OSHA No. 200 
or its equivalent is to be used for this purpose. 
ACCESS TO EMPLOYEE EXPOSURE AND MEDICAL RECORDS (29 CFR 1910.20): An employer must 
provide exposure and medical records to an employee or designated representative within fifteen days after the 
request for access to records.  If the employee requests copies of this information, the employer must make the copies 
available to the employee at no cost.  All employee medical records must be maintained for the duration of 
employment plus 30 
years by the employer. 
EMPLOYEE EMERGENCY PLANS AND FIRE PREVENTION PLANS (29 CFR 1910.38): This regulation 
applies to all emergency action plans and fire prevention plans required by particular OSHA standards.  With the 
exception of employers with 10 or fewer employees, both the emergency action plan and the fire prevention plan are 
required in writing.  The required elements of each of these plans are provided in the regulation.  If the employer has 
10 or fewer employees, the elements of both types of plan must be provided orally to employees.  The employer shall 
also perform housekeeping and maintenance of equipment and systems as part of the fire prevention plan. 
OCCUPATIONAL NOISE EXPOSURE (29 CFR 1910.95): On many sites, different site activities (e.g., drilling 
operations, heavy equipment operations) may result in appreciable noise levels.  It is important that area and personal 
noise surveys be conducted to categorize noise levels appropriately.  A sound level meter that has the capability to 
integrate and average sound levels over the course of a work day is required.  Currently, the OSHA-Permissible 
Exposure Limit for an eight-hour workday, forty-hour work week, is 90 dBA, as recorded on a sound level meter on 
the A weighted scale.  An employer shall implement a hearing conservation program if 8-hour time weighted average 
noise exposures equal or exceed 85 decibels on the A scale.  Continuous intermittent and impulsive sound levels of 
80 dBA or greater shall be integrated into the time weighted average. 
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EYE AND FACE PROTECTION (29 CFR 1910.133): Eye and face protection is required when there is the potential 
for on-site injury.  Particular information on goggles, spectacles, and face protection is included in this regulation. 
Design, construction, testing, and use of such devices must be in accordance with ANSI Z87.1-1968 specifications. 
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION (29 CFR 1910.134): Prior to wearing a respirator, an employee should be certified 
as medically able to wear one.  Each employer should have a written respiratory protection plan for selection and use 
of respirators.  All employees must be trained regarding the appropriate use of a respirator. 
OCCUPATIONAL HEAD PROTECTION (29 CFR 1910.135): On-site situations requiring head protection include: 
presence of overhead objects, on-site operation of heavy equipment, potential for flying objects in the work area, and 
possible electrical shock hazard.  In addition to protecting workers from falling or flying objects, head protection 
affords limited protection from electric shock and burn.  Head protection must meet ANSI Z89.1-1969 specifications. 
HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS (29 CFR 1910.307): Electrical equipment used in hazardous locations must be 
intrinsically safe and suitable for use in the appropriate classified environment.  Specified definitions of 
classifications and further information can be found in Section 1910.307 and 1910.399. 
TOXIC AND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES (Subpart Z, 29 CFR 1910.1000): There are other applicable OSHA 
standards that refer to particular air sampling procedures for chemical contaminants, PPE requirements, and record 
keeping for a variety of compounds.
 Asbestos  29 CFR 1910.1001   Coal tar pitch volatiles  29 CFR 1910.1002 
4-nitrobiphenyl  29 CFR 1910.1003   Alpha-Naphthylamine  29 CFR 1910.1004
 Methyl chloromethyl ether  29 CFR 1910.1006
 3,3'-dichlorobenzidine  29 CFR 1910.1007
 bis-chloromethyl ether  29 CFR 1910.1008
 Benzidine  29 CFR 1910.1010
 4-aminodiphenyl  29 CFR 1910.1011
 Ethyleneimine  29 CFR 1910.1012
 beta-propiolactone  29 CFR 1910.1013
 2-acetylaminofluorene  29 CFR 1910.1014
 4-dimethylaminoazobenzene  29 CFR 1910.1015
 N-nitrosodimethylamine  29 CFR 1910.1016
 Vinyl chloride  29 CFR 1910.1017
 Inorganic arsenic  29 CFR 1910.1018
 Lead  29 CFR 1910.1025
 Benzene  29 CFR 1910.1028
 Coke oven emissions  29 CFR 1910.1029
 1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane  29 CFR 1910.1044
 Acrylonitrile  29 CFR 1910.1045
 Ethylene oxide  29 CFR 1910.1047
 Formaldehyde  29 CFR 1910.1048 
HAZARD COMMUNICATION (29 CFR 1910.1200): The employer will establish a hazard communication program 
to ensure that hazards associated with chemical usage are communicated to employees.  The hazard communication 
program does not apply to hazardous wastes.  There are training, labeling, and material safety data sheet (MSDS) 
requirements for known chemicals.  Employers are required to develop a written hazard 
communication program that will include:
 List of known hazardous chemicals on-site; unknown
 Method for informing employee of chemical hazards associated with
 non-routine tasks; and 
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 Methods for informing both employees and subcontractors about
 chemical hazards (e.g., chemical hazard training, distribution of
 MSDSs). 
2.  ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The HASP must include key personnel as well as their alternates.  The HASP must also identify the communication 
procedures and provide for briefings to be held before site activity is initiated, and daily thereafter.  These meeting 
should be held at any time they appear necessary to ensure that employees are adequately apprised of the health and 
safety procedures being followed at the site. 
Primary team member=s roles and responsibilities are listed below.  As applicable, team members should read the work 
plan, sampling and analysis plan, and/or quality assurance plan prior to the completion of their assigned tasks.
 Organization and Responsibilities (Primary Team Members) 
Name  Organization  Responsibility 
Mark Durno  USEPA Region 5  EPA OSC Incident Commander 
Steve Renninger  U.S.EPA Region 5  EPA Field Ops Leader 
NOTE: Refer to Section 4 of this SHASP for Training Requirements. 
Alternate team member=s roles and responsibilities are listed below.  As applicable, team members should read the work 
plan, sampling and analysis plan, and/or quality assurance plan prior to the completion of their assigned tasks.
 Organization and Responsibilities (Alternate Team Members) 
Name  Organization  Responsibility 
Michelle Cullerton  Region 5 START  Team Member - Air Sampling 
Steve Jacobs  Region 5 START  Team Member - AirSampling 
Ellery Savage  USEPA  ERT  Team Member -Air Sampling 
Doug Draper  USEPA ERT Contractor  Team Member - Air Sampling 
Ben Markadel  Region 5 START  Health and Safety 
Jodi McCardy  Region 5 START  Data Management 
NOTE: Refer to Section 4 of this SHASP for Training Requirements. 
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1.3  COMMUNICATIONS 
1.3.1 Radio Communications: 
. 
Radio Communications 
Name  Job/Team  Channel/Frequency
 EPA Response Team  Support Local Response  Channel 5 Freq 165.5 
1.3.2 Phone Communications: 
. 
Phone Communications 
Name  Voice/Cellular/Pager  FAX 
EPA IC Mark Durno  513 456-9878 / 513 -281-7654/NA  312-353-9176 
1.3.3  General signals for personnel in PPE: 
Signal  Meaning 
Thumbs Up  I'm OK  /  I agree 
Thumbs Down  Don't Agree 
Hands Across Throat  Out of air  /  Trouble breathing 
Grab Hand  /  Arm  Come with me. 
Hands on head  I need assistance. 
1.4  SCOPE OF WORK 
Description of Work: 
General Tasks 
1.  Set up electronic database using SCRIBE, collect state and local air moinitoring data. 
2. Perform site reconnisance around local perimeter for chem, rad and bio. 
3. Monitor outside of perimeter for chemical, rad and particulate materials (multi-Rae, NaI detector, Ion chamber and Data 
Ram 4 particulate monitor). 
4. Deploy RADeCO particulate air monitors (1) downwind (1) upwind and (1) > 100 uR/hr. 
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5. Prepare for Level B entry into restricted zone. 
6. Follow Radiation Entry/Egress, Sample Analysis and Reporting Procedures identified below. 
7. Record Data on RRSF-900 and enter into Scribe database. 
8. Report data to  IC, HQ, RERT, DOE and State and Local Officials. 
9. Wear TLDs, report exposue from EPD Mk2  dosimeters every hour to EPA Health & Safety Officer. 
10. Dose Management starts at 1 mR/hr. 
Specific Tasks 
11.1 Pre-Deployment Operational Checks 
a. 	 Perform operational checks on Micro-R meters (i.e., model 192, 19) and pancake detectors (2241-2 coupled to 
model 44-9 pancake detector) in accordance with QSGs. 
b.	 Place radiation meters in front seat of vehicle or dashboard with audible >on.= 
11.2  Arrival Procedures 
a. 	 If there is a visible smoke plume, arrive up-wind of the scene. 
b.	 Check radiation meters against notification guidelines. The notification guidelines are an ambient reading of 100 
FR/hr with the micro-R meter and/or 330 cpm with pancake detector. (These are equivalent readings when 
calibrated to a cesium-137 source). 
c. 	 If first responders have set up an exclusion zone for the public, drive outside the perimeter of the exclusion zone, 
recording any readings at or above notification guidelines. Record these readings on RRSF-900.  If guidelines are 
exceeded, make notifications to EPA, RERT Commander, DOE RAP, and State and local radiological response 
programs. Notifications can be made through the National Response Center. 
d.	 Collect wipe samples of any visible dust in areas where notification guidelines were exceeded.  Follow

contamination assessment procedures in section 4 of this SOG.  

e. 	 If removable contamination exists, recommendations should be made to the IC that the exclusion zone be expanded 
and radiological protective actions implemented. (Any recommendations should be made in consultation with DOE 
and the RERT). 
f. 	 Follow radiological perimeter, reconnaissance, and hot zone monitoring procedures. 
12.0  Pre-Entry Procedures 
12.1  Planning 
a. 	 Synchronize the EPA and the incident commander=s action objectives. 
b.	 Establish the EPA role in the incident response plan. 
c. 	 Collect all first responder radiation data and record as Afirst responder data@ on form RRSF-900. 
12.2  Organize Assets and Brief Personnel 
a. 	 Establish an initial-entry team. 
b.	 Establish a backup team. 
c. 	 Establish a decontamination team (hot zone exit self-surveys may have to be performed until additional assets 
arrive). 
d.	 Brief all personnel on the required tasks to accomplish during the entry. 
e. 	 Communicate situation, objectives, control measures, access restrictions, and turn-back criteria. 
12.3  Safety Planning and Medical Screening 
a. 	 Develop site-specific HASP. 
b.	 Perform medical screening on entry team, backup team, and if available, decontamination team. 
c. 	 Radiological health and safety requirements include thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) badges, EPD Mk2 
real-time dosimeters, and briefing on radiological turn-back levels, 10 Roentgens/hour, however dose management 
starts at 1 mR/hr. 
12.4  Equipment Calibration and Operational Checks 
a. 	 Inspect the personal protective equipment (PPE) for signs of cracks, rips, tears, or other defects. 
b.	 Follow QSG for chemical agent detectors. 
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c. 	 Follow the QSG for the SAM-935, Ludlum Model 43-90 alpha scintillator, and Eberline RO20 ion chamber. 
d.  Verify that your staging area is free of contamination. 
e. 	 Conduct communication checks between entry team, backup team, Lead OSC, and decontamination team. 
12.5  Don PPE (Level C is appropriate for radiological hazards; unknown conditions require a minimum of Level B. 
a. 	 Use the buddy-team method to don PPE. 
b.	 Inspect and verify the proper PPE fit and function. 
12.6  Entry Clearance 
a. 	 Request permission from the Lead OSC and IC to enter the hot zone. 
b.	 Record time on air, entry team personnel names, and equipment taken into hot zone. 
c. 	 Entry team verifies required tasks and plan of action for entry to the Lead OSC. 
d.	 Confirm decontamination line is established and the backup team is ready. 
e. 	 Receive clearance and permit entry team to enter the hot zone. 
13.0  Entry Procedures 
13.1  Reconnaissance 
a. 	 Adjust the reconnaissance plan, as required, to meet the needs of the IC and OSC to ensure there is a mission 
justification for all entries 
b.	 In developing the reconnaissance plan consider the following objectives:

1)  Locations and types of hazards.

2)  Physical layouts and descriptions.

3)  Casualty status or information.

4)  Additional requirements.

5)  Video and/or still camera pictures.  

13.2  Monitoring Initial Entry Procedure 
a. 	 Conduct non-radiological air monitoring (Multirae® ) throughout operations to identify any atmospheres that are 
corrosive, combustible, or oxygen-deficient; toxic substances that are immediately dangerous to life or health 
(IDLH); and exposures over Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs). 
b.	 Approach the center of the incident scene from the downwind direction.  Place RADeCO Air Sampler at 100 µR/hr 
point (follow the QSG).  Place small “ x”on the exterior surface of the filter paper.  Record flow rate and start time 
on form RRSF-900. 
c. 	 Continue to walk in a line and record dose rate (micro-R) measurements at100 FR/hr, 500 FR/hr, and 1 
milli-Roentgen per hour (mR/hr) level on form RRSF-900. Measurements should be collected at waist level. 
d.	 With the SAM-935, collect one-minute spectrum at the 100 u/R hr location.  This is a high enough exposure rate to 
identify the isotope(s). Record the identified isotope(s) and spectrum # on RRSF-900.  The SAM-935 should be in 
MCA mode with the following isotopes enabled; Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226, Ir-192, Am-241, and Pu-239.) 
e. 	 Collect a wipe sample at each monitoring point location in an area that is likely to contain loose surface 
contamination. With moderate pressure, swipe an area approximately 3 inches by 6 inches and place wipe in a 
glassine envelope. 
f.   Mark radiological monitoring location with pin flags, marking paint, or duct tape. 
g. 	 Record all readings including Global Positioning System (GPS) locations of measurement points on form

RRSF-900.

14.0  Egress Procedures 
a. 	 Exit hot/exclusion zone through the Contamination Reduction Corridor (CRC) 
b.	 Place hand tools and monitoring instruments taken into the hot zone at a table or inside a bucket provided in the 
designated equipment/instrument drop station. 
c. 	 Position the tools and monitoring equipment so that the incoming Entry Team can easily acquire them. 
d.	 Remove the outer gloves and place them in a designated container. 
e. 	 Follow standard PPE doffing protocols.  The order of PPE removal will depend on the level of protection.  Step by 
step doffing and personnel decontamination procedures can be found in RRDSOP 601(currently under 
development). 
f. 	 Personal contamination surveys must take place in a low background environment.  Perspiration should be removed 
from hands and face using paper towel or other absorbent material. 
g. 	 If the Entry Team is using a self-frisking technique, set up the pancake GM detector with the window facing up and 
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move finger tips and the palms of each hand across the detector.  Speed is about 1 to 2 inches per second. Count 
rates with the pancake GM greater than 100 counts per minute above background reading (as a continuous 
deflection) should be considered contaminated and personnel personal decontamination is recommended. 
e. 	 If no contamination is found on the hands, pick up the unit and scan the bottom of the feet and underside of the 
neck where the respirator was worn. 
f. 	 If  contamination is detected on hands, feet or the underside of the neck decontamination of these areas should be 
performed and a full body scan should follow. 
g. 	 If no contamination is found on the hands, feet and neck, a full body scan is not warranted. 
15.0  Contamination Assessment 
15.1  Contamination Swipe Surveys 
a. 	 Survey/count the swipe samples in an area where the ambient radiation level is at normal (pre-event) background 
levels. 
b.	 Place the filter paper on a flat non-contaminated surface and count for 15 seconds with a Ludlum Model 2241 on 
the “ det 2”setting with the Ludlum Model Probe 43-90 to determine if alpha contamination is present.  Record the 
result on form RRSF-900. 
c. 	 If the reading is greater than 5x background, contamination exists. 
d.	 To determine if loose beta/gamma contamination is present, change the Probe to the Ludlum Model 44-9 and 
switch to the “ det 1”setting on the Ludlum Model 2241.  Record the result on form RRSF-900. 
e. 	 If the reading is greater than 2x background, contamination exists. 
15.2  Filter Paper Alpha Airborne Radioactivity Determination 
a.	 Count the filter paper for 10 minutes with a Ludlum Model 2241 on the “ det 2”setting using the Ludlum Probe 
model 43-90.  Record results on the appropriate form. 
b.	 Wait for 30 minutes and count again.  If the filter paper count rate decreases by approximately one-half, then the 
radioactivity is most likely due to radon decay products.  If the count rate does not decrease, then the radioactivity 
most likely exists and level B, or greater, respiratory protection should continue to be worn in this area. 
15.3  Filter Paper Beta Radioactivity Determination 
a.	 Count the filter paper for 10 minutes with a Ludlum Model 2241 on the “ det 1”setting with the Ludlum Probe 
model 44-9. Record results on form RRSF-900. 
b.	 Wait for 30 minutes and count again. If the filter paper count rate decreases by approximately one-half, then the 
radioactivity is most likely due to radon decay products.  If the count rate does not decrease, then the radioactivity is 
due to some other beta activity.  This indicates that a radioactive airborne condition exists and level C respiratory, 
or greater, protection should continue to be worn in this area. 
16.  Sample Shipping/Analysis and Reporting 
16.1  Shipping 
a. 	 Prepare the sample for transport. Transfer sample collection media to appropriate containers and label in accordance 
with the chain-of-custody procedures. Record any pertinent information on a separate Chain-of-Custody Form for 
group sample transfer. 
b.	 Ship airborne radioactivity samples that are greater than twice background after 30-minute decay to a certified lab (a 
list of certified labs is in development by EPA working with DOE, once available, it will be posted to 
www.epaosc.org) and request the following analyses: Alpha spectroscopy for the actinides (i.e. U-234, U-235, 
U-238, Th-230, Th-232, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, Am-241), total strontium, and gamma spectrometry. 
c. 	 Report all survey and contamination assessment data to the IC as well as to the RERT, DOE RAP, and State/local 
radiological response programs. 
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Individual operations required to complete the above scope of work are divided into numbered tasks (i.e., Task #1 - Perform 
site reconnaissance: Task #2 Collect samples of spilled material: etc). 
Task Descriptions 
Task # 
#1  Set Up electronic database using SCRIBE. Collect State and Local air monitoring data. 
#2  Monitor outside of perimeter for chemical, rad and particulate materials (multi-Rae, NaI detector, Ion 
chamber and Data Ram 4 particulate monitor). 
#3  Deploy RADeCO particulate air monitors (1) downwind (1) upwind and (1) > 100 uR/hr. 
#4  Prepare for Level B entry into restricted zone. 
#5  Follow Radiation Entry/Egress, Sample Analysis and Reporting Procedures identified above. 
#6  Record Data on RRSF-900 and enter into Scribe database. 
#7  Report data to  IC, HQ, RERT, DOE and State and Local Officials. 
#8  Wear TLDs, report exposue from EPD Mk2  dosimeters every hour to EPA Health & Safety Officer. 
# 9  Dose Management starts at 1 mR/hr. 
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2. HEALTH AND SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS (SITE DESCRIPTION, HAZARD EVALUATION, INITIAL AND 
PERIODIC MONITORING,  AND CONTROL) 
Health and Safety Risk Analysis should be established for each task and operation identified in the site-specific work 
plan.  Discussion of these analyses should include identification of the chemical, radiological and/or biological 
contaminants, affected media, concentrations, and potential routes of exposure for use in risk analysis.  The Safety Risk 
Analysis should also address anticipated on-site operations and safety problems. 
2.1  SITE DESCRIPTION 
Is the site currently in operation?  Yes  No 
Site History- Description: 
Explosion at the Chicago Board of Trade Building. Local Fire Department responding to contain the fire and prerform rescue 
operations.  Chicago's 511 Hazmat Team reported reading of 5 milli-roentgens per hour 200 feet from explosion site,  In 
addition The GR-130 Exploranium detector identified the presence of cesium-137 and cobalt-60.The Chicago Department of 
the Environment requested EPA assistance to perform air monitoring for radiological and chemical parameters. 
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Site Map 
<see attached map> 
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2.2 Hazard Evaluation 
Responses to a Chemical, Radiological and/or Biological incident poses additional concerns and potential stresses not 
typically present at a hazardous material incident.  There will probably be considerable public interest and an unusual amount 
of news media attention; the operations will be subject to public scrutiny.  Also, there may have been deaths and injuries 
stemming from the incident.  The cause of the incident may be unknown, and there may be conflicting or uncertain theories, 
observations, and information available to responders.  There may be damaged structures, fires and explosions, and missing 
persons.  Additionally, the site may be viewed as a potential crime scene, necessitating consideration of evidence collection 
and preservation procedures.  Most likely, the circumstances will be unusual.  The situation may present serious physical and 
psychological threats that cause stress in the workers.  Team members should be aware of the unusual aspects of the response 
and potential effects on team members. 
NOTE:  Secondary hazards (devices) may be present and pose a significant risk to response personnel.  CAUTION 
must be taken by all personnel.  Should a secondary device be suspected and/or identified, contact and removal of the 
device from the site will be performed by properly trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or similarly trained 
personnel, prior to team entry.  Items (boxes, packages, etc.) which have not been monitored by EOD personnel will not 
be approached or handled in any manner. 
2.2.1 Hazard Evaluation 
Radioactive 
Isotope 
cesium-137 (unconfirmed) 
DAC (uCi/mL)  0.00000006 
Half-Life  30y 
Surface Activity  unknown at this time 
Level (dpm/100cm) 
Exposure Rate  Ranges from background to 5 milli-roentgens per hour with Exploranium 
(mR/hr) 
Counts Per Minute  Several locations greater than 20,000 cpm. 
Energy(s) in  .662 MeV 
(MeV) 
Routes Of  inhalation 
Exposure  ingestion 
external 
Major Radiation(s)  gamma 
beta 
Location  200 ft from explosion 
cobalt-60 (unconfirmed) Radioactive 
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Isotope 
DAC (uCi/mL)  0.00000007 
Half-Life  5.3y 
Surface Activity  unknown at this time 
Level (dpm/100cm) 
Exposure Rate  5 mR/hr 
(mR/hr) 
Counts Per Minute  0 
Energy(s) in  1.1 MeV 
(MeV)  1.2 Mev 
Routes Of  Ingestion, Inhalation, External 
Exposure 
Major Radiation(s)  beta/gamma 
Location  200 ft from explosion site. 
2.2.2  Physical Hazard Evaluation (Extract Physical Hazards From File and Add Any Others To List) 
Debris, hazardous conditions, electrical, heavy particulate and heat. 
2.2  Hazard Control 
An appropriate combination of engineering/administrative controls, work practices, and PPE shall be used to reduce 
and maintain team members exposures to a level at or below applicable exposure criteria. 
Applicable  The exclusion zone will be clearly marked and access restricted to those personnel directly involved with the

Engineering  response operations.  Prior to entering the area, personnel will know their specific task assignments and

And Administrative  responsibilities while within the contaminated area.  Remote sensing devices will be used whenever feasible.

Control Measures:  Site entry and egress will be accomplished following pre-established procedures.  Entry and exit corridors

leading to the decontamination stations will be clearly marked.  Emergency exits for personnel within the 
contaminated facility will have means of transporting personnel to the decontamination stations without 
contaminating the surrounding environment, other personnel, and/or the transportation vehicle.  Personnel will 
enter and exit the contaminated areas only through the designated corridors.  All personnel entering the 
exclusion zone will be ‘ logged in and out’for their entry and exit times, level of protection ( LOP ), and task to 
be performed.  Personnel will follow any pre-established routes within the facility to preclude contamination of 
additional areas.  Each team member will be provided with a map/plan of the facility that indicates the route to 
be taken and the location of emergency exits to be used.  All personnel and equipment exiting the contaminated 
area will require decontamination prior to entering the support zone as described in the decontamination section 
of this plan. 
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PPE:  Refer to PPE Section for assigned levels of protection and required PPE for this site. 
Task Descriptions 
Task  # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Description  Contaminant  Risk 
Set Up electronic database using  N/A  N/A 
SCRIBE. Collect State and Local 
air monitoring data. 
Monitor outside of perimeter (in 
Confirm presence of 
radioactive material i.e., 
particulates, low visibility, debris, 
rescue vihicles 
vehicle)for chemical, rad and  Cs-137 and Co-60 
particulate materials (multi-Rae, 
NaI detector, Ion chamber and Data 
Ram 4 particulate monitor). 
Deploy RADeCO particulate air  Radioactive material, 
monitors (1) downwind (1) upwind  particulates, monitor for chem 
materials 
particulates, low visibility, debris 
and (1) > 100 uR/hr.  rescue vehicles 
Prepare for Level B entry into 
restricted zone. 
Radioactive material,  Heat stress, low visibility, 
particulates, monitor for chem 
materials 
particulates, debris, rescue vehicles 
Follow Radiation Entry/Egress, 
Sample Analysis and Reporting  Radioactive material,  Heat stress, low visibility, 
Procedures identified above.  particulates, monitor for chem 
materials 
particulates, debris, rescue vehicles 
Record Data on RRSF-900 and  N/A  N/A/ 
enter into Scribe database. 
N/A 
Report data to  IC, HQ, RERT,  N/A 
DOE and State and Local Officials. 
N/A 
Wear TLDs, report exposue from 
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8  EPD Mk2  dosimeters every hour to 
EPA Health & Safety Officer. 
Dose Management starts at 1 
mR/hr. 
Maintain ALARA 
9 
2.3  RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD?  Yes  No 
2.3.1  RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD EVALUATION AND CONTROL 
Thermoluminescent dosimeters and Siemens EPD Mk2 real -time sosimeters should be worn at all times.  Hourly Hp10 
cummulative exposures should be recorded on exposure record forms and manitained by the Health and Safety Officer.  Dose 
management starts at 1 mill-roentgen per hour. Emergency exposures should be maintained below 5 REM total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE). 
In addition, if OSCs integrate with a FRMAC response, they may be asked to wear an additional TLD badge processed by a 
Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program (DOELAP) or National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation 
Program (NVLAP) accredited processor.  FRMAC may provide a dose report to each participant’ s home organization after 
the conclusion of the individual’ s activities.  However, FRMAC dosimetry does not replace the TLD and dosimeters issued 
by EPA. The EPA dosimetry record will serve as the dose of record.  Guidance for wearing external dosimeters includes: 
The dosimeter must be worn on the chest area on or between the waist and the neck unless otherwise instructed by 
Health and Safety (H&S) personnel. The dosimeter is to be worn only by the individual to whom it was issued. Lost, 
damaged, or contaminated dosimeters must be reported immediately to the H&S staff. If a participant discovers 
that his/her dosimeter is missing while in a radiological area, he/she shall immediately leave the area, then notify 
the team leader and report the missing dosimeter to the H&S Manager. A new dosimeter will be issued by H&S. 
Dosimeters must be returned or exchanged at the time designated by the H&S Manager, upon request, or at the end 
of the operation. 
For emergencies, EPA has issued draft guidance that provides exposure rates that are based upon the understanding that, 
during emergencies, OSCs may receive doses that exceed the ACL  of 500 mRem (TEDE).  This guidance has been 
incorporated into the revised SHEM 38 guidance.  These guidance include “ Turn-back Levels”(shown in Table 2) that may 
be used at sites to ensure that these exposure limitations are not exceeded. Under this new guidance, EPA’ s On-Scene 
Coordinators are considered emergency workers, and thus the recommendations provided by EPA for emergency worker dose 
limitations, which are issued under EPA’ s Protective Action Guidelines Manual [EPA 3], are applicable. 
People who are not trained in radiation should not be expected to serve in roles that will require them to be 
exposed to radiation levels that would exceed 100 mrem/year.  Thus, these personnel (who may serve in roles as 
PIOs, headquarters liaisons, or emergency operations center personnel, at locations such as the FRMAC, Joint 
Field Office, or Emergency Operations Centers) should not be exposed to ionizing radiation that would increase 
their TEDE to greater than 100 mrem/year (limits considered acceptable to the general public).  If such personnel 
must be deployed to forward locations (not including field work), they should be issued TLDs but the Agency's 
Administrative Control Level of 500 mrem/year should not be waived. 
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2.3.1.1  Radiological Hazard Evaluation 
Potential radiological hazards are described below by task number.  Hazard Evaluation Sheets for major known contaminants 
are attached at the end of this plan. 
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Task  DAC  Route(s) of  Major  Energy(s) 
Number  Radionuclide  (mCi/ml)  Exposure  Radiation(s)  (MeV)  Half-Life 
1-9  Cesium-137  6.0 x10-8  External, 
Ingestion, 
Gamma 
Beta 
.662 
.173 
30 yr 
Inhalation 
Cobalt-60  7.0 x10-8  External, 
Ingestion, 
Inhalation 
Gamma 
Beta 
1.1 
1.3 
5.3 
The daughter product of Cesium -137 is Barium-137m, a radionuclide with a half-life of 2.552 minutes.  Due to secular 
equilibrium, Ba-137m builds up in C-137 sources to an activity essentilly equal to that of Cs-137. 
2.3.1.2  Radiological Hazard Control 
Engineering/administrative controls and work practices shall be instituted to reduce and maintain employee exposures to a 
level at or below the permissible exposure/dose limits (see sections 4.2.3 and 5.5.1).  Whenever engineering/administrative 
controls and work practices are not feasible or effective, any reasonable combination of engineering/administrative controls, 
work practices, and PPE shall be used to reduce and maintain employee exposures to a level at or below permissible 
exposure/dose limits. 
Applicable Engineering/Administrative Control Measures: 
Time, distance, shielding, PPE, monitor exposure with real-time dosimters. 
3.  EMPLOYEE TRAINING 
Personnel will  not be assigned to perform response tasks, use assigned levels of PPE or site specific monitoring equipment, 
or be assigned leadership roles unless they have been trained and have demonstrated competence in each specific area. 
Prior to work, team members shall have received training as indicated below.  (Indicate with AX@) 
Required Training 
Radiation Basic Training (as described in EPA's Report 38)

Radiation Advanced Training (as described in EPA's Report 38)

Annual Radiation Refresher (as described in EPA's Report 38)

40-Hour OSHA HAZWOPER Initial Training and Annual Refresher (29 CFR 1910.120)

Annual First Aid / CPR

8-Hour General Radiation Health & Safety

DOT and Biannual Refresher (for handling and transportation of samples)

40-60 Hours of advanced NBC (domestic preparedness) response training beyond the 29 CFR 1910.120

NOTE: 
1.  Personnel functioning independently of an immediate supervisor must have a minimum of 3 days of actual field experience 
Page 20 Created by the ERT CBN-HASP Wizard BETA.

This HASP exists SOLELY for BETA testing and Peer-Review purposes.

In the event of an emergency, contact the ERT Emergency Hotline @ (732) 321-6660

under a skilled supervisor. 
2.  All employees must have had training to recognize the symptoms and signs of over-exposure to the chemical, biological, 
and/or radiation hazards present. 
3.  If there is no medical facility in proximity to the site, training records in the HASP must indicate at least one individual 
on-site is adequately trained to render first aid. 
If any training above has been waved for any member, explain: 
4.  LEVEL OF PROTECTION (LOP) AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
4.1  LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
The Table below indicates the levels of protection ( LOPs ) which have been selected for each work task based on an 
evaluation of the potential or known hazards, the routes of potential hazard, and the performance specifications of the PPE. 
On-site monitoring results and other information obtained from on-site activities will be used to modify these LOPs and the 
PPE, as necessary, to ensure sufficient personnel protection.  The authorized LOP and PPE shall only be changed with the 
approval of the site SHSO. 
Levels of Protection Table 1 
Task # 
A  B X  C(X)  D  Modifications Allowed (None) 
Note: Use "X" for initial levels of protection.  Use "(X)" to indicate levels of protection that may be used as site conditions 
warrant.  Refer to Section 3 of this SHASP for Training Requirements. 
4.2  PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
The PPE selected for each task is indicated in the Tables below. Refer to 29 CFR 1910.120 for the minimum PPE required for 
each LOP. 
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5. MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE 
5.1  MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 
Team members shall actively participate in their applicable medical surveillance program and shall have received, within the 
past year, an appropriate physical examination and health rating. 
Team members should inform the Site Health and Safety Officer of any allergies, medical conditions, or similar situations that 
are relevant to the safe conduct of the work to which this SHASP applies. 
Site personnel who may be exposed at or above the OSHA-PELs or other published exposure levels must wear a respirator.  If 
the individual wears a respirator 30 or more days each year the individual must be enrolled in a comprehensive medical 
monitoring program before working on site. 
5.1.1  OTHER MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES 
5.2  RADIATION EXPOSURE 
Is there a concern for radiation at the site?  Yes  No 
5.2.1  External Dosimetry 
Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) Badges:  TLD 
Pocket Dosimeters:  No 
Other:  Siemens EPD real time.  Dose Management at 1 mR/hr 
5.2.2  Internal Dosimetry 
Whole body count  Bioassay  Other: 
Requirements:  Based on site conditions Internal dosimetry may be required. 
Participants who are exposed to loose (i.e., removable) radioactive material or who work in areas where radioactive material 
may be inhaled may be asked to submit bioassay samples and participate in whole-body, lung, or wound counting. (Bioassay 
is the term that is used to describe the assessment of the quantity of radioactive material present in the body.)  The NRC 
requirements state that “ a bioassay is required to verify the performance of a respirator, if intake would have exceeded 10% of 
an ALI [Annual Limit on Intake] before credit was taken for a protection factor”[add reference].  The evaluation of an 
individual’ s CEDE will be based on bioassay data rather than air concentration values unless bioassay data are unavailable or 
inadequate, or internal dose estimates based on representative air concentration values are demonstrated to be as, or more, 
accurate.  If necessary, EPA’ s ORIA and SHEMP, working with REAC/TS, will develop a site-specific Bioassay Plan for 
inclusion in the site-specific H&S Plan.  Preliminary CEDE estimates, based upon air sampling results, will be performed 
under the responsibility of the Health and Safety Manager. Dose assessments, based on bioassay results, will be assigned after 
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samples have been collected and analyzed.  Personnel shall be notified promptly of a confirmed positive bioassay result and 
the results of dose assessments and subsequent refinements. 
The internal dose assessment program will involve the tracking and review of air monitoring results to determine trends, and 
collecting nasal smears or nose blow samples, urine samples, or fecal samples to monitor intakes of transportable 
radionuclides.  Additionally in vivo measurements are used to monitor the deposition of non-transportable radionuclides.  The 
internal dose assessment program should be designed to rapidly detect a release of radioactive material and/or a breach of 
respiratory protection. 
There are two types of bioassays: 
In vivo bioassay involves counting the living tissue. 
In vitro involves counting samples, such as urine, blood, phlegm, nasal smears, etc. 
Bioassays may be required during general operations or may be initiated in response to an occurrence to determine if there has 
been an intake of radioactive material. Bioassay sampling may be requested to provide follow up to a known intake in order to 
quantify the intake and to monitor the status of the radioactivity to refine the dose assessment, depending on the radionuclide, 
method of ingestion/inhalation, and biological half life. 
5.2.3  Radiation Dose
 Emergency Response Dose Limits: Implementation of these dose limits may be designated on a site-specific basis.  5 REM 
TEDE During Emergenct Response Phase. 
Site-Specific Dose Limits: Once ER Phase is over 500 mRem  ACL should be used. 
ALARA Policy:  Radiation doses to site personnel shall be maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), taking into 
account the work objective, state of technology available, economics of improvements in dose reduction with respect to 
overall health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations. 
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6.  AIR AND PERSONNEL MONITORING 
Health and safety monitoring will be conducted to ensure proper selection of engineering/administrative controls, work 
practices, and/or PPE so that employees are not exposed to hazardous substances at levels that exceed permissible 
exposure/dose limits or published exposure levels.  Health and safety monitoring will be conducted using the instruments, 
frequency, and action levels for the hazard present.  Health and safety monitoring instruments shall have been appropriately 
calibrated and/or performance.  Monitoring must also be performed for high risk employees. 
6.1  Oxygen, Combustible Gases, Toxic Gases, and Radiation Hazard Evaluation 
Upon initial entry all chemical, biological, and radioactive materials will be characterized.  Oxygen, combustible gases, toxic 
gases and radiation will be monitored. 
6.2  Hazard Monitoring 
Oxygen Contentration  Continuous  Intermediate  Other: 
Combustible Gaes  Continuous  Intermediate  Other: 
Toxic Gases  Continuous  Intermediate  Other: 
Radiation  Gamma Decay  Beta Decay  Alpha Decay 
Other:_________________________  Continuous  Intermediate  Other:________________________________ 
Other:_________________________  Continuous  Intermediate  Other:________________________________ 
Other:_________________________  Continuous  Intermediate  Other:________________________________ 
Other _________________________  Continuous  Intermediate  Other:________________________________ 
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Instrumentation Equipment Checklist 
Equipment  No  Equipment  No 
Multi-gas monito6 
Type:__Multi-Rae Plus/Draeger Multi-warn 
3  Calibration Gas  X 
O<sub>2</sub>/Explosimeter with Cal. Kit  Single Gas Monitor 
Type:______________________________________ 
Wipe Samples  X  Total Station 
Glassine envelopes  X  Noise Dosimeter 
NaI Detector  4  Draeger Pump, Tubes ________________________ 
Accuro Pump, Tubes _________________________  Real-time Aerosol Monitor Data RAM 4  2 
Personal Real-time Aerosol Monitor  XRF, Portable 
Hazard Categorization Kit, with Gas  Infrared Monitor 
Ion Chamber  1  Ground Penetrating Radar 
TLDs  8  SAM-935 MCA  1 
Siemens EPD Mk2 Dosimeters  8  Terrain Resistivity Meter with ACC's 
___EM-31  ___EM-34  Generator  2 
Weather Station;___Datalogger  Heat Stress Monitor 
Wind Guage, Hand Held  pH: ___Paper;___Pen;___Meter 
Conductivity Probe/Pen  Water Quality Tester 
Dissolved Oxygen Meter  Relative Humidity: ___Probe; ___Pen 
H<sub>2</sub>S Test Strips  RADeCO Air Samplers  3 
2241-2 + Pancake GM  2  Sling Psychfrometer 
Interscan __SO<sub2</sub> __H<sub>2</sub>S  LB5211 47mm filter paper  X 
2241-2 + 43-90 alpha scintillation  2  Chlor-n-soil Kit 
Batteries for Equipment  X 
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Sampling Equipment Checklist 
Equipment  No  Equipment  No 
Glass Bottles (sizes __________________)  Glass Bottles, Wide Mouth (_______________) 
VOA Bottles (40mL)  Polyethylene Bottles (size_______) 
Sample Preservatives: ___HNO<sub>3</sub>, 
___NaOH, ___H<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub>, 
___HCL 
Hand Bailers 
String and/or Rope  Personal Air Sampling Pumps with Calibrator, 
Chargers, Supplies 
Air Flow Calibrator  Generator(s), Portable 
High-Volume Air Samplers with Calibrators: 
___PM-10; ___PS-1; ___PM-2.5 
High-Flow Air Sampler 
Analytical Balance  Water level Indicator 
Well Pump  Cat Head/Motpr/Pulley 
Sampling Platform (Boat)  Kemmerer Water Sampler 
Eckman Dredge  Trowels and/or Spoons 
Shovel and/or Post-Hole Digger  Mixing Plates and/or Bowls 
Sieves  Hand Auger (size _______________)
 Sleeves/Caps/Extensions  Split Spoon Sampler 
Geoprobe  Soil Gas Tile Probe with Accessories 
Slam Bar (Size __________)  Extensions/Sleeves/Caps 
Soil Probe  Knives and/or Scissors 
Plastic Sample Bags  X  Plastic Sheeting 
Surveying: ___Flags; ___Tape  Auto Level; ___Tripod 
Field Transit; ___Tripod  Brunton Compas; ___Rod, 25ft. 
Chain or Tape (200ft.) and/or Rolatape  Hand-held GPS (______________) 
Non-Sparking Tools  Thieving Rods with Bulbs 
Coliwasa Samplers with Tubes  Sudge Judge 
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Spray Paint/ Marker  pH Paper 
7.  SITE CONTROL 
7.1  SITE LAYOUT AND WORK ZONES 
Site Work  Work zones will be established and clearly marked prior to beginning operations. All personnel will be made 
Zones:  aware of the zone boundaries and the operations permitted in each. 
ATTACH A MAP OR SITE SKETCH TO THIS PLAN, INDICATING THE DESIGNATED SITE 
WORK ZONES. 
Site Access  Only those personnel directly involved with the operations will be allowed on site. All personnel entering the 
Requirements and  exclusion zone will be Alogged@ in and out.  Site-specific access requirements will be followed. 
Special 
Considerations 
Illumination  Intrinsically safe lighting will be used as needed. Lighting should be of such power and be so positioned that a 
Requirements:  minimum amount of shadows are created within the working area.  Team members will use intrinsically safe 
flashlights. 
Sanitary Facilities  Available nearby or local sanitary facilities will be identified.  If additional facilities are needed, the team will

(toilet, shower,  make those arrangements.

potable water):

FACILITIES LOCATED WITHIN THE EXCLUSION ZONE WILL NOT BE USED BY TEAM 
MEMBERS. 
On-Site	 Communication methods and procedures will be selected that are appropriate for the tasks, needs, and PPE. 
Communications:	 Only intrinsically safe communication devices shall be used within the exclusion zone.  If two-way radios are 
to be utilized on site, prior to beginning operations, frequency assignments will be given and made known to 
all team members. 
Other 
Site-Control 
Requirements: 
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7.2  SAFE WORK PRACTICES 
Daily  A daily safety meeting will be conducted for all team members and documented on the Daily Safety Meeting 
Safety  Record form or in the field logbook. The information and data obtained from applicable site characterization 
Meeting:  and analysis will be addressed in the safety meetings and also used to update this SHASP, as necessary. 
Work  Site work will be limited to 12 hours per day for 12 consecutive days, except for emergency responses.  Work 
Limitations:  will be performed only during daylight hours unless appropriate lighting is available. Work - rest cycles will be 
determined as site conditions allow. 
Weather  Outdoor operations will cease during electrical storms. The Site Health and Safety Officer will determine if

Limitations:  other inclement weather conditions pose a safety threat to team members.  

Buddy System:	 At all times, field work will be conducted according to the buddy system, using no fewer than 2 members per 
team. 
Line of Sight:	 Each team member shall remain in the line of sight and within verbal/signal communication of at least one 
other team member, who is in the line of sight or communications (radio) with the team leader, Site Health and 
Safety Officer or other personnel having the means to effect/call rescue or EMS services. 
Eating, Drinking,  Eating, drinking, smoking, and the use of tobacco products shall be prohibited in the exclusion and 
and Smoking:  contamination reduction zone, at a minimum, and shall only be permitted in designated (clearly marked) areas 
of the support zone. 
Contamination	 Team members shall avoid unnecessary contamination of personnel, equipment, and materials to the extent 
Avoidance:	 practicable.  Personnel will avoid all contact with potential contamination at all times.   While in the exclusion 
zone, personnel will not sit, kneel or otherwise come in contact with potentially contaminated surfaces. 
Equipment will not be placed on unprotected surfaces.  All personnel and equipment in the exclusion zone will 
require decontamination prior to leaving the site. Contact with any potential contamination will be brought to 
the attention of the Site Health and Safety Officer and decontamination personnel. 
Sample Handling:	 Protective gloves, of a type designated in section 6 will be worn when containerized samples are handled for 
labeling, packaging, transportation, and other purposes.  Samples will not be handled prior to decontamination. 
Decontamination of sample containers will follow the procedures outlined for equipment decontamination. 
Samples will be stored in a secure area at all times in order to follow custody requirements. 
Vermiculite  Respiratory protection (i.e., high-efficiency particulate air filtration) is recommended when vermiculite is used 
Handling: 
to package samples into shipping containers (some vermiculite contains low concentrations of asbestos). 
Equipment and  A checklist of equipment and supplies that may be needed for this work has been established.  Additionally 
Supplies:  required  equipment may be added to the list.  Use of this list assists in the procurement, packaging and field 
availability of needed equipment. 
Nearest Medical	 : 
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Secondary hazards (devices) should be identified and removed from the site by properly trained Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or similarly trained personnel, prior to team entry. Items (boxes, packages, etc.) which 
have not been monitored by EOD personnel will not be approached or handled in any manner. 
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8.  GENERAL DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES 
All equipment, materials, and personnel will be evaluated for contamination upon leaving the exclusion zone.  Equipment and 
materials will be decontaminated and/or disposed and personnel will be decontaminated as necessary.  Decontamination will 
be performed in the contamination reduction corridor or any designated area such that the exposure of uncontaminated 
employees, equipment, and materials will be minimized.  General decontamination procedures and decontamination solutions 
are described below. 
Personnel  Personnel decontamination will follow pre-established and rehearsed procedures as outlined in Attachment 3 
Decontamination  –Decontamination Procedures. All personnel who have entered the contaminated area will require 
Procedures:  decontamination. Depending on the level of protection (LOP) used (A; B; C), personnel will be required to 
go through multiple steps within the decontamination stations. Specific descriptions of the decontamination 
station steps and appropriate decontamination solutions are located in Attachment 3. 
Depending on the situation and available information, dry decontamination methods will be used whenever 
feasible to avoid potential cross-contamination of personnel and equipment and to preclude the creation of 
large amounts of decontamination and rinsing liquids. 
PPE Requirements for  Personnel performing decontamination procedures will be outfitted in personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Personnel Performing  at the same or no more than one level lower than team members. EXAMPLE: Team members are in Level A 
Decontamination:  –Decontamination Personnel will be in Level B. 
Personnel operating stations where fluids (neutralization and rinsing) are used will require splash protection. 
General Personnel  Following appropriate decontamination procedures, all team members will wash their hands and face with 
Decontamination:  soap and water.  Team members should shower at the end of each work shift, regardless of their activities 
on-site.
 Disposable PPE:	 Disposable PPE will be rendered unusable when removed. Disposable PPE will be treated with an

appropriate decontamination solution, double bagged, labeled, and stored in a secure area. PPE will be

disposed of as hazardous waste, in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

Equipment &  When feasible, all equipment taken into the contaminated area will be protected with plastic. Care should be 
Material  taken to avoid obstructing intake and exhaust vents/ports on equipment.  Equipment should not be placed on 
Decontamination  unprotected surfaces while in the exclusion zone.  Equipment will be placed at the pre-established 
Procedures:  equipment drop station prior to entry in the contamination reduction corridor.  NO EQUIPMENT WILL 
BE BROUGHT DIRECTLY INTO THE CONTAMINATION REDUCTION CORRIDOR FROM

THE EXCLUSION ZONE. 

The plastic protection wrap on the equipment will be misted as needed with a decontamination solution,

wiped clean, double bagged, labeled and disposed of with other hazardous wastes.  After the outer wrapping

has been removed, the equipment will be wiped again and placed in a clean area for re-use or calibration.

Disposal of  Dry wastes will be treated if needed with a decontamination solution, double bagged, labeled and stored in a 
Decontamination  secure area until disposal.  Decontamination and rinsing solutions will be drummed, labeled and stored in a 
Wastes (e.g., dry  secure area.  Disposal of both dry and liquid wastes will be arranged according to applicable regulatory 
wastes,  requirements. Stored wastes will be kept in a secure area at all times. 
decontamination 
fluids, etc.): 
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Ventilation:	 All decontamination procedures will be conducted in a well-ventilated area, preferably outdoors and 
downwind of the support zone.  If decontamination must be performed indoors, adequate mechanical 
ventilation will be provided for the decontamination work. 
Additional information can be found in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Site Entry and Egress Draft Standard 
Operating Procedure. 
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Decontamination Equipment Checklist 
Equipment  No  Equipment  No 
Wash tubs  1  Bucket  1 
Scub Brushes  2  Pressurized Sprayer  1 
Detergent ( Type:_____________ )  Solvent ( Type: __RADCON___________ )  2 
Household Bleach Solution  Distilled Water 
Deinonized Water  Disposable Facepiece Sanitizer Wipes 
Face Mask Sanitizer Powder  Wire Brush  2 
Spray Bottle  Banner/Barrier Tape 
Plastic Sheeting  Tarps and Poles 
Trash Bags  Trash Cans  1 
Masking Tape  Duct Tape  X 
Paper Towels  Folding Chairs 
Step Ladders  5-Gallon Water Jugs 
Tables  Steam Cleaner with Generator 
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9.  SPILL CONTAINMENT PROGRAM 
N/A 
10.  CONFINED SPACE ENTRY PROCEDURES 
N/A 
11.  EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
This section contains additional information pertaining to on-site emergency response and does not duplicate pertinent 
emergency response information contained in earlier sections of this plan (e.g., site layout, monitoring equipment, etc.). 
Emergency response procedures will be rehearsed regularly, as applicable, during all response site activities. 
11.1  EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES 
All Personnel:	 All team members shall be alert to the possibility of an on-site emergency; report potential or actual emergency

situations to the team leader and SSO; and notify appropriate emergency resources, as necessary.

Personnel will be made aware of their roles and responsibilities for emergency situations.   Emergency response 
procedures, evacuation routes, and assigned responsibilities will be reviewed prior to beginning response operations. 
Team  The team leaders will determine the emergency actions to be performed by team members and will direct these

Leaders:  actions.  The team leader also will ensure that applicable incidents are reported to the SSO. During emergency

situations, team leaders will follow pre-established procedures and take direction from the SSO. 

SHS:	  The SHS will recommend health/safety and protective measures appropriate to the emergency. 
Other: 
11.2  LOCAL AND SITE RESOURCES 
Local Ambulance &  Primary  Alternate 
Phone:  Name:  Superior  Name: Critical Mass 
Phone: 312-555-1212  Phone: 312-555-1212 
Hospital Name &  Primary  Alternate 
Phone:  Name: Northwestern Memorial  Name: Rush Presbeterian 
Phone: 312-555-1212  Phone: 312-555-1212 
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Directions to Primary Hospital 
Take Jackson to Michigan Avenue, go 2 Miles North and make a right on Superior street. Emergency 
Room enterance on left. 
Police Dept.  Primary  Alternate 
Name: Mike Gierczek 
Phone:  312-555-1212 
Radio Frequency:  Cha. 6 Freq. 173.2 
Call Sign:  P2 
Name: 
Phone: 
Radio Frequency: 
Call Sign: 
Fire Dept.  Primary  Alternate 
Name: Terry Sheehan 
Phone: 312-555 1212 
Radio Frequency: Chan 6 Freq 173.2 
Call Sign: DOE 1 
Name: 
Phone: 
Radio Frequency: 
Call Sign: 
Poison Control Hotline:  Name: John Emerald 
Phone:  312-555-1212 
DOE REAC/TS:  REAC/TS is an emergency response team of Health & Safety Professionals and 
(Radiation Emergency  Radiation Medical Support that provides 24-hour medical consultation on health 
Assistance Center /  problems associated with radiation acidents. 
Training Site) 
Emergency Phone Number: +1 865 576 1005  (ask for REAC/TS) 
Potentionally Responsible  Name: N/A 
Party Contact:  Phone: 
Site Contacts:  Name: N/A 
Phone: 
Name: 
Phone: 
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Name:

Phone:

On-Site Phone:  Name: 
Phone: Unavailable 
Fax: 
Name: 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Name: 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Other:  Other:  Other: 
Other Resource 
Information: 
Incident 
Reporting 
Procedures: 
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11.3  OTHER EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES 
On-Site 
Evacuation 
Signal/Alarm 
* Audible alarms must 
be perceptible above 
ambient noise.  If 
visible (light) alarms 
are used, they must be 
distinguishable from 
ambient light levels 
and sources. 
Primary  Alternate 
3 Blows on air horn  Repeated 3 blows on car horn 
On-Site 
Assembly Area  Primary  Alternate 
Clark and Harrison Command Post  Federal Building 536 S. Jackson 
Emergency 
Egress Route  Primary  Alternate 
Adams and LaSalle Street  Clark and Jackson 
Off-Site 
Assembly Area  Primary  Alternate 
Chicago Fire Academy  None 
Emergency 
Reporting: 
Site Security and 
Control: 
In an emergency situation, team members will leave the area as per the pre-established routes and not 
re-enter the area until the emergency situation has been terminated. During an emergency situation, routine 
operations will stop until the emergency is over.  Personnel will attempt to control site access. 
Emergency 
Decontamination 
Procedures: 
Personnel will be decontaminated sufficiently so they are no longer a threat to those performing 
decontamination. Gross visible contamination will be removed. Outer PPE will be removed, the contaminant 
neutralized, and the PPE will be held for possible testing. Emergency first aid ( to save life or limb ) will be 
conducted to the extent available on site. The victim will be wrapped in such a manner as to avoid 
contamination of the transportation vehicle and taken to the nearest medical treatment facility.  The facility 
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will be contacted and informed of the victim=s scheduled arrival and possible exposure. 
PPE:	 Team members will don appropriate PPE when responding to an emergency situation.  The SHSO and 
Section 6 of this plan will provide guidance regarding appropriate PPE. Unless it is obvious that a victim 
suffered a physical injury, personnel will don a level of PPE one higher than the victim. Emergency response 
personnel will undergo decontamination prior to leaving the site. This can be accomplished at the same time 
the victim is undergoing emergency decontamination . 
Emergency	 Adequate supplies of  equipment shall be maintained in the support zone or other approved work locations. 
Equipment:	 Emergency equipment should not be taken into the exclusion zone unless protected from contamination. 
Unprotected emergency equipment may require disposal unless decontamination can be accomplished or the 
equipment is disposable. 
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12. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION 
Radioactive Material Safety Data Sheet 
This data sheet presents information on radioisotopes only.

For information on chemical compounds incorporating this radionuclide, see the relevant Material Safety Data Sheet.

Cesium-137 
Part 1 –Radioactive Material Identification 
Common Names:  Cesium-137  Chemical Symbol:  Cs-137 or 137Cs 
Atomic Number:  55  Mass Number:  137 (82 neutrons) 
Chemical Form:  Cesium 
chloride 
Physical Form:  A pellet of cesium ceramic housed 
in a welded stainless steel capsule 
Part 2 –Radiation Characteristics 
Physical half-life:  30.22 years  Specific Activity (GBq/g):  3,220 
Principle 
Emissions 
EMax 
(keV) 
Eeff 
(keV) 
Dose Rate 
(mSv/h/GBq at 1m) 
Shielding Required 
Beta* (B)  511 
(94.6%) 
157  - -
Gamma (y) / 
X-Rays 
662 
(89.9%) 
- 103a  HVL Lead: 0.65 cm 
Alpha (a)  - - - -
Neutron (n)  - - - -
* Where Beta radiation is present, Bremsstrahlung radiation will be produced. Shielding may be required.

Note: Only emissions with abundance greater than 10% are shown.

a The Health Physics and Radiological Health Handbook, Scintra, Inc., Revised Edition, 1992

Progeny: Barium-137m (Ba-137m) 
Part 3 –Detection and Measurement 
Methods of detection (in order of preference) 
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1.  A radiation survey meter equipped with an energy-compensated Geiger Mueller detector. 
2.  Ion chamber survey meter –tends to be less sensitive than a Geiger Mueller survey meter but is 
able to respond more precisely in higher radiation fields. 
3.  Gamma scintillation detector –very sensitive but is also energy dependent. Must be calibrated for 
Cs-137 before it can be used for dose assessment surveys. 
Dosimetry 
Whole Body þ  Skin ¨	 Extremity ¨  Neutron ¨ 
Internal:  Sealed sources pose no internal radiation hazard. However, in the event of loss 
of containment by the sealed source, all precautions should be taken to 
prevent 
inhalation or ingestion of the material. 
Critical Organ(s):  None known at this time. 
Annual dose limits:  Non-nuclear energy workers:  1mSv per year 
Nuclear energy workers:  a) 50 mSv in one year 
b) 100 mSv total over five years 
Pregnant nuclear energy workers:  4 mSv over the balance of the pregnancy 
Part 4 –Preventive Measures 
Always use the principles of time, distance and shielding to minimize dose 
Engineering Controls:	 Sealed radioactive sources used in industrial applications should always 
be within a protective source housing to minimize radiation dose and to 
protect the source capsule from damage. 
Personal Protective  No special PPE required.

Equipment (for normal handling

of unsealed sources only. Always

wear disposable gloves, safety 
glasses, personal protective 
equipment and clothing as 
appropriate to the material 
handled). 
Page 39 Created by the ERT CBN-HASP Wizard BETA.

This HASP exists SOLELY for BETA testing and Peer-Review purposes.

In the event of an emergency, contact the ERT Emergency Hotline @ (732) 321-6660

Special Storage  None 
Requirements: 
Part 5 –Control Levels 
Oral Ingestion  Inhalation 
ALI (kBq)  ALI (kBq)  DAC (Bq/ml) 
3700  7400  2.2 x 10-3 
Exemption Quantity (EQ):  10,000 Bq 
Part 6 –Non-Radiological Hazards 
No potential health effects are known regarding non-radiological hazards associated with cesium. 
However, large oral doses of the material may cause gastrointestinal disturbances. Chronic effects are 
not known at this time. 
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL): 
15 mg/m3 total dust, 5 mg/m3 respirable fraction for nuisance dusts 
Part 7 - Emergency Procedures 
The following is a guide for first responders. The following actions, including remediation, should be carried out by qualified 
individuals. In cases where life-threatening injury has resulted, first treat the injury, second deal with personal 
decontamination. 
Personal Decontamination Techniques 
· Wash well with soap and water and monitor skin 
· Do not abrade skin, only blot dry 
· Decontamination of clothing and surfaces are covered under operating and emergency procedures 
Spill and Leak Control 
· Alert everyone in the area 
· Confine the problem or emergency (includes the use of absorbent material) 
· Clear area 
· Summon Aid 
Damage to Sealed Radioactive Source Holder 
· Evacuate the immediate vicinity around the source holder 
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· Place a barrier at a safe distance from the source holder (min. 5 meters)

· Identify area as a radiation hazard

· Contact emergency number posted on local warning sign

Suggested Emergency Protective Equipment 
· Gloves 
· Footwear Covers 
· Safety Glasses 
· Outer layer or easily removed protective clothing (as situation requires) 
Revision Date:  December 17, 2001 
This information was prepared by:  DOE ANL 
Human Health Fact Sheet  ANL, October 2001 
Cesium 
What Is It? Cesium is a soft, silvery white-gray metal that occurs in nature as cesium-133. The 
natural source yielding the greatest quantity of cesium is the rare mineral pollucite. American ores of 
pollucite, found in Maine and South Dakota, contain about 13% cesium oxide. Although it is a metal, 
cesium melts at the relatively low temperature of 28o C (82o F), so like mercury it is liquid at moderate 
temperatures. This most alkaline of metals reacts explosively when it comes in contact with cold 
water.  There are 11 major radioactive isotopes of cesium. (Isotopes are different forms of an element 
that have the same number of protons in the nucleus but a different number of neutrons.) Only three 
have half-lives long enough to warrant concern: cesium-134, cesium-135 and cesium-137. Each of 
these decays by emitting a beta particle, and their half-lives range from about 2 to 2 million years. The 
half-lives of the other cesium isotopes are less than two weeks. Of these three, the isotope of most 
concern for Department of Energy (DOE) environmental management sites such as Hanford is 
cesium-137 which has a half lifeof 30 years. Its decay product, barium-137m (the“ m”  means 
metastable) stabilizes itself by emitting an energetic gamma ray with a half-life of about 2.6 minutes. It 
is this decay product that makes cesium an external hazard (that is, a hazard without being taken into 
the body). Cesium-135 and cesium-134 are typically of less concern because of their radiological 
decay characteristics. The very long half-life of cesium-135 means it has a very low specific activity, 
and the slow decay rate combined with its low decay energy contribute to its low hazard. Cesium-134 
has a half-life of 2.1 years and decays by emitting a beta particle. The relatively small amount of 
cesium-134 produced more than 20 years ago would essentially all be gone today due to radioactive 
decay. 
Where Does It Come From? Cesium is naturally present as the isotope 133 in various ores and to a 
lesser extent in soil. The three radioactive cesium isotopes identified above are produced by nuclear 
fission. When an atom of uranium-235 (or other fissile nuclide) fissions, it generally splits 
asymmetrically into two large fragments –  fission products with mass numbers in the range of about 
90 and 140 –  and two or three neutrons. (The mass number is the sum of the number of protons and 
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neutrons in the nucleus of the atom.) Cesium radionuclides are such fission products, with cesium-135 
and cesium-137 being produced with relatively high yields of about 7% and 6%, respectively. That is, 
about 7 atoms of cesium-135 and 6 atoms of cesium-137 are produced per 100 fissions. Cesium-137 is 
a major radionuclide in spent nuclear fuel, highlevel radioactive wastes resulting from the processing 
of spent nuclear fuel, and radioactive wastes associated with the operation of nuclear reactors and fuel 
reprocessing plants. 
How Is It Used? Cesium metal is used in photoelectric cells and various optical instruments, and 
cesium compounds are used in the production of glass and ceramics. Cesium-137 is also used in 
brachytherapy to treat various types of cancer. (Brachytherapy is a method of radiation treatment in 
which sealed sources are used to deliver a radiation dose at a distance of up to a few centimeters by 
surface, intracavitary, or interstitial application.) 
What’ s in the Environment? Cesium-133 exists naturally as a stable isotope. The concentration of 
cesium in the earth’ s crust is 1.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg), and the concentration in sea water 
is about 0.5 micrograms/kg. Cesium has been shown to biomagnify in aquatic food chains. Radioactive 
cesium is present in soil around the world largely as a result of fallout from past atmospheric nuclear 
weapons tests. The concentration of cesium-137 in surface soil from fallout ranges from about 0.1 to 1 
picocurie (pCi)/g, averaging less than 0.4 pCi/g (or 0.3 billionth of a milligram per kilogram soil). 
Cesium is present as a contaminant at certain facilities, such as nuclear reactors and facilities that 
process spent nuclear fuel. 
Cesium is generally one of the less mobile radioactive metals in the environment. It preferentially 
adheres quite well to soil, and the concentration associated with sandy soil particles is estimated to be 
280 times higher than in interstitial water (water in the pore space between soil particles); 
concentration ratios are much higher (about 2,000 to more than 4,000) in clay and loam soils. Thus, 
cesium is generally not a major contaminant in groundwater at DOE sites. At Hanford, the highest 
concentrations of cesium-137 are in areas that contain waste from processing irradiated fuel, such as in 
the tanks in the central portion of the site and to a lesser degree in the former liquid disposal areas 
along the Columbia River. 
What Happens to It in the Body? Cesium can be taken into the body by eating food, drinking 
water, or breathing air. After being taken in, cesium behaves in a manner similar to potassium and 
distributes uniformly throughout the body. Gastrointestinal absorption from food or water is the 
principal source of internally deposited cesium in the general population. Essentially all cesium that is 
ingested is absorbed into the bloodstream through the intestines. Cesium tends to concentrate in 
muscles because of their relatively large mass. Like potassium, cesium is excreted from the body fairly 
quickly. Ten percent is excreted with a biological half-life of 2 days, and the rest leaves the body with 
a biological half-life of about 110 days. This means that if someone is exposed to radioactive cesium 
and the source of exposure is removed, much of the cesium will readily clear the body along the 
normal pathways for potassium excretion within several months. 
What Are the Primary Health Effects? Cesium-137 presents an external as well as internal health 
hazard. The strong external gamma radiation associated with its short-lived decay product 
barium-137m makes external exposure a concern, and shielding is often needed to handle materials 
containing large concentrations of cesium. While in the body, cesium poses a health hazard from both 
beta and gamma radiation, and the main health concern is associated with the increased likelihood for 
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inducing cancer. 
What Is the Risk? Lifetime cancer mortality risk coefficients have been calculated for nearly all 
radionuclides, including cesium (see box at right).While the coefficients for ingestion are somewhat 
lower than for inhalation, ingestion is generally the most common means of entry into the body. 
Similar to other radionuclides, the risk coefficients for tap water are about 80% of those for dietary 
ingestion. 
In addition to risks from internal exposures, there is a risk from external gamma exposure. Using the 
external gamma risk coefficient to estimate a lifetime cancer mortality risk, if it is assumed that 
100,000 people were continuously exposed to a thick layer of 
soil with an initial average concentration of 1 pCi/g cesium-137, then 6 of these 100,000 people would 
be predicted to incur a fatal cancer. (This is in comparison to the 25,000 people from the group 
predicted to die of cancer from all other causes per the U.S. average.) This risk is largely associated 
with the gamma ray from barium-137m. 
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Radioactive Material Safety Data Sheet 
This data sheet presents information on radioisotopes only.

For information on chemical compounds incorporating this radionuclide, see the relevant Material Safety Data Sheet.

Cobalt-60 
Part 1 –Radioactive Material Identification 
Common Names:  Cobalt-60  Chemical Symbol:  Co-60 or 60Co 
Atomic Number:  27  Mass Number:  60 (33 neutrons) 
Chemical Form:  Cobalt metal  Physical Form:  Thin cylinder of cobalt metal 
Part 2 –Radiation Characteristics 
Physical half-life:  5.27 years  Specific Activity (GBq/g):  41,800 
Principle 
Emissions 
EMax 
(keV) 
Eeff 
(keV) 
Dose Rate 
(mSv/h/GBq at 1m) 
Shielding Required 
Beta* (B)  318 (100%)  96  - -
Gamma (y) / 
X-Rays 
1173 (100%) 
1332 (100%) 
- 370a  HVL Lead: 1.2 cm 
Alpha (a)  - - - -
Neutron (n)  - - - -
* Where Beta radiation is present, Bremsstrahlung radiation will be produced. Shielding may be required.

Note: Only emissions with abundance greater than 10% are shown.

a The Health Physics and Radiological Health Handbook, Scintra, Inc., Revised Edition, 1992

Progeny: Nickel-60 (Ni-60) 
Part 3 –Detection and Measurement 
Methods of detection (in order of preference) 
1.  A radiation survey meter equipped with an energy-compensated Geiger Mueller detector. 
2.  Ion chamber survey meter –tends to be less sensitive than a Geiger Mueller survey meter but is 
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able to respond more precisely in higher radiation fields. 
3.	 Gamma scintillation detector –very sensitive but is also energy dependent. Must be calibrated for 
Co-60 before it can be used for dose assessment surveys. 
Dosimetry 
Whole Body þ  Skin ¨	 Extremity ¨  Neutron ¨ 
Internal:  Sealed sources pose no internal radiation hazard. However, in the event of loss 
of containment by the sealed source, all precautions should be taken to prevent 
inhalation or ingestion of the material. 
Critical Organ(s):  None known at this time. 
Annual dose 
limits: 
Non-nuclear energy workers:  1mSv per year 
Nuclear energy workers:  a) 50 mSv in one year 
b) 100 mSv total over five years 
Pregnant nuclear energy workers:  4 mSv over the balance of the pregnancy 
Part 4 –Preventive Measures 
Always use the principles of time, distance and shielding to minimize dose 
Engineering Controls:  Sealed radioactive sources used in industrial applications should always be 
within a protective source housing to minimize radiation dose and to protect 
the source capsule from damage. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
(for normal handling of unsealed sources 
only. Always wear disposable gloves, safety 
glasses, personal protective equipment and 
clothing as appropriate to the material 
handled). 
No special PPE required. 
Special Storage Requirements:  None 
Part 5 –Control Levels 
Oral Ingestion Inhalation  Inhalation 
ALI (kBq)  ALI (kBq)  DAC (Bq/ml) 
18,500  7,400  2.6 x 10-3 
Exemption Quantity (EQ):  100,000 Bq 
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Part 6 –Non-Radiological Hazards 
Prolonged exposure to airborne particles mat result in coughing, dyspnea, decreased pulmonary 
functioning and respiratory hypersensitivity. Confirmed animal carcinogen with unknown relevance to 
humans. 
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL): 
0.1 mg/m3 
Part 7 - Emergency Procedures 
The following is a guide for first responders. The following actions, including remediation, should be carried out by qualified 
individuals. In cases where life-threatening injury has resulted, first treat the injury, second deal with personal decontamination. 
Personal Decontamination Techniques 
· Wash well with soap and water and monitor skin 
· Do not abrade skin, only blot dry 
· Decontamination of clothing and surfaces are covered under operating and emergency procedures 
Spill and Leak Control 
· Alert everyone in the area 
· Confine the problem or emergency (includes the use of absorbent material) 
· Clear area 
· Summon Aid 
Damage to Sealed Radioactive Source Holder 
· Evacuate the immediate vicinity around the source holder 
· Place a barrier at a safe distance from the source holder (min. 5 meters) 
· Identify area as a radiation hazard 
· Contact emergency number posted on local warning sign 
Suggested Emergency Protective Equipment 
· Gloves 
· Footwear Covers 
· Safety Glasses 
· Outer layer or easily removed protective clothing (as situation requires) 
Revision Date:  December 17, 2001 
This information was prepared by:  DOE ANL 
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Human Health Fact Sheet  ANL, October 2001 
Cobalt 
What Is It? Cobalt is a hard, silvery-white metal that occurs in nature as cobalt-59. Cobalt is a 
constituent of the minerals cobaltite, smaltite, erythrite, and other ores, and it is usually found in 
association with nickel, silver, lead, copper, and iron. Pure cobalt metal is prepared by reducing its 
compounds with aluminum, carbon, or hydrogen. It is similar to iron and nickel in its 
physical properties. Cobalt has relatively low strength and little ductility at normal temperatures and is 
a component of several alloys. 
There are nine major radioactive cobalt isotopes. (Isotopes are different forms of an element that have 
the same number of protons in the nucleus but a different number of neutrons.) Of these, only 
cobalt-57 and cobalt-60 have half-lives long enough to warrant concern. The half-lives of all other 
isotopes are less than 80 days. Cobalt-57 decays with a half-life of 270 days by electron capture and 
cobalt-60 decays with a half-life of 5.3 years by emitting a beta particle with two energetic gamma 
rays; the combined energy of these two gamma rays is 2.5 MeV (one has an energy of 1.2 MeV and 
the other has an energy of 1.3 MeV). Cobalt-60 is the isotope of most concern at Department of 
Energy (DOE) environmental management sites such as Hanford, for the cobalt-57 produced more 
than 20 years ago has long since decayed away. The two energetic gamma rays that accompany the 
radioactive decay of cobalt-60 make this isotope an external hazard (that is, it can be hazardous 
without being taken into the body). 
Where Does It Come From? Cobalt is naturally present as the isotope 59 in various ores and to a 
lesser extent in soil. Cobalt-60 is produced by neutron activation of components in nuclear reactors; it 
can also be produced in a particle accelerator. When an atom of uranium-235 (or other fissile nuclide) 
fissions, it generally splits asymmetrically into two large fragments –  fission products with mass 
numbers in the range of about 90 and 140 –  and two or three neutrons. (The mass number is the sum of 
the number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus of the atom.) These neutrons can cause additional 
fissions (producing a chain reaction), escape from the reactor, or irradiate nearby materials. A number 
of reactor components are made of various alloys of steel that contain chromium, manganese, nickel, 
iron and cobalt, and these elements can absorb neutrons to produce radioactive isotopes, including 
cobalt-60. Cobalt-60 is a radionuclide of concern in spent nuclear fuel (as a component of the fuel 
hardware) and in the radioactive wastes associated with nuclear reactors and fuel reprocessing plants. 
How Is It Used? Cobalt is used as a component of several alloys, including carboloy and stellite that 
are used to make very hard cutting tools. Cobalt is also used in some stainless steels. Alnico, an alloy 
of aluminum, nickel, cobalt, and other metals, is used to make high-strength, permanent magnets. 
Cobalt is also used in electroplating to give a hard surface that is resistant to oxidation, and as a blue 
colorant in pottery enamels and glass. High-energy gamma rays emitted during the radioactive decay 
of cobalt-60 can be used to detect flaws in metal components and in brachytherapy to treat various 
types of cancer. (Brachytherapy is a method of radiation treatment in which sealed sources are used to 
deliver a radiation dose at a distance of up to a few centimeters by surface, intracavitary, or interstitial 
application.) 
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What’ s in the Environment? Cobalt-59 is present in soil as a stable isotope at a concentration of 
about 1 to 2 milligram per kilogram (mg/kg). Trace amounts of cobalt-60 are also present around the 
globe from radioactive fallout as a result of past atmospheric weapons tests. It may also be present as a 
contaminant at certain facilities, such as nuclear reactors and facilities that process spent nuclear fuel. 
The highest concentrations of cobalt-60 at the Hanford Site are in areas that contain waste from 
processing irradiated fuel, principally in the hardware associated with the spent fuel. Transport of 
cobalt in the environment is strongly influenced by its chemical form. It is generally one of the less 
mobile radioactive metals in soil, although certain forms can move downward with percolating water 
into underlying layers of soil. Liquid wastes containing cobalt-60 were disposed of in cribs in the 200 
East Area of Hanford, and this radionuclide has been detected in groundwater in concentrations above 
100 picocuries (pCi) per liter. Cobalt-60 in the 200 Area appears to be highly mobile, probably 
because of the presence of a soluble cobalt-cyanide (or ferrocyanide) complex. In other settings, cobalt 
has been found to adhere preferentially to soil. For sandy soil, the concentration in soil particles is 
estimated to be about 60 times higher than in water between the soil particles, and cobalt binds even 
more tightly to loam where the estimated concentration ratio is 1,300. 
What Happens to It in the Body? Cobalt can be taken into the body by eating food, drinking water, 
or 
breathing air. Gastrointestinal absorption from food or water is the principal source of internally 
deposited cobalt in the general population. Estimates of the gastrointestinal absorption of cobalt range 
from 5 to 30%, depending on the chemical form and amount ingested. Cobalt is an essential element 
found in most body tissues, with the highest concentration in the liver. Vitamin B12 is a 
cobaltcontaining 
vitamin essential for red blood cell formation in humans, and the intestinal absorption of cobalt 
in this vitamin is high. Fifty percent of cobalt that reaches the blood is excreted right away, mainly in 
urine; 5% deposits in the liver, and the remaining 45% deposits evenly in other tissues of the body. Of 
the cobalt that deposits in the liver and other tissues, 60% leaves the body with a biological half-life of 
6 days and 20% clears with a biological half-life of 60 days; the last 20% is retained much longer, with 
a 
biological half-life of 800 days (per simplified models that do not reflect intermediate redistribution). 
Inhaled cobalt oxide moves from the lung to body tissues quite readily. 
What Are the Primary Health Effects? Cobalt-60 poses both an internal and external hazard, and 
the 
main health concern is associated with the increased likelihood of cancer. External exposure is a 
concern 
because of the strong external gamma radiation, and shielding is often needed to handle wastes and 
other materials with high concentrations of this isotope. Inside the body, cobalt presents a hazard from 
both beta and gamma radiation. 
What Is the Risk? Lifetime cancer mortality risk coefficients have been calculated for nearly 
all radionuclides, including cobalt (see box at right). While the coefficients for ingestion are 
somewhat lower than for inhalation, ingestion is generally the most common means of entry into 
the body. Similar to other radionuclides, the risk coefficients for tap water are about 70% of those 
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for dietary ingestion. In addition to the risk from internal exposure, there is a risk from external 
gamma exposure. Using the external gamma risk coefficient to estimate a lifetime cancer mortality 
risk, if it is assumed that 100,000 people were continuously exposed to a thick layer of soil with 
an initial average concentration of 1 pCi/g cobalt-60, then 6 of these 100,000 people would be 
predicted to incur a fatal cancer. (This is compared to the 25,000 people from the group predicted to 
die of cancer from all other causes per the U.S. average.) The external risk for cobalt-57 is less than 
1% of this risk. 
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Radiation Quick Facts 
Protective Action Guides (PAGs) 
Three sets of PAGs for the three phases of a nuclear incident: 
Early (Emergency) Phase - from recognition of the incident through a few days. This is the 
period when immediate decisions to take protective actions such as evacuation or shelter-in-
place for members of the public living in or nearby the affected area must be made without 
significant radiation measurement data. 
Intermediate Phase - lasting days to months. This is the period beginning after the source 
and releases have been brought under control and reliable environmental measurements are 
available for use as a basis for decisions on protective actions. 
Late or Recovery Phase - lasting months to years. This is the period beginning when 
recovery actions designed to reduce radiation levels in the affected area to acceptable levels 
for unrestricted use are begun, and ends when all recovery actions have been completed. 
What are PAGs? 
The Protective Action Guides or PAGs are decision levels at which EPA recommends state and 
local authorities take protective actions to manage and minimize the impact of a radiological 
emergency or incident on public health. 
How were the PAGs developed? 
EPA applied four principles in developing the PAGs: 
	 Avoid acute health effects, 
	 Keep the risk of delayed health effects within upper bounds that are adequately 
protective of public health, within emergency conditions, and reasonably achievable. 
	 Reduce any risk to public health that is achievable at acceptable cost. 
	 Avoid actions that would result in a higher health risk than if no action had been taken, 
regardless of the above principles. 
When would PAGs be used? 
While the PAGs were originally developed specifically for nuclear power plant incidents, they 
can be applied to any radiological incident. However, the PAGs are only guidance, and state and 
local officials may decide to use different levels based on incident-specific information.  
What are some of the types of protective actions? 
Sheltering-in-place and evacuation are usually the first two protective actions taken after a 
radiological incident to help the public avoid exposure to radioactive material in the air and to 
move them out of the affected area. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
How would the PAGs be used? 
PAGs would be used with any available reliable information on current radiological conditions 
and with other pertinent local information to help authorities make the best decision to protect 
the life, health, property, and economy of their citizens. 
The early (emergency) phase is the period at the beginning of the incident when immediate 
decisions for effective use of protective actions are required and actual field measurement data is 
generally not available. The response during the early phase includes the initial emergency 
response actions to protect public health and welfare in the short term. Priority should always be 
given to life-saving and first aid actions. In general, early phase protective actions should be 
made very quickly, and the protective action decisions can be modified later as more information 
becomes available. 
The intermediate phase of the response may follow the early phase response within as little as a 
few hours. The intermediate phase of the response is usually assumed to begin after the source 
and releases have been brought under control and protective action decisions can be made based 
on measurements of exposure and radioactive materials that have been deposited as a result of 
the incident. During the intermediate phase, decisions must be made on the initial actions needed 
to recover from the incident, reopen critical infrastructures and return to some state of normal 
activities. All of these decisions must take into account the health, welfare, economic and other 
factors that must be balanced by the local officials. For example, it can be expected that hospitals 
and their access roads will need to remain open or be reopened quickly. 
The late phase is the period when recovery and cleanup actions designed to reduce radiation 
levels in the environment to acceptable levels are commenced and end when all the recovery 
actions have been completed. Long-term decisions should be made with stakeholder 
involvement, and can also include incident specific technical working groups to provide expert 
advice to the decision-makers on impacts, costs and alternatives. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues 
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: www.epa.gov/radiation/rert 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Americium 

Radiation Basics – Americium 
;  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Americium primarily emits alpha particles. 
 Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Americium does not emit beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Americium emits some gamma rays as it decays. 
What is americium? 
Americium (chemical symbol Am) is a man-made radioactive metal that is solid under normal 
conditions. All isotopes of americium are radioactive. The most important isotope of americium 
is Am-241. 
What happens to americium-241 when it enters the environment? 
	 When released into air, americium deposits particles in the soil and water. Small 
particles in air can travel far from the release site. 
	 In water, americium will stick to particles in the water or to the sediment at the 
bottom. 
	 Deposited on soil, americium will stick to surface particles, but not travel very deep 
into the ground. 
	 Plants and vegetation growing in or nearby contaminated soil may take up small 
amounts of americium from the soil. 
	 Fish may take up small amounts of Americium, but the fleshy tissue will absorb very 
little. In shellfish, americium attaches to the shell and not the parts you normally eat. 
How can people come in contact with americium-241 ? 
Exposure to any significant amount of Am-241 is unlikely under normal circumstances.  
Because americium-241 was widely dispersed globally during the testing of nuclear weapons, 
very minute amounts of it are found in the soil, plants, and water. Also, living near a weapons 
testing or production facility may increase your chances of exposure to Am-241. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Smoke detectors containing Am-241 also provide some radiation exposure. However, the 
radiation exposure people receive from a smoke detector is very low. The health risk reduction 
from the fire protection vastly outweighs the health risk from the radiation. To avoid radiation 
exposure, you should handle your smoke detector carefully and follow the manufacture’s 
disposal instructions. 
How can americium affect my health? 
Americium-241 is primarily an alpha emitter, but also emits some gamma rays. It poses a 

significant risk if ingested (swallowed) or inhaled. Once in the body, it tends to concentrate in 

the bone, liver, and muscle. Americium can stay in the body for decades and continue to expose 

the surrounding tissues to radiation, increasing the risk of developing cancer. 

When inhaled, some Americium stays in the lungs; eventually dissolving in the bloodstream. 

Undissolved material passes from the body through the feces. 

Americium also poses a cancer risk to all organs of the body from direct external exposure 

to its gamma radiation. One source of direct exposure would be contaminated soil. 

Exposure to any significant amount of Am-241 is unlikely under normal circumstances. 

How can I reduce my health risk? 
Most Americans never get close to a significant amount of americium-241.  
Ionizing chamber smoke detectors contain a small amount of Am-241. Smoke detectors pose 
very little risk if used and disposed of according to manufacturers' instructions. However, you 
can follow some precautions to protect yourself and your family: 
	 Never try to access or remove the Am-241 source in your smoke detector. 
	 Be aware that industrial instruments, using americium-241 can be lost, stolen, or 
otherwise fall out of monitored control. These "orphan sources” present a significant 
risk to those who come in contact with them. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
	 Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
	 Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
	 Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
	 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
	 Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Cesium 

Radiation Basics – Cesium 
  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Cesium does not emit alpha particles. 
;  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Cesium primarily emits beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Cesium emits gamma rays as it decays. 
What is Cesium? 
Cesium (chemical symbol Cs) is a soft, malleable, silvery white metal that becomes liquid near 
room temperature. Cesium is a naturally-occurring element found combined with other elements 
in rocks, soil, and dust in low amounts. Naturally occurring cesium is not radioactive and 
is referred to as stable cesium. The most common radioactive form of cesium, cesium-137, is 
produced when uranium and plutonium absorb neutrons and undergo fission or when splitting of 
uranium and plutonium occurs in a reactor or atomic bomb. 
What happens to cesium-137 when it enters the environment? 
	 In air, cesium moves easily through the environment. This makes the cleanup of Cs­
137 difficult. 
	 Cesium dissolves easily in water. 
	 Deposited on soil, cesium binds strongly and does not travel very far below the 
surface. 
	 Plants and vegetation growing in or nearby contaminated soil may take up small 
amounts of Cs-137from the soil. 
How can people come in contact with cesium-137? 
Cesium-137 in the environment comes from a variety of sources. The largest single source was 
fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests in the 1950s and 1960s, which dispersed and 
deposited cesium-137 world-wide. However much of the cesium-137 from testing has now 
decayed. Nuclear reactor waste and accidental releases such as the Chernobyl accident in the 
Ukraine release some cesium-137 to the environment. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
People may also be externally exposed to the gamma radiation emitted by cesium-137 by 
walking on contaminated sites, coming in contact with waste materials at contaminated sites, 
breathing the air around these sites, and drinking contaminated water. People may also 
unknowingly handle a strong industrial source of Cs-137. 
How can cesium affect my health? 
It is highly unlikely that you would be exposed to high enough amounts of stable cesium to cause 

harmful health effects. 

Like all radionuclides, exposure to radiation from cesium-137 increases the risk of cancer. 

Exposure to large amounts of radioactive cesium can damage cells in your body. In the case of 

very high exposures, you might also experience acute radiation syndrome which includes nausea, 

vomiting, diarrhea, bleeding, coma, and even death. 

Everyone is exposed to very small amounts of cesium-137 in soil and water as a result of 

atmospheric fallout. Exposure to waste materials, from contaminated sites, or from nuclear  

The magnitude of the health risk depends on exposure conditions. These include such factors as 

strength of the source, length of exposure, distance from the source, and whether there was 

shielding between you and the source (such as metal plating). 

How can I reduce my health risk? 
Since cesium is naturally found in the environment, we cannot avoid being exposed to it. 
However, these relatively low amounts do not warrant immediate steps to reduce exposure. 
In the unlikely case that you are exposed to high levels of radioactive cesium because of 
accidental release at a nuclear plant or a nuclear weapon has been detonated, follow the advice of 
public health officials who will publish appropriate guidelines for reducing exposure. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Cobalt 

Radiation Basics – Cobalt 
  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Cobalt does not emit alpha particles. 
;  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Cobalt emits beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Cobalt primarily emits gamma rays. 
What is cobalt? 
Cobalt (chemical symbol Co) is a hard, brittle, gray metal with a bluish tint that is solid under 
normal conditions. Cobalt is similar to iron and nickel in its properties and can be magnetized 
like iron. Cobalt may be stable (non-radioactive, as found in nature), or unstable (radioactive, 
when man-made). The most common radioactive isotope of cobalt is cobalt-60. 
What happens to cobalt when it enters the environment? 
Cobalt enters the environment from natural sources and the burning of coal or oil or the 
production of cobalt alloys. Cobalt cannot be destroyed in the environment. It can only change 
its form or become attached or separated from particles. 
	 In air, cobalt will be associated with particles which will settle to the ground within a 
few days. 
	 In water or soil, cobalt will stick to particles. Some cobalt compounds may dissolve in 
water. 
	 Radioactive decay is the only way of decreasing the amount of radioactive cobalt-60 
in the environment. 
How can people come in contact with cobalt? 
Most exposure to cobalt-60 takes place intentionally during medical tests and treatments. Such 
exposures are carefully controlled to avoid adverse health impacts and to maximize the benefits 
of medical care. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Accidental exposures may occur as the result of loss or improper disposal of medical and 
industrial radiation sources. Though relatively rare, exposure has also occurred by accidental 
mishandling of a source at a metal recycling facility or steel mill.  
Cobalt-60 can also be released to the environment through leaks or spills at nuclear power plants, 
and in solid waste originating from nuclear power plants. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
regulations allow small amounts of cobalt-60 to be released into the air, or poured down drains 
as part of a liquid. 
How can cobalt affect my health? 
External exposure to the gamma radiation from cobalt-60 increases cancer risk. The magnitude 
of the health risk depends on the quantity of Co-60 involved and on exposure conditions: 
  length of exposure 
  distance from the source (for external exposure) 
  whether the cobalt-60 was ingested or inhaled. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
You are unlikely to encounter cobalt-60 unless you undergo certain medical treatments. 
Thorough discussions with your doctor about the amount of exposure and potential alternatives 
allow you to make informed decisions about the relative risks. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Plutonium 

Radiation Basics – Plutonium 
;  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Plutonium primarily emits alpha particles. 
;  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Only a few isotopes of plutonium emit beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Some isotopes of plutonium emit gamma rays. 
What is plutonium? 
Plutonium (chemical symbol Pu) is a radioactive metal with Atomic Number 94. Plutonium is 
considered a man-made element, although scientists have found trace amounts of naturally­
occurring plutonium produced under highly unusual geologic circumstances. The most common 
radioisotopes of plutonium are plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and plutonium-240. 
What happens to plutonium when it enters the environment? 
Plutonium is: 
	 Released to the air, from nuclear reactors weapons production plants, and research 
facilities. 
	 Released to the water from accidental releases and disposal of radioactive wastes. 
	 Deposited on soil from fallout from nuclear weapons testing. 
Plants and vegetation growing in or nearby contaminated soil may take up small amounts of 

plutonium from the soil. 

All isotopes of plutonium undergo radioactive decay. As plutonium decays, it releases radiation 

and forms other radioactive isotopes. For example, Pu-238 emits an alpha particle and becomes 

uranium-234; Pu-239 emits an alpha particle and becomes uranium-235. 

This process happens slowly since the half-lives of plutonium isotopes tend to be relatively long: 

Pu-238 has a half-life of 87.7 years; Pu-239 has a half-life is 24,100 years, and Pu-240 has a 

half-life of 6,560 years. The decay process continues until a stable, non-radioactive element is 

formed. 
OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
How can people come in contact with plutonium? 
Since plutonium levels in the environment are very low, they pose little risk to most people. 
However, residual plutonium from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing is dispersed widely in 
the environment. As a result, virtually everyone comes into contact with extremely small 
amounts of plutonium. 
People who live near nuclear weapons production or testing sites may have increased exposure to 
plutonium, primarily through particles in the air, but possibly from water as well. 
How can plutonium affect my health? 
External exposure to plutonium poses very little health risk, since plutonium isotopes emit alpha 
radiation, and almost no beta or gamma radiation. In contrast, internal exposure to plutonium is 
an extremely serious health hazard. It generally stays in the body for decades, exposing organs 
and tissues to radiation, and increasing the risk of cancer. Plutonium is also a toxic metal, and 
may cause damage to the kidneys. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
Since plutonium levels in the environment are very low, they pose little risk to most people. 
Plutonium particles in dust are the greatest concern, because they pose the greatest health risk. 
People living near government weapons facilities can track radiation monitoring data made 
available by site personnel. If radiation levels rise, they should follow the radiation protection 
instructions given by site personnel. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Radium 

Radiation Basics – Radium 
;  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Radium emits alpha particles. 
  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Radium does not emit beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Radium emits gamma rays as it decays. 
What is radium? 
Radium (chemical symbol Ra) is a naturally-occurring radioactive metal. Its most common 
isotopes are radium-226, radium 224, and radium-228. Radium is a radionuclide formed by the 
decay of uranium and thorium in the environment. It occurs at low levels in virtually all rock, 
soil, water, plants, and animals. All isotopes of radium are radioactive. 
What happens to radium when it enters the environment? 
Radium decays in the environment to produce radon. 
	 Radium can be found in air. 
	 Radium is soluble in water. As a result, groundwater in areas where concentrations of 
radium are high in surrounding bedrock typically has relatively high radium content. 
Uranium mining results in higher levels of radium in nearby water. 
	 Radium is present at very low levels in rocks and soil and may attach to those 
materials. 
	 Radium is constantly being produced by the decay of uranium and thorium. 
	 Plants and vegetation may take up radium from the soil. 
	 Radium may concentrate in fish and other aquatic animals. 
How can people come in contact with radium? 
Since radium is present at low levels in the natural environment, everyone has some minor 
exposure to it. Individuals may be exposed to higher levels of radium if they live in an area 
where there are high levels of radium in rock and soil. Private well water in such areas can also 
be an added source of radium. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
The concentration of radium in drinking water is generally low, but some regions have higher 
concentrations due to geologic sources. Radium concentrations in food and air are believed to be 
very low. 
People can also be exposed to radium if it is released into the air from the burning of coal or 
other fuels. Working in a uranium mine or in a plant that processes ores can lead to higher 
exposures. Phosphate rocks typically contain relatively high levels of both uranium and radium 
and can raise exposures in phosphate mining areas. 
The greatest health risk from radium in the environment is its decay product, radon, which can 
collect in buildings. 
How can radium affect my health? 
Long-term exposure to radium increases the risk of developing several diseases. Inhaled or 
ingested radium increases the risk of developing such diseases as lymphoma, bone cancer, and 
diseases that affect the formation of blood, such as leukemia and aplastic anemia. These effects 
usually take years to develop. 
External exposure to radium's gamma radiation increases the risk of cancer to varying degrees in 
all tissues and organs. 
However, the greatest health risk from radium is from exposure to its radioactive decay product 
radon. It is common in many soils and can collect in homes and other buildings. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
The most effective way to protect yourself and your family is to test your home for radium's 
decay product, radon. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Strontium 

Radiation Basics – Strontium 
  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Strontium does not emit alpha particles. 
;  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Strontium emits beta particles. 
  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Strontium does not emit gamma rays. 
What is strontium? 
Strontium (chemical symbol Sr) is a silvery metal that rapidly turns yellowish in air. Strontium is 
a naturally occurring element found in rocks, soil, dust, coal, and oil. Naturally-occurring 
strontium is not radioactive and is referred to as stable strontium. Strontium can also exist as 
several radioactive isotopes. The most common, strontium-90, is formed in nuclear reactors or 
during the explosion of nuclear weapons. Sr-90 is the most important radioactive isotope in the 
environment. 
What happens to strontium when it enters the environment? 
	 Radioactive decay is the only way of decreasing the amount of Sr-90 in the 
environment. 
	 In air, stable strontium is present as dust which eventually settles over land and water. 
	 Stable strontium dissolves in water. 
	 Stable strontium in soil can dissolve in water and move deeper in the soil to 
underground water. 
	 Plants and vegetation growing in or nearby contaminated soil may take up small 
amounts of from the soil. 
How can people come in contact with Stontium-90? 
Strontium-90 was widely dispersed in the 1950s and 1960s in fallout from the atmospheric 
testing of nuclear weapons. It has been slowly decaying since then so current levels from these 
tests are very low. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Sr-90 is also found in waste from nuclear reactors. It is considered one of the more hazardous 
constituents of nuclear wastes. The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant introduced a 
large amount of Sr-90 into the environment. A large part of the Sr-90 was deposited in the Soviet 
Republics. The rest was dispersed as fallout over Northern Europe and worldwide. No significant 
amount of Sr-90 reached the United States.  
Everyone is exposed to small amounts of Sr-90, since it is widely dispersed in the environment 
and the food chain. Dietary intake of Sr-90, however, has steadily fallen over the last 30 years 
with the suspension of nuclear weapons testing. 
People who live near or work in nuclear facilities may have increased exposure to strontium-90. 
The greatest concern would be the exposures from an accident at a nuclear reactor, or an accident 
involving high-level radioactive waste. 
How can strontium affect my health? 
Strontium-90 is chemically similar to calcium, and tends to deposit in bone and blood forming 
tissue (bone marrow). Thus, Sr-90 is referred to as a "bone seeker." Internal exposure to Sr-90 is 
linked to bone cancer, cancer of the soft tissue near the bone, and leukemia. Risk of cancer 
increases depending on the concentration of Sr-90 in the environment and on the exposure 
conditions: time, distance, shielding and ingestion. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
Strontium-90 dispersed in the environment, like that from atmospheric weapons testing, is 
essentially impossible to avoid. You may also be exposed to tiny amounts from nuclear power 
reactors and certain government facilities. The more serious risk to you (though it is unlikely), is 
that you may unwittingly encounter an industrial instrument containing a Sr-90 radiation source. 
This situation is more likely if you work in specific industries: 
  scrap metal sorting, sales and brokerage 
  metal melting and casting 
  municipal and fill operations 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Thorium 

Radiation Basics – Thorium 
;  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Thorium is an alpha emitter. 
  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Thorium does not emit beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose a 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Thorium emits gamma rays. 
What is thorium? 
Thorium is a naturally-occurring radioactive metal found at low levels in soil, rocks, water, 
plants, and animals; and, is solid under normal conditions. It has several different isotopes, both 
natural and man-made, all of which are radioactive. In general, naturally-occurring thorium 
exists in the form of either thorium-232, -230, or -228. However, thorium-229 is man-made. 
What happens to thorium when it enters the environment? 
Natural thorium is present in very small quantities in virtually all rock, soil, water, plants and 
animals. Where high concentrations occur in rock, thorium may be mined and refined, producing 
waste products such as mill tailings. If not properly controlled, wind and water can introduce the 
tailings into the wider environment. Commercial and federal facilities that have processed 
thorium may also have released thorium to the air, water, or soil.  
Man-made thorium isotopes are rare, and almost never enter the environment. 
How can people come in contact with thorium? 
Since thorium is naturally present in the environment, people are exposed to tiny amounts in air, 
food and water. The amounts are usually very small and pose little health hazard.  
Thorium is used to make ceramics, gas lantern mantles, welding rods, camera and telescope 
lenses, and metals used in the aerospace industry and in nuclear reactions. Thorium can also be 
used as a fuel for generating nuclear energy. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Most people are not exposed to dangerous levels of thorium. However, people who live near 
thorium mining areas or near certain government or industrial facilities may have increased 
exposure to thorium, especially if their water is from a private well.  
How can thorium affect my health? 
Studies have shown that inhaling thorium dust causes an increased risk of developing lung 
cancer and cancer of the pancreas. Bone cancer risk is also increased because thorium may be 
stored in bone. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
Most people are not exposed to dangerous levels of thorium. However, people who live near 
thorium mining areas or near certain government or industrial facilities may have increased 
exposure to thorium, especially if their water is from a private well.  
Analytical laboratories can test water for thorium content. Occasionally, household items may be 
found with thorium in them, such as some older ceramic wares in which uranium was used in the 
glaze, or gas lantern mantles. These generally do not pose serious health risks, but may 
nevertheless be retired from use as a prudent avoidance measure.  
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov  OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
Radiation Quick Facts 
Uranium 

Radiation Basics – Uranium 
;  Alpha Particles - can be stopped by thin layers of light materials, such as a sheet of paper, 
and pose no direct or external radiation threat; can pose a serious health threat if inhaled or 
ingested (swallowed). Uranium primarily emits alpha particles. 
  Beta Particles - can be stopped by aluminum; can pose a serious direct or external 
radiation threat; can be lethal depending on dose received; can pose a serious health threat if 
inhaled or ingested. Uranium does not emit beta particles. 
;  Gamma Rays - can be slowed or stopped by very dense materials such as lead; can pose 
cancer risk to all organs from direct external exposure and can pose a serious health threat 
internally if inhaled or swallowed; have high energy and a short wave length; travel at the 
speed of light and can cover hundreds to thousands of meters in air and pass through many 
kinds of materials, including human tissue. Uranium emits weak gamma rays. 
What is uranium? 
Uranium (chemical symbol U) is a naturally-occurring radioactive element, with atomic number 
92. Uranium is commonly found in very small amounts in rocks, soil, water, plants, and animals 
(including humans). When refined, uranium is a silvery-white metal. Uranium is weakly 
radioactive and contributes to low levels of natural background radiation in the environment. 
Uranium found naturally has 3 different isotopes, U-238, U-235, and U-234. Other isotopes can 
be synthesized. All uranium isotopes are radioactive. 
What happens to uranium when it enters the environment? 
Uranium is present naturally in virtually all soil, rock and water. Uranium in soil and rocks is 
distributed throughout the environment by wind, rain and geologic processes. Rocks weather and 
break down to form soil, and soil can be washed by water and blown by wind, moving uranium 
into streams and lakes, and ultimately settling out and reforming as rock. Uranium can also be 
removed and concentrated by people through mining and refining. These mining and refining 
processes produce wastes such as mill tailings which may be introduced back into the 
environment by wind and water if they are not properly controlled. Manufacturing of nuclear 
fuel, and other human activities also release uranium to the environment. 
All uranium isotopes are radioactive. The three natural uranium isotopes found in the 
environment, U-234, U-235, and U-238, undergo radioactive decay by emission of an alpha 
particle accompanied by weak gamma radiation. The dominant isotope, U-238, forms a long 
series of decay products that includes the key radionuclides radium-226, and radon-222. The 
decay process continues until a stable, non-radioactive decay product is formed (see uranium 
decay series). The release of radiation during the decay process raises health concerns. OSC Radiological Response Guidelines 
How can people come in contact with uranium? 
A person can be exposed to uranium by inhaling dust in air, or ingesting water and food. The 
general population is exposed to uranium primarily through food and water. The average daily 
intake of uranium from food ranges from 0.07 to 1.1 micrograms per day. The amount of 
uranium in air is usually very small. People who live near federal government facilities that made 
or tested nuclear weapons, or facilities that mine or process uranium ore or enrich uranium for 
reactor fuel, may have increased exposure to uranium. 
How can uranium affect my health? 
About 99 percent of the uranium ingested in food or water will leave a person's body in the feces, 
and the remainder will enter the blood. Most of this absorbed uranium will be removed by the 
kidneys and excreted in the urine within a few days. A small amount of the uranium in the 
bloodstream will deposit in a person's bones, where it will remain for years.  
The greatest health risk from large intakes of uranium is toxic damage to the kidneys, because, in 
addition to being weakly radioactive, uranium is a toxic metal. Uranium exposure also increases 
your risk of getting cancer due to its radioactivity. Since uranium tends to concentrate in specific 
locations in the body, risk of cancer of the bone, liver cancer, and blood diseases (such as 
leukemia) are increased. Inhaled uranium increases the risk of lung cancer. 
How can I reduce my health risk? 
Most people are not exposed to dangerous levels of uranium. However, people who live near 
uranium mining areas, or near government weapons facilities or certain industrial facilities may 
have increased exposure to uranium, especially if their water is from a private well. Analytical 
laboratories can test water for uranium content. Occasionally, household wares may be found 
with uranium in them, such as some older ceramic dishes or plates in which uranium was used in 
the glaze. These generally do not pose serious health risks, but may nevertheless be retired from 
use as a prudent avoidance measure. A radiation counter is required to confirm if ceramics 
contain uranium. 
Other Radiation Resources 
Visit the URLs listed below for additional information on radiation related issues.  
  Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry 
www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaq.html 
  Department of Homeland Security 
www.ready.gov/radiation.html 
  Department of Energy                                                                                      
www.doe.gov 
  Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/radiation.html 
  Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
www.crcpd.org 
For more information contact EPA’s Radiological Emergency Response Program 
Website: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/index.html 
E-mail: radiation.questions@epa.gov 